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Introduction
“It is in Africa that the future of the world is being played out, because it is in Africa in particular
where the…forces that have yet to make their contribution are found: wealth in economic terms,
and wealth in human terms” –Michel Camdessus (Managing Director of the IMF, Jan 19, 2000).

Africa as an underdeveloped and catastrophic geopolitical space inhabited by victims of
economic, natural, and political crisis is a pervasive trope that exists not only in the global
media, but is reinforced through the academy. There is no shortage of references to some facet
of African existence as being in crisis, either in education, agriculture, politics, economics, or
environment. Similarly, Melinda Smith compiled a collection of academic articles addressing the
need to move Beyond the African Tragedy (2006). Or, as Siba Grovogui points out,
Africa’ has emerged to the large Western public yet again as a metaphor for a number of
evils: failed states, AIDS, poverty, corruption, and ‘fratricide’. The multiplicity of these
signs of evil and despair allows for multiple allusions to race without the inconvenience
of falling prey to a natural-history ontology of race, civilization, and culture, particularly in
relation to supposed regional performances and ethics (Grovogui 2001, 426).
The continent’s failures are cemented in the need for development. The dominant
understanding of development in Africa exists within a framework of poverty reduction and
economic growth (Gelb 2000). In accordance with this view, Africa can finally begin contributing
to the world once the continent starts to develop economically and socially.
This dissertation progresses with the latent assumption that Africa has already
contributed and continues to contribute to the world through its human and natural resources.
Through European colonialism, imperialism, Cold War political maneuverings, structural
adjustments, and globalization, Africa has made considerable contributions to the “so called”
developed world. And through the legacies of these exploitative processes it continues to do so.
This particular assumption runs counter to the dominant claims of Africa as providing the world
with little more than a philanthropist’s dream, through its need for constant intervention.
However, if one were to take up the presupposition that Africa has not yet made any global
contributions and remains in a perpetual crisis, the next logical question is, who or what is
1

responsible for impeding progress on the continent? Furthermore, whose interest does it serve
to describe Africa in such pejorative terms? Throughout this dissertation, I illustrate how the
answers to these questions are embedded in the discursive practices of the current
development paradigm. One of the arguments that I advance in this dissertation is that the
contemporary development paradigm is predicated on the demand that African countries own
their development. The dominant definition of ownership comes from the Organization of
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) High-Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness as
“a developing country governments’ abilities to exercise leadership over their development
policies and strategies and co-ordinate development actions” (OECD 2011, 29). However, the
call for ownership dates back to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund’s (IMF)
imposition of Structural adjustments in Africa.
The origins and importance of “ownership”
Ownership of development, country ownership, ownership of adjustment policies, or
simply ownership comes from the Bank and IMF’s legitimacy crisis that emerges in the wake of
its imposition of neoliberal development in the 1990s. Neoliberal development pertains to
structuring and conditioning of political and social entities around the market so that progress in
these areas is understood in predominantly economic terms. Accordingly, neoliberal
development entails the state implementing a constellation of policies that should lead to
individuals having the freedoms to participate in domestic and global markets. A neoliberal state
does not interfere with the market, as neoliberal theory purports that government failure is worse
than market failure (Harvey 2005). In the 1980s and 1990s, the World Bank and IMF proposed a
neoliberal model of development for Africa (and the rest of the global South) that made stateadoption of neoliberal policies a condition for continued access to concessional loans. During
this same time period, many African states were experiencing crises in their economic sectors
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for a variety of reasons (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999) including global shocks and government
spending.
In order to stabilize their economies, African states borrowed heavily from the IMF and
World Bank to avoid borrowing from private banks, which would provide loans with interest at
market rates. From the IMF and World Bank, African governments could acquire concessional
loans, or loans with little to no interest and extended periods for debt-repayment. In exchange
for these loans, the two Bretton Woods Institutions (the IMF and World Bank) required African
governments to implement a host of neoliberal development policies. Primarily, African
governments had to privatize state-owned enterprises, liberalize their borders, and essentially
integrate into the global market on the IMF and World Bank’s terms (Harvey 2005; Owusu 2003;
Portes 1997). Although there was some variation across the recommended policies, the
predominate policy prescriptions sought to increase GDP growth, which became synonymous
with development, through an unleashing of market forces (Harvey 2005; Pons-Vignon and
Segatti 2013). Not only did these policies not lead to sustained economic growth for many
African countries, but they also destroyed post-independence gains in the social sectors.
As the institutional manifestations of neoliberal development, the World Bank and IMF
shouldered a considerable amount of the responsibility for the reversals in social progress that
took place on the African continent and in Latin America throughout this period. Needing to
remain legitimate institutions capable of solving development problems, the Bank and IMF
proceeded to design a development paradigm that would not only prevent the institutions from
ever taking responsibility for underdevelopment in Africa again, but also ensure that the IMF and
World Bank would remain inexorable fixtures in Africa; they accomplished this twin feat through
the call for more ownership in Africa.
In the context of today’s development scheme for Africa, ownership has become
paramount for any type of development success and has been taken up by a wide range of
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members in the international community. Giving a speech in Busan, Korea, then Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton argued,
We need to get serious about what we mean when we talk about country ownership of
development strategies. Let’s be clear, too often, donors’ decisions are driven more by
our own political interests or our policy preferences or development orthodoxies than by
our partners’ needs. But now our partners have access to evidence-based analysis and
best practices, so they can better decide what will work for them. We have to be willing
to follow their lead (United States Government 2012b, 5)
The language of ownership also permeates the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
In a speech on the sustainable development agenda in Africa in July 2016, the Administrator of
the United Nation’s Development Programmed (UNDP), Helen Clark noted,
Broad coalitions around the SDGs are needed to leverage stakeholders’ strengths, build
synergies, and promote national ownership. Government leadership and commitment to
the SDGs is vital, but it is insufficient on its own. To achieve the SDGs, there will need to
be engagement across civil society, the private sector, philanthropy, multilateral
institutions, and development partners as appropriate (Clark 2016, n.p. emphasis mine).
In the story of Africa’s tragic existence in relation to the West, foreign aid donors are the
protagonists for progress, assisting struggling African civil societies in their futile attempts to
check predatory African states that hamper economic, political, and social progress. Headlines
like, “Malawi Leader Hails World Bank for $70m Support to MASAF 4” and “Germany’s ‘Marshall
Plan’ for Africa” are not uncommon headlines that reinforce the depiction of foreign aid as a
saving grace for the continent (Pelz 2017; Nyasa Times 2017). The positioning of donors as an
indispensable part of Africa’s development is also cemented in the international call for
ownership. But what if aid and development were the source of underdevelopment?
The idea that foreign aid is responsible for truncating economic and political
progress in Africa is not novel (Dijkstra 2015; Hydén 2011; Kinsella and Brehony 2009; Van de
Walle and Ndulo 2014). Dambisa Moyo’s widely-cited, Dead Aid (2009) criticizes foreign aid for
creating a culture of dependency in Africa. William Easterly takes umbrage at the inefficiencies
that characterize the delivery of aid in places like Africa under the auspices of grand
development plans (2006; Easterly and Pfutze 2008). However, these scholars and other critics

4

of foreign aid often still conform to the notion of development; they just do not think that aid will
help reach these ends. This dissertation explores not the question of aid effectiveness, but
rather the consequences when the tacit power politics that inform aid are effective.
This dissertation critically analyzes the ways in which the discourses and practices of
ownership of development materialize in Africa. The two dominant questions guiding this
dissertation are: 1) what is ownership of development; and, 2) how does it operate in the African
context? More specifically, I examine what I call the ownership paradigm in Burkina Faso and
Kenya. The ownership paradigm refers to the language, principles, tools, and strategies inter
alia that come from the World Bank, and is subsequently reinforced through the Organization of
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) High-Level Forums. The story of ownership
as it unfolds in these two distinct African contexts makes clear how rooted the paradigm is in
questions of accountability for Africa’s limited progress towards the achievement of international
development benchmarks. Despite rhetoric suggesting that the international call for more
ownership indicates a shift in the neoliberal development associated with structural adjustments,
ownership merely allows for a continuation of neoliberal development in Africa, but without the
possibility to hold donors accountable.
Critically exploring the ownership paradigm highlights the ways in which donors,
especially the World Bank, maintain a degree of power over the political and economic
trajectories of African states and societies.1 While there remain other examples of conflict
between donors and African states under the ownership paradigm, like disagreement over
policy implementation (as I demonstrate with Kenya), by accepting the ownership principles,
African development stakeholders and Western donors no longer disagree over the strategy
and end-goals of development. By consenting to these policies, African development
stakeholders accept responsibility for Africa’s underdevelopment and foreclose the possibility of

1

As I mention later, although the IMF was a part of the legitimacy crisis and thus perpetuates ownership as necessary for
development, the World Bank was the primary architect of the paradigm.
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addressing the history of exploitation that has contributed to the continent’s inability to develop
according to international metrics for progress. Adopting the principles and practices of the
ownership paradigm also requires Africans to enter the paradigm as underdeveloped.
Throughout this dissertation I will demonstrate the ways in which the ownership
paradigm clearly dictates who can produce development knowledge (as this process has
already taken place before reaching the domestic level) and who is responsible for carrying it
out. African governments and civil society are not producers of development knowledge; they
are merely responsible for carrying it out. This is evident in the widely circulated phrase that
accompanies ownership: “governments are in the driver’s seat”. This phrase reappears several
times in the Kenyan case central to this dissertation. For instance, while conducting an interview
with a government official in the Kenyan Treasury in June of 2013, I noticed a sign on the office
wall that said, “Donors want governments in the drivers’ seat, but they want to hold on to the
road map.” Taking a moment to unpack this phrase, the implementer and the knower of
development become clear. Drivers merely follow the rules and sanctioned roads that have
already been established. The average driver had no say in where to pave a new road or put up
a new stop sign. There is also the possibility that the driver is only a chauffer, taking direction
from an employer. In the end, being in the driver’s seat does not immediately translate into
African countries having power over their development possibilities, as the approved roads have
already been paved. More important than being behind the wheel or even holding the map, is
designing the map. The map indicates the legitimate courses and avenues that one can take to
reach a destination. But the map is also a site of power and privilege. Exploring ownership in
Africa shows that African governments are certainly in the drivers’ seats, but donors have
designed the road map.
Much of the consent that donors acquire over African development comes from a
paradigm that positions donors as an epistemic community for all things development-related
(Haas 1989). As an epistemic community of development experts, donors are most essential
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under the pretext of a crisis. In other words, donor advice and presence in African development
policy-making is most incontrovertible when African governments and societies fear that their
development is in critical condition. Africa as a tragedy in perpetuity, results in the need for an
epistemic community. The interminable crisis in African development, and need for ownership,
also allow for the institutionalization of donors in the domestic policy-making spheres of aiddependent African countries. This process is facilitated through the designation of donors as
“development partners”. Although the ownership paradigm proposes country-specific
approaches to development, my dissertation illustrates how the paradigm actually forecloses the
possibility for genuinely African-specific development to the extent that it does not conform to
the dictates of neoliberal development.
In order to answer the two questions guiding this research, I employ a range of
qualitative methods. I draw heavily on data from seventy-five primary interviews that I conducted
with government official, donors, and civil society organizations in both Burkina Faso and Kenya
in the summer of 2013, 2015 and winter of 2016, along with participant observations carried out
during the same period. I also analyze primary source policy documents from three
stakeholders groups: donors, government, and civil society. I supplement the interviews and
policy documents with analysis of speeches and public interviews from donors operating within
the ownership paradigm. I use the data from all of these sources to analyze the evolution of
discourses and practices that the ownership paradigm produces in Africa.
There are some limitations within this study. Although I attempted to keep the data
collection process as similar as possible in both countries, the realities of conducting fieldwork
led to several discrepancies. The interviews and participant observations from Burkina Faso
come from three different cities: Tenkodogo, Ouagadougou, and Koudougou, while I was only
able to conduct interviews with government and civil society representatives in one site in
Kenya, namely Nairobi. The data from Burkina Faso is thus more representative of a wider
range of development stakeholders in Burkina Faso than in Kenya. To supplement the Nairobi-
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based perspective, I thus draw on more diverse data (i.e. interviews and policy documents) in
the Kenya chapter.
This dissertation makes contributions to debates in political economy. To understand
what ownership of development is and how it operates in the African context is to expose the
matrix that allows for the incorporation of international ideas (under the auspices of irrefutable
knowledge) into the domestic sphere. I further pinpoint the key decision-makers in African
politics and the mechanisms through which they influence development. In many ways, this
dissertation is a critique of the ways in which the quest for a particular form of development in
Africa exposes the continent to a range of epistemic experiments. Neoliberal development, as
one such experiment, further constitutes the African development stakeholder as
underdeveloped while constituting donors as the bearers of development knowledge. Instead of
development conforming to specific African cultural contexts, it is the other way around: African
societies must conform to development. In understanding development as societies ability to
identify problems and find lasting solutions to those problems, sustainable and genuine
development must come from the people. This rendering of development allows for a multiplicity
of possibilities not dependent on donors being the sole bearers of knowledge.

Dissertation Summary
Chapter one provides a review of the relevant literature, theoretical contributions, and more
detailed explanation of my methodology. In this chapter, I explain how ownership constitutes a
development paradigm that does not mark a significant break with the hegemonic paradigm that
characterized development in Africa in the 1980s and 1990s. The chapter also provides an
overview of the current literature on ownership, as scholars have explored the concept using a
range of theoretical lenses, and explains why I believe ownership is best understood as a
paradigm. I then further justify my case selection and theoretical assumptions that undergird this
study.
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Chapter two presents the first empirical case study of Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso
represents a case in which all development stakeholders have fully adopted the ownership
principles under the pretense of there being a Faustian-type bargain between the government
and donors. Although the government and civil society organizations recognize that donors
continue to heavily influence the country’s development trajectory, Burkinabè stakeholders view
themselves as underdeveloped and lacking the necessary resources to reach development.
Donors, although intrusive, provide Burkina with the necessary epistemic and financial
resources to achieve development. The Burkina Faso case also demonstrates the way in which
the ownership paradigm constrains development choices at the local level. I provide the
example of family planning in Burkina Faso. At the local level, health agents in Burkina Faso
use shaming methods in an attempt to change men and women’s attitudes towards the adoption
of modern family planning methods (namely birth control and the spacing of births) despite
obvious resistance to this type of family planning.
Chapter three lays out Kenya as the second empirical case. Kenya is another African
country that has taken up the ownership paradigm for its development ends. The Kenyan
government, although displaying a mastery of the development lexis along with expressed
commitment to the principles, remains in a paternalistic relationship with donors. Donors
consider the Kenyan government’s lack of ownership to be a consequence of implementation
problems on the part of the government. Instead of viewing the lack of implementation as
demonstrative of flaws in the ownership paradigm, donors view it as emblematic of a longer
history of donors’ own battles with the government to implement policies.
The fourth chapter comparatively analyzes the findings from the two case studies. The
chapter demonstrates how ownership reproduces the underdeveloped subject in Burkina Faso
and Kenya, but through different means. It also explores the construction of donors as an
epistemic community, and the absolution of donors from any responsibility for development
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failures. Chapter four also explores the different conceptualizations of ownership that come from
both countries and offers an historical institutionalist explanation for their divergence.
The dissertation concludes with a discussion of the consequences of my findings, namely
Africans being increasingly dependent on donors for development. The conclusion also posits
alternative frameworks to development derived from different African contexts that provide a
feasible alternative to ownership.

10

Chapter 1: Theorizing Ownership in Africa
“What the new [IMF-World Bank] paradigm seems to be principally about getting African
governments to accept, implement, and legitimate policies made in Europe and North America
largely in the interest of Western banks” James Ferguson (2009, 83)
“Given high levels of aid dependency in most of Africa, promoting African ‘ownership’ of the
policy process is not a straightforward matter” Fantu Cheru (2006, 357).

In the African context, ownership produces development outcomes that run counter to
global development goals. The ownership paradigm reproduces the underdeveloped subject,
and donor-dependency that surpasses financial aid to the level of epistemic dependency.
Through discursive practices, the ownership paradigm produces the need for more and not less
development in Africa.
The assumptions guiding the analysis of ownership throughout this dissertation are
predicated on ownership being a paradigmatic framework for international development. By
referring to ownership as a paradigm, I am arguing that there are a range of relatively consistent
ideas, methods, theories, commitments, approaches, and beliefs that together construct a
particular reality associated with ownership as a model for development (Geddes 2003; Kuhn
1970, 2012). According to Geddes, paradigms determine “which facts are theoretically salient;
defining what constitutes a paradox and what questions urgently require answers; identifying
which cases need to be examined and what kinds of evidence are considered meaningful”
(Geddes 2003, 7). Paradigms can collapse, usually based on the internal inconsistencies of the
theory or the paradigm’s inability to grapple with the unfolding of real world events. Often, it is
not that the evidence was new, causing the paradigm to collapse, but that scholars failed to
notice or take the evidence into consideration.
The origins of ownership lay in the ruins of the development paradigm grounded in
formal structural adjustment programs, otherwise known as SAPs. The story of structural
adjustments and their limitations in Africa during the late 1980s and 1990s is one that scholars
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have retold in various ways and in extensive details ( See Ali 1998; Chikulo 1997; Easterly
2005; Konadu-Agyemang 2000; Lugalla 1995; Rono 2002; Kaiser 1996; Mkandawire and
Soludo 1999; Vavrus 2005). The adjustment of macroeconomic policies and the associated
political reforms that donors enforced on African governments and societies became known as
the Washington Consensus.2 This development paradigm assumed a universal approach to,
and understanding of, progress. After a series of global events in the 1990s, the policies and
programs associated with SAPs came under considerable scrutiny.3 Activists around the world
led protests against the neoliberal economic policies that characterized the Bretton Woods
Institutions’ reforms (Broad 2002).
Eventually, critiques of the Bank and IMF began to come directly from American
policymakers in Washington. For example, the Bush administration made efforts to defund the
World Bank and began giving more leverage to bilateral development interventions through the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Millennium Challenge Accounts
(MCA) to promote neoliberal policies (Engler 2011). Both the World Bank and the IMF
experienced a crisis of legitimacy as institutions and required public facelifts (Kosack, Ranis,
and Vreeland 2004; Stone 2011). The “crisis” of global poverty became the central focus of the
Bank’s interventions in the late 1990s.4 Although the IMF was also subject to the criticisms and
attempts to reinvent itself (Stone 2011), I focus specifically in this dissertation on the World
Bank’s experiences, as it has mobilized the language of poverty and ownership as its dominant
goal. The IMF continues to express its open commitment to macroeconomic stability, even if it
clashes with poverty objectives (Boughton 2003). The World Bank responded to the global

2 The Washington Consensus refers to the constellation of neoliberal development policies coming from the World Bank and IMF,
both located on 14th Street in Washington D.C. that would lead to an economic and political liberalization (Williamson 1993)
3
Two examples of such events are the Mexican Tequila Crisis of 1994 which represents a country that followed dogmatically the
policy recommendations from both institutions and the rise of the Asian Tigers in South East Asia, which represented countries that
strayed from the universal policy recommendations undergirding structural adjustments and adopted more context-specific
economic policies for development (Rodrik 2008).
4
Around the same time as the Bank’s renewed focus on poverty, then President James Wolfensohn (who was also responsible for
elaborating the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) published a treatise titled “The Other Crisis”, in which he articulates
that there are a staggering number of people living below the poverty line around the world. The response to this crisis is a global
commitment with the backing of the World Bank and other development institutions, to rid the world of extreme poverty (Wolfensohn
1998).
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critiques with the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF)—a “novel” approach to
fighting global poverty.
The World Bank launched the CDF in January of 1999 as a more holistic approach to
development and poverty reduction. CDF entailed four principles: 1) development strategies
should be long-term and comprehensive; 2) each country should own its own development
strategy with input from its citizens; 3) there should be partnership between all development
stakeholders including government, civil society, donors, and the private sector; 4) development
outcomes and performance should be based on measurable results.5 Alongside the CDF, the
Bank designed the skeleton for every country’s long-term and holistic development approach—
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). In a joint note, then presidents of the World Bank,
James Wolfensohn, and IMF, Stanley Fischer, articulated the vision and overlap between
PRSPs and the CDF,
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is based on CDF principles. It integrates
poverty reducing policies into a coherent, growth oriented macroeconomic framework.
As with CDF, national governments are responsible for the preparation of PRSPs with
the participation of domestic and external partners…Thus, the PRSP is an operational
vehicle—which can be a specific output of the CDF or of processes based on CDF
principles—that is intended to translate a country’s poverty reduction strategy into a
focused action plan (Wolfensohn and Fischer 2000, n.p.).
Although the institutions toted PRSPs and CDF as voluntary, drafting a Bank and IMF-approved
PRSP was a condition for accessing funds through the heavily indebted poor countries initiative
(HIPC).6 The joint note states, “A PRSP must be broadly endorsed by the Bank and Fund
Boards to provide a basis for both institutions’ programs in low income countries, and for
countries to obtain debt relief under the HIPC Initiative” (Wolfensohn and Fischer 2000, n.p.).
The CDF principles and PRSP approach by themselves do not constitute the ownership

These four principles are articulated in a World Bank document titled, “Comprehensive Development Framework” made available
on the Bank’s webpage on January 11, 2014. The permanent URL, http://go.worldbank.org/N2NDBE5QL0 has since ceased to
function.
6
The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) is World Bank and IMF initiative launched in 1996 to provide debt relief and
concessional loans to countries with unmanageable debt. Countries that are eligible for HIPC must produce a World Bank and IMFapproved poverty reduction strategy paper.
5
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paradigm. It was not until the larger international community added to, adopted, and proliferated
these principles that they became paradigmatic.
OECD High-Level Fora
In 2003, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) began a series
of High Level Fora to discuss increasing the effectiveness of foreign aid. The fora came as a
response to mounting criticism of foreign aid’s inability to produce its intended aims—
modernized development. Easterly and Williamson note, “Despite the transfer of over $4.6
trillion in gross official development assistance (ODA) to developing countries from 1960
through 2008, a substantial amount of the world remains in extreme poverty and stagnant
growth”(Easterly and Williamson 2011, 1930). Similarly, Dambisa Moyo argues, “But has more
than US$1 trillion in development assistance over the last several decades made African people
better off? No. In fact, across the globe the recipients of this aid are worse off; much worse off”
(Moyo 2009, 2). The four OECD high-level fora, which took place in Rome (2003), Paris (2005),
Accra (2008), and Busan (2011), established a set of principles for ameliorating aid practices,
including donor-government relations, in efforts to reach the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs).7 These high-level fora were a direct response to the global critiques of aid
effectiveness.
By the 2005 meeting in Paris, members of the international community came to a
consensus on the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, hereinafter referred to as the Paris
Declaration. This document articulates the five principles for improving aid effectiveness:
ownership, alignment, harmonization, results, and mutual accountability (Paris Declaration
2012). Ownership, as with the CDF, is the dominant principle, which leads to realization of the
subsequent principles. The OECD defines ownership as “a developing country governments’

The MDGs are another aspect of the post-Washington Consensus era. MDGs are the product of the UN’s millennial resolution to
halve global poverty by the year 2015. The initiative has come to dominate all facets of international development. The OECD highlevel forums have seized the initiatives as integral why aid’s effectiveness must improve. Every country receiving OECD aid must
domesticate the eight MDGs.
7
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abilities to exercise leadership over their development policies and strategies and co-ordinate
development actions” (OECD 2011, 29). Because ownership means that governments are
coordinating development actions, they should, ideally, be responsible for making sure donors
align with the country’s development objectives, harmonize with government systems,
implement and evaluate programs, and hold donors accountable. The Paris Declaration also
outlined the ways in which the international development community would measure
ownership—through PRSPs.
Although the general requirement for ownership is that countries have their own
operational development strategy, the requirements for what is considered an operational
development strategy map directly onto the PRSP framework. Operational development
strategies refer to an authoritative countrywide development policy with a realistic development
strategy that can be funded through linking with budget allocations (OECD 2011). The strategy
must also be tied to a medium term expenditure framework (OECD 2011).
The international development community further reinforced the Paris principles in the
subsequent high-level meeting in Accra, Ghana in 2008. The Accra Agenda for Action (AAA)
outlined development stakeholder’s agreement to “broaden country-level policy dialogue on
development” (OECD 2008, 2). “Developing country governments will take stronger leadership
of their own development policies, and will engage with their parliaments and citizens in shaping
those policies” (OECD 2008, 2). Donors and government officials must include members from
different facets of society at various points in the policy cycle: formulation, approval,
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.
The OECD high-level forums builds on the Bank’s CDF from 1999 and culminate into
what I refer to as the ownership paradigm. Much like CDF, the Paris declaration promotes
principles of long-term development strategy with a poverty-reduction focus; use of a mediumterm expenditure framework; results-oriented development, aid alignment and harmonization
with country systems; and broad inclusion of local stakeholders—all of which can only happen
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through country ownership. Furthermore, the Paris Declaration formally adopted PRSPs, the
Bank’s framework for long-term poverty reduction in aid-dependent countries. The ownership
paradigm also entails a rhetorical shift from the language of donors and aid-recipients to that of
development partners. Despite the Bank being the first to advocate the ownership approach, it
is the Paris Declaration that is often credited with being the source for change towards
ownership in the international architecture (Steinle and Correll 2008; Hyden 2008; Booth 2012;
Gottschalk 2005; Holvoet and Renard 2007). Nevertheless, the ideas, principles, approach and
instruments tied to ownership should indicate a paradigmatic approach to development.
Debate over the paradigm shift
The degree to which Paris and the CDF indicate a new paradigm or a shift from the
previous Washington Consensus paradigm is a point of disagreement in the development
literature. Rodrik (2006), in his article, “Goodbye Washington Consensus, hello Washington
Confusion” proposes that there has been a fundamental shift in the Bank’s development policy
thinking from the era of structural adjustments. Focusing only on the Bank’s policy document
Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform (2006), Rodrik maintains
that not only has there been a move from the monolithic economic policies embedded in the
Washington consensus, but that there is no longer a global consensus on development policies.
Instead, there is the promotion of institutional reforms and those of UN Millennium development
project, which promotes an increase in foreign aid (2005). Rodrik, who also promoted the need
to end the one-size fits all model of economic development (see Rodrik 2008), explains how the
Bank is moving towards this model. Two of the conclusions he draws from the Bank’s document
are that “the broad objectives economic reform-namely market-oriented incentives,
macroeconomic stability, and outward orientation—do not translate into unique set of policy
actions” and “different contexts require different solutions to solving common problems”(Rodrik
2006, 976). These two conclusions would suggest an inability to establish another development

16

paradigm predicated on a monolithic approach to progress. Rodrik is not alone in arguing that
there is enough discontinuity and lack of a paradigm to call the current moment postWashington Consensus (Gereffi 2014; Werner, Bair, and Fernández 2014). Other scholars
suggest that the CDF language of partnership between donors, civil society and government is
what sets it apart from the previous model (Gilbert and Vines 2006). Penders (2001) also views
the CDF as a substantially mutated development framework from the standpoint of ownership
and conditionality. He argues that the ownership principle, although it still requires donor
conditionalities, does so with the intent of brining forth poverty reduction, whereas it was
previously based solely on economic growth (Pender 2001).
For there to be a collapse in any paradigm, the logic and expectations internal to that
paradigm must conflict with reality to such an extent that a series of anomalies arise and the old
paradigm becomes difficult to maintain in the face of mounting contradictions (Geddes 2003; T.
Kuhn 1996). The Mexican and Asian financial crises of the 1990s coupled with limited growth
experienced in African countries that adopted the Washington Consensus are the type of
anomalies that created instability in the pervious development paradigm (Gore 2000; Rodrik
2006; Serra and Stiglitz 2008; Hurt, Knio, and Ryner 2009). However, closer examination of
what the ownership paradigm entails exposes the limited responsibility that donors, especially
the World Bank, assume for the failure of structural adjustments (Cheru 2009; Ferguson 2006). I
argue that there has been less of a shift and more of a circle as the language of ownership is
new rhetoric cloaking old policies.
While acknowledging that there have been some changes between the approaches and
policies of the Washington Consensus and the ownership model, I demonstrate how these
changes are superficial and hence no more than a mutation of the Washington Consensus
development paradigm. For example, poverty reduction is not a novel agenda for the Bank.
When the Bank was undergoing its first legitimacy crisis in the 1960s, former World Bank
president and U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara re-branded the Bank as a global
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institution for poverty reduction (Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye 1995).To the extent that the
language of partnership, harmonization, and alignment are novel, the ends that they serve in
Africa have not changed—placing responsibility for Africa’s inability to progress along a
particular telos on factors autochthonous to Africa (Harper-Shipman, forthcoming).
In order for there to be true reforms in the development paradigm, or a paradigmatic
shift, the West must reckon with its role in exploiting and purging the African continent, which
includes the disastrous consequences of structural adjustments (Harper-Shipman, forthcoming).
As the guiding development institutions, neither the World Bank nor the IMF have done so. In
fact, on numerous occasions, the Bank has suggested that the problem with structural
adjustments was not the policies themselves, but the lack of ownership (Devarajan, Dollar, and
Holmgren 2001).
In the 1994 World Bank report Adjustment in Africa, the institution concluded its
assessment of structural adjustments in Africa by indicating the programs’ failures were due to a
lack of country ownership (Husain and Faruqee 1994). Furthermore, the original language of
ownership referred to structural adjustments (Johnson and Wasty 1993). It is further difficult to
argue that there has been a paradigm shift when top officials at the Bank have also
acknowledged the continuation in policies. In 2013, Shantayanan Devarajan, the former Chief
Economist of the World Bank’s Africa division, gave an interview with the Think Africa Press,
where he argued that “If you look at the programmes of the 2000s and compare them to the
SAP, they are exactly the same…”(Mbom 2013, n.p.). The dominant difference between the two
periods in Africa, he argues, is that the policies are now coming from Bangui and Dakar instead
of Washington D.C. That the policies are now coming from Bangui and Dakar points to Africa’s
consenting to the ownership paradigm. This dissertation argues that it is the discursive nature of
ownership that facilitates this rhetorical shift in development practices.8
8 There is also distinct continuities between the ownership paradigm and the strategies and objectives of modernization theory. The
policy prescriptions and development goals that African stakeholders and donors propose are obviously informed by the
promises of modernization theory. For example, donors continue to promote increased education and economic growth as
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Embedded in the desire to get African countries to engage in the ownership paradigm is
the need not only to legitimize structural adjustments but also to exonerate donors from future
culpability for failed development policies in Africa. In a speech to African leaders in Addis
Ababa in 1998, World Bank President James Wolfensohn stated, “I do not want to come to
another meeting where we talk about World Bank projects. I reject World Bank projects, unless
they are owned by African leadership and the African people, we in the Bank are not going to
participate” (Wolfensohn 2005, 95). And with the end of “World Bank projects” and other donordriven projects it becomes difficult to blame the Bank if projects fail, even though the Bank
provides the epistemic and financial aid. Throughout this dissertation, I unpack the ways in
which the ownership paradigm does not represent a paradigmatic break from the previous
development model, but instead allows donors to continue dictating development goals and
approaches while distancing themselves from any responsibility when these goals are not met.
Furthermore, by extending the teleological ends of development and integrating them within
global development agendas while reconstituting donors as development partners who
contribute “expertise” to development policy, the ownership paradigm reproduces the
underdeveloped subject in Africa. I draw empirical evidence to support my argument from the
health sectors of Burkina Faso and Kenya. I look specifically at family planning policies in
Burkina Faso and the general health sector strategy in Kenya. From within each case, I
demonstrate how consenting to ownership constrains African stakeholders’ development
choices.

Methodology
This dissertation answers two dominant questions: How do development stakeholders in Africa
define ownership and how does ownership operate in the context of contemporary African
development? The dominant method for answering these questions is through a discursive
indispensable factors for social and political development (Pieterse 2010). Much like modernization theory, ownership of
development also entails a break from traditional norms in order to reach development objectives (Bruton 1985). To this end, the
ownership paradigm simply provides a new rhetoric for advancing development and its modernizing agenda.
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triangulation of health policies, documents and interviews. I also employ a discursive analysis of
ownership as it unfolds in Africa. Discourse analysis is the examination of how discourse,
meaning-making tools that exist in society, shape and are shaped by institutions, situations, and
social structures in ways that (re)produce networks of power (Schiffrin, Tannen, and Hamilton
2008; Dijk 2011; Weiss and Wodak 2007). Discourse analysis is useful because it pertains to
the ways in which language produces knowledge and through practice develops meaning (Hall
2006). Because discourse makes claims about meaning and reality, an examination of
ownership’s discursive practices thus allows for an interrogation of sites of power within the
language and practices (both overt and covert) of the dominant development paradigm.
Within development studies, discourse analysis is most associated with the postdevelopment critiques of development (Kirshner and Power 2015; Litonjua 2012; Escobar 2011;
Ferguson 1990). To this end, the discursive practices are inextricable from the source of
knowledge production that acts to legitimize and guide development practices.9
Methodologically, using a discursive analysis to interrogate ownership thus requires an
examination of the language surrounding the origins and practice of ownership in Africa. I
analyze the discourse and practices using the seventy-five original interviews10, donor and
government policy documents and programs produced under the ownership paradigm, and the
nonlinguistic elements through participant observations in both countries. Because I framed my
inquiry as a comparative analysis, I implemented the same process for collecting data in both
countries, to the extent that it was possible.

9

For postdevelopment scholars employing a discourse analysis, the language of development is examined in relation to the
practices of development (Escobar 2011; Ferguson 1990). For example, in arguing that development constitutes a specific
constellation of knowledge and practice, Arturo Escobar analyzes the forms of knowledge that produce the concepts, theories,
subjects and objects of development, the power schemes that normalize development practices, and the forms of subjectivity, i.e.
how people come to view themselves as developed or undeveloped (1995, 10).
10
Despite the many benefits of interviewing, there are also potential limitations when using interviews. A common concern that
follows the argument that I am proposing in this dissertation, is: what if participants are only telling you, the researcher, what they
think you want to hear? Or what if they said that they control, development vis-à-vis donors out of pride and desire to seem as if they
are in control -- when in fact they know they are not? In other words, what if I am the one being duped? This dissertation navigates
this challenging terrain by constructing a set of semi-structured interview questions (see Appendix 1) that are intended to highlight
inconsistencies throughout the responses. For example, if a participant tells me that the government is solely in control of their
development policies, I followed up by asking them to give examples of how the government is in control and by having respondents
discuss what could be evidence indicating the contrary.
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I gather data from seventy-five original semi-structured interviews as well as participant
observation that I conducted in both countries.11 I conducted field research for a total of four
months, two months in Kenya (one month in June 2013 and 5 weeks from December 2015 thru
January 2016) and two months in Burkina Faso from June 2015 through August 2015. From
within the health sectors, I spoke with top-ranking government officials and policymakers in the
Ministries of Health (MoH) and Finance.12 In Kenya I interviewed government officials in the
external resource department (ERD) in the National Treasury. In Burkina Faso, I interviewed
policy makers in la Direction générale de l’économie et de la Planification (DGEP) or the
General Directorate for the economy and planning. The government officials in the ERD and
DGEP were able to speak to their respective country’s economic and national development
strategies and the degree to which donors were involved in elaborating these strategies. These
departments and the MoH represent the government stakeholder under the ownership
paradigm. As previously stated, the ownership paradigm identifies government as the dominant
development actor. While the government’s increasing role in the development realm may
indicate another reason to conclude that there has been a paradigm shift from the Washington
Consensus, when neoliberal policies required a reduced role for the state in the social sectors,
that would be premature. As (Pons-Vignon and Segatti 2013) demonstrate, even under the
Washington Consensus, the state’s role was never reduced as much as it was redirected. Thus,
understanding the African state’s role under this new model helps elucidate the realities and
potential for ownership in Africa, as the postcolonial African state remains the primary decisionmaking apparatus.
The other indispensable stakeholder under the ownership paradigm is the donor. I
interviewed a variety of donors in the two case studies. In Burkina Faso, I spoke with
representatives from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. Peace
University of Connecticut IRB Protocol #H-15-134: “Who Owns Development in Africa?”
In Kenya, the Ministry of Finance is now the National Treasury and in Burkina, the official title is the Ministry of Finance and
Economics (MOFE).
11
12
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Corps, and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). In Kenya, I interviewed
representatives from the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the European
Union, and the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). I spoke with World Bank
representatives in both countries. I focus principally on the World Bank instead of the IMF. I do
so because the Bank is responsible for developing the Poverty Reduction Strategy Approach
and remains the primary arbiter of development policy in the global South (Pender 2001; Rodrik
2006; Ferguson 2006). Admittedly, there is considerable variation across donor organizations
and their aid practices (Easterly and Williamson 2011; Easterly and Pfutze 2008).13
Nevertheless, despite this divergence all of the donors that I interviewed at the very least,
signed on to the Paris Declaration. I supplement these interviews with analysis of donor policies
from Family Planning 2020, a substantial conglomeration of international donors promoting
family planning policies in Africa and the rest of the global South. I also analyze donor-funded
global initiatives such as the International Conference on Population Development (ICPD), the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to
understand international donors’ discourse and policies towards health.
The third key development stakeholder is civil society. In Africa, this concept is a point of
contestation and confusion for scholars. Dominant theorizations of civil society define it as the
distinct sphere that exists independent of the state and the market; this autonomy allows civil
society actors to regulate and place checks on the dominant political and economic institutions,
keeping them from becoming hegemonic (Edwards 2009; Fukuyama 2001; Polanyi 2001).
Development discourse, and thus the ownership paradigm, fully incorporates this understanding
of civil society into its schema (States News Service 2012; Steinle and Correll 2008; World Bank
2000; Declaration 2012; Wood et al. 2008; Fisher and Marquette 2016). This model gives
13

Some of the divergent practices among donors came out in my interviews with donors. Consistently, multilateral donors, and
government officials in Burkina and Kenya listed USAID as being one of the worst organizations to work with in terms of adhering
to the government’s development strategies, not using country systems, and circumventing government to deliver aid. The field of
development economics is also not so monolithic. The economics discourse that I discuss throughout this dissertation pertains to the
dominant development economics discourse that has become institutionalized in international development practices.
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primacy to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to carry out development programs and
deliver services, and act as the government watch dog. Looking at education policies in Burkina
Faso, Kenya, Tanzania, and Mali, Mundy et al. note that under the guise of ownership, “civil
society actors are expected to act as independent watch dogs and critics, as well as
complementary service providers, subcontractors, and partners to government” (Mundy, Cherry,
Haggerty, Maclure, and Sivasubramanian 2007, 2).
The African context highlights two problems with this theorizing of civil society. First, as
an analytical category, civil society does not map neatly on to African realities, illustrating the
limited utility of concept for comparison across spatial, temporal, and cultural context (Comaroff
and Comaroff 1999). Second, even when donors and scholars force the concept onto existing
contexts in postcolonial Africa, one still finds a dearth of possibility for an autonomous civil
socieites (Mbembé 2001; Mamdani 1996; Amutabi 2013). Because the ownership paradigm
heavily implicates civil society in the development process, I interviewed representatives from
civil society organizations such as NGOs, community based organizations, and local
associations. I was able to observe representatives from the local health associations of
Tenkodogo (Burkina Faso) report to the NGOs that funded them regarding local efforts at
implementing the health sector strategy. I was also able to participate in the Economic
Cooperation of West African States’ (ECOWAS) Good Practices Forum in Health from July 29 31, 2015. The Forum’s theme was “Ending Preventable Mother and Child Deaths in West Africa
– What works in Reproductive Health and Family Planning”. Member states from West Africa,
donors including USAID and the World Bank, and civil society associations from across West
Africa presented research on maternal and child health, understood largely as the need to
increase the adoption of family planning methods. In Kenya and Burkina Faso the health sector
continues to receive government funding; however, service delivery occurs predominantly
through NGOs. Examining the sphere of civil society allowed me to examine the ways in which
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ownership percolates through to the everyday activities of Africans and does not stay at the
level of abstract technical development jargon.
I chose Kenya and Burkina Faso as the case studies central to my dissertation because
of their distinct histories with donors, their economic positions within their respective sub regions
of Africa, and for variation across colonial histories.14 Kenya, a strong political player in the East
African region, is notorious for its “hot and cold” relationship with donors; it represents a case in
which government officials and members of civil society attempt to use ownership as a form of
leverage vis-à-vis donor preferences.15 Kenya has also been amenable to market-based
approaches to development since independence. Burkina Faso has remained one of the more
politically stable countries in the region, despite being one of the poorest by GDP standards.16
Unlike Kenya, Burkina Faso experienced a revolutionary period of anti-imperialism and antimarket-driven development from 1983 until 1987. In both of these countries, I use health as a
sectoral backdrop for analyzing development policies.
Understanding the ways in which hegemony of knowledge production plays out in the
health sector is crucial because of what health represents to development practitioners: an
objective space concerned only with the saving of lives through modern means. Modern
medicine, although rife with a history of racism and sexism, still seemingly transcends tedious
debates about power and development because lives are at stake. However, health in Africa
has been and remains a site of power and privilege mediated through knowledge and material
production (Chapman 2016; Waitzkin 2015). “Rather than the state focusing on the
determinants of health, ‘experts’ and corporations alike are encouraged to offer their goods and
services through the free market, whereby, it is expected that the responsible, health conscious,
neoliberal citizen will buy into them” (Ayo 2012, 102). Ayo’s summarization of neoliberal health
14

For more on case studies see Bennett and Elman (2006) and Gerring (2004)
In a pre-dissertation field survey conducted in 2013 (IRB protocol #H13-136), I interviewed 25 Kenyan government officials in
order to analyze their conceptualization of aid ownership (including whether or not they felt that they, or donors, controlled their
development policies).
16
In fall of the 2014, Burkina Faso experienced a coup d’état that ousted President Blaise Comparé, who had been in power for close
to thirty years.
15
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highlights the ways in which neoliberalized health is no longer a question of reduced state
intervention and services to the health sector. Donors are pushing for more involvement from
the private sectors in both countries. A World Bank official who I interviewed in Burkina Faso
acknowledged that the Bank’s primary objective for health in Burkina was to increase and
standardize the private sector’s involvement in the health sector.17 As is the case with family
planning, if the market is providing these health services, the population must consume them.
Another underlying logic behind family planning policies as they exist under the poverty
reduction scheme is that poor women having too many children places a burden on national
economic resources, further straining already limited national resources in low-income
countries. Thus, the act of teaching women how to consume modern contraceptives
demonstrates how poverty reduction tied to family planning becomes the individual woman’s
responsibility.
The primary data central to this dissertation, combined with a robust review of secondary
source data on reproductive health policy in Africa, are central to determining whether health
policies and strategies align with health conditions and problems at the sub-national level, or
whether they largely reflect “outside” priorities. In other words, triangulating between these
various forms of data allows me to trace the process by which the concept of ownership has
emerged at the international, national, and sub-national levels, as well as the extent to which
there is overlap or divergence in the way actors at these various levels are conceptualizing and
employing the concept. The dominant findings from my study indicate that ownership of
development in Africa necessitates and recreates the underdeveloped African subject, heavily
implicates donors in the decision-making at the state and local levels, but absolves donors of
any responsibility for failed development policies in Africa.
Some of the main arguments that I advance in this dissertation about the true nature of
ownership, prima facie, appear structural. Arguing that the ownership paradigm reproduces the
17

ST0731, 07/31/2015_Ouagadougou

25

underdeveloped African subject and further entrenches donor dependency ostensibly assumes
that the African subject has limited agency. As Maulana Karenga has insisted, scholars should
engage Africans “as subjects rather than objects…stressing their agency and initiative in history
and life rather than describing a mute and victimized experience” (Karenga 2006, 254). At the
same time, African agency operates within the context of structural and other constraints. To
quote Steven Lukes,
Social life can only properly be understood as an interplay of power and structure, a web
of possibilities for agents, whose nature is both active and structured, to make choices
and pursue strategies within given limits, which in consequence expand and contract
over time (2004, 68–69).
The web of possibilities for African agents operating in the development structure is
evident in my findings not only in the different conceptualizations of ownership across the two
country cases but also within the countries themselves. I find that there is no universal
definition of ownership of development. That there is no consensus around the meaning of
ownership is not a novel finding (Buiter 2007). However, what informs the different
conceptualizations and its consequence for attempting to apply a standard measure of
ownership is missing from the literature on ownership. I argue that the varied renderings of
ownership in Africa are informed by a type of historical institutionalism whereby the country’s
initial engagement with structural adjustments acts as a critical juncture for the contemporary
interactions with the ownership paradigm (Thelen 1999; Sanders 2008; Fioretos, Falleti, and
Sheingate 2016; Lichbach and Zuckerman 2009). In Burkina Faso, Thomas Sankara’s
leadership between 1983 and 1987 was grounded in a rejection of both structural adjustments
and political aid. In advocating for a model of self-reliant development, the Sankara model was
inculcating Burkinabé with a sense of ownership predicated on collective responsibility for
progress and resistance to neoimperialism from the West. Alternatively, under Daniel Arap Moi,
Kenya was the first African country to accept structural adjustments and today continues to
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promote a rendering of ownership close to that produced under the dominant ownership
paradigm.

Review of the Literature
The literature on country ownership, aid ownership, and/or ownership of development
has grown extensively over the past fifteen years. In the African context, scholars have
employed a range of theoretical frames to discuss the possibilities and limitations of the
ownership paradigm in Africa.
Prior to the formal adoption of ownership through the OECD, Carlsson, Somolekae, van
de Walle (1997) sought to measure ownership in Africa by examining donor-government
relations. The authors looked specifically at the degree to which donor procedures and needs
drove the direction of foreign aid and the impact of donor conditionalities on development
projects and programs in various aid-dependent African countries. For Carlsson et al., the origin
and impetus for development policies factored heavily into whether or not the country truly
owned its development. When assessing how much control the Ghanaian government
exercises over development, for instance, Carlsson et. al. observed that “about 35 percent of
[policy] proposals for bilateral projects are prepared with significant donor input, while project
design is either completely in the hands of donors or partially controlled by the donor” (Carlsson
1997, 95).18 Across their various African cases, the authors found very limited evidence of
country ownership.
Just over a decade later, Whitfield (2009) examined the presence of ownership in the
African context. For Whitfield et al. ownership is also a matter of government control over the
design and implementation of development policy. The authors ground their conceptualization of
ownership in John Stuart Mill’s foundational notion of sovereignty. For Mill, “non-intervention
18

Although international financial institutions (IFIs) have identified Ghana as demonstrating strong ownership, this assessment is
questionable given the amount of control and input donors have in the development arena, as measured by Carlssson et. al.
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provided a protected space for societies to struggle for and amongst themselves” (Whitfield
2009, 7). Sovereignty as a political space within which states are free to arrange their domestic
affairs without undue pressure or unwanted involvement from foreign actors sets a much higher
threshold for ownership than the existing framework for aid-dependent countries. When one
undergirds ownership in pursuit of popular national sovereignty, the outcome is ownership as
collective local command of development strategies. There is a dearth of ownership in Africa by
this standard. As Whitfield 2009 argues:
The willingness of powerful states to accept a plurality of domestic political
arrangements and developmental visions has weakened and the “right” to sovereignty
for weaker states has gradually been made conditional upon meeting responsibilities
imposed by the international community (Whitfield et al. 2009, 8).
Analyzing ownership in Africa as a matter of sovereignty or state control over policy direction
and implementation means that donors are the ones who impede the possibility of ownership in
Africa. Alternatively, scholars have proposed the neopatrimonial African state as being the
dominant obstacle to ownership (Booth 2012; Faust 2010). One such example comes from
Khan and Sharma (2001), who discuss ownership through the lens of the principal-agent
dilemma.
According to Khan and Sharma, donor agencies are the principals and African states are
the agents and their relationship is often riddled with mistrust. Information between the two
parties can be asymmetrical in the sense that donors are unsure of whether governments will
properly execute and remain committed to policies or programs. Conditionalities were designed
as an earlier solution to this problem. However, they have a poor track record for bringing about
sustainable progress (Chikulo 1997; Gould 2005). Donors have turned to ownership as an
alternative, with advocates suggesting that a principal-agent view of ownership coalesces the
demands of borrowers and lenders, harmonizing their incentives in ways that make it more likely
that governments will remain committed to development policies. Khan and Sharma define
ownership loosely as “a situation in which the policy content of the program is similar to what the
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country itself would have chosen in the absence of IMF involvement…In such a situation, the
country ‘owns’ the program in the sense that it is committed to the spirit of the program, rather
than just to comply with its letter” (2001, 13-14).
In theory, country ownership could address a number of complications that often arise
with principals and agents in the aid realm, the most pressing and costly of which are monitoring
and evaluation (Holvoet and Renard 2007). With ownership, donor agencies can be more
certain that African governments are using funds for the purposes for which they were intended,
enabling donors to reduce money spent, as with conditionalities, on monitoring. Resolving
fundamental problems of traditional donor-recipient relationships while replacing tedious
conditionalities would ultimately increase aid’s effectiveness (Khan and Sharma 2001; Pender
2001).19 The World Bank and IMF, however, continue to attach conditionalities to lending
instruments like the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) and the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Credit (PRSCs) that do little to increase recipient ownership. With the PRSC,
specifically, the World Bank imposes conditionalities on countries’ PRSPs through a Letter of
Development Policy (LoDP), which remains guarded from the public (Stewart and Wang 2004).
There are also those scholars who examine ownership through the frame of
participation. In this sense, ownership is about increasing local stakeholder participation in the
policy-making and implementation processes. This approach to assessing ownership extends
beyond sovereignty and principal agent theories in that it takes into account civil society and
non-state entities as necessary for achieving country ownership. Fischer and Marquette (2016)
analyze ownership through a political economy analysis (PEA) framework. The PEA approach
entails donors focusing on the factors that influence political behavior in a given context and
examining how these factors come to bear on policy and development approaches such as
cultural norms or geography. The authors argue that PEA is still donor-centric, meaning it does

19 Khan and Sharma (2001) actually argue that ownership works best with IMF conditionalities to address the

principal-agent dilemma. Conditionalities should include measures that somehow increase country ownership.
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not incorporate local stakeholders into the framework in a meaningful way. In a similar fashion,
but in the context of the Peruvian health sector, Buffardi (2013) engages ownership around
degrees of stakeholder participation. She finds three different relationships: doctor knows best,
empowered patient, and it takes a village. Empowered patient and “it takes a village” are
examples of stakeholders practicing a version of ownership that involves civil society and
central government (Buffardi 2013).20 Nevertheless, Buffardi finds that the “doctor knows best”
relationship model that is most pervasive in Peru’s health sector.
These varying theories illustrate how ownership of development should unfold based on
some variation of the international community’s definition of the term: “a developing country
government’s abilities to exercise leadership over their development policies and strategies and
co-ordinate development actions” (OECD 2011, 29). These analyses generally assume that the
challenges central to current international development architecture is making aid more
effective; or donors giving more control to “developing countries”; or persuading developing
countries to commit to the development policies coming from the international community
(Booth 2012; Faust 2010; Buiter 2007; Renzio, Whitfield, and Bergamaschi 2008). Thus, the
end goal for all of these types of analyses becomes: how do policymakers and international
donors increase ownership?
This dissertation takes a different approach, in that it attempts to analyze ownership
based on how various key stakeholders conceptualize the term and how it actually functions in
practice in two distinct African contexts—Burkina Faso and Kenya. In doing so, I argue that
Africa needs to move past ownership. I demonstrate how the international community’s push for
ownership as a corrective to various contentions with development and aid further entrenches
the problematic tenets of international development, namely donor-dependency, a sense of

“Doctor knows best” refers to the donor-driven model of ownership where donors manage the various stages of the policymaking
process from design to implementation. “It takes a village” has very little donor involvement. Civil society works with the government
and other sectors to address health priorities. Finally, the “empowered patient” model of donor-recipient relations in Peru, there is
donor involvement, but not to the extent of driving the entire policymaking process. Donors use the budget support modality to allow
Peruvian development stakeholders to partake in developing the health sector.
20
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underdevelopment, and a one-size fits all model of social, political, and economic progress.
These findings make sense when analyzing not just the practices, as scholars have done, but
the discourses of ownership as well. Thus, I use epistemic communities and post-development
theory as analytical lenses for examining the ownership paradigm. Using these theoretical
frameworks, I demonstrate that ownership has little to do with increasing Africans’ control over
their development trajectories. It has more to do with contentions over culpability for failed
development strategies and a desire on the part of the international donor community to hand to
African governments and societies the responsibility for development’s failures.
Epistemic Communities
Epistemic communities are collective groups of experts or scholars who seek to
influence policy by changing the interests of decision-makers in a given realm with a particular
type of knowledge that validates their intervention (Adler and Haas 1992, 2; Dunlop 2009;
Marier 2008; Haas 1989, 398). Scholars demonstrate the ways in which these communities
could influence inter-state cooperation by framing policy issues in such a way that states see
the need for policy coordination. Through a leveraging of uncertainty, interpretation, and
institutionalization, epistemic communities could promote new patterns of behavior at the state
level, which translate into different policy trajectories.
Uncertainty is key to the legitimizing the contributions and presence of an epistemic
community in the policy-making arena. The uncertainty that comes with moments of crisis
creates a situation in which policy-makers and politicians, by themselves, are unsure of which
strategy is best—the assumption being that states seek to reduce uncertainty (Radaelli 1995;
Adler and Haas 1992). Desiring to reduce uncertainty means that in moments of crisis, policymakers are willing to concede power to an epistemic community based on the ability of
members in the community to offer consensual knowledge. Consensual knowledge, in turn, is a
form of power that insulates the epistemic community’s authority over policy-making from
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outside criticism on the grounds that government officials and those outside of the community
do not have the epistemic or professional training to challenge the advice (Haas 1989, 398).
Uncertainty legitimizes the consensual knowledge coming from the epistemic community, or as
Haas states, “In the face of uncertainty, and more so in the wake of a shock or crisis, many of
the conditions facilitating a focus on power are absent” (1992, 14). In other words, politicians are
so preoccupied with the crisis that they are willing to cede power to the epistemic community in
order to address the crisis.
Interpretation is central to the maintenance of an epistemic community because the
community essentially offers politicians and policy-makers the interpretive lens through which
they will view the problem. That there is room for interpreting the crisis allows room for
competing epistemic communities to influence government (Cross 2013; Ewig 2011). To be
sure, not only does “the group responsible for articulating the dimensions of reality [have] great
social and political influence”, but the group establishes a space wherein alternative knowledge
becomes subjugated (Haas 1992, 14; Foucault 1980). Thus, institutionalization becomes
essential for ensuring the community’s continued influence over policymaking, with little
competition from alternative knowledge sources. Haas (1992) argues that epistemic
communities can institutionalize their influence by acquiring bureaucratic power within the
national government and at the international level. He states, “Epistemic communities can
insinuate their views and influence national governments and international organizations by
occupying niches in advisory and regulatory bodies. This suggests that the application of
consensual knowledge to policymaking depends on the ability of the groups transmitting this
knowledge to gain and exercise bureaucratic power” (Adler and Haas 1992, 30). Ultimately,
epistemic communities, in order to be influential, require some level of permanence within the
decision-making apparatus.
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Over time, scholars have both reworked and criticized the epistemic communities
approach (Toke 1999; Adler 2008).21 For the purposes of this dissertation, the most salient
criticisms and amendments come from (Krebs 2001) and Cross (2013). Krebs (2001) proposes
that epistemic communities may be comprised of scientists whose motivations are not objective
and altruistic, but rather are the product of their national backgrounds and strategic interests.
This amendment allows for the incorporation of donors into the epistemic community frame.
Cross (2013) argues that the definition of epistemic community should include non-academic
actors as potential members and non-state actors as potential targets. This means that the
binding factors among members of such communities are no longer just scientific knowledge but
also professionalism and professional interests. Donors as an epistemic community can (and
do) attempt to influence civil society interests as well as government interests.
I explore ownership of development as the creation and maintenance of an epistemic
community of Western donors. There is a long tradition of critical reflection on the implications of
the episteme on notions of social, political, and economic progress in the global South (Serra
and Stiglitz 2008; Mbembé 2001; Keita 2011; Guardiola-Rivera 2010). For example,
Mkandawire (2014) demonstrates how economic ideas and frameworks coming directly from
Western donors have been the guiding force behind policies in postcolonial Africa. The push for
ownership that the epistemic community of donors has made since 2005 and subsequent policy
changes illustrate the impact that this community of development professionals has in
sustaining particular development paradigms. It also demonstrates how ownership thus
becomes a necessary mechanism for translating these theories into policies. Few scholars have
made the link between epistemic communities and international development, and even fewer
have examined the concept as it plays out in the global South, or Africa specifically (Ahu Sandal
2011; Cohendet, Grandadam, Simon, and Capdevila 2014; Hennemann, Rybski, and Liefner
21

Anthony Zito (2001) argues that epistemic communities should consider that national institutions are not necessarily open to
receiving new ideas; Emanuel Adler (2008) proposes that epistemic communities function along similar lines as “communities of
practice”, thus the focus is on the particular actions associated with the community’s advice and not the specific “knowledge” per se.
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2012; Youde 2007). Much of the epistemic communities literature relies heavily on Europe as
the source of empirical case studies (Adler 2008; Marier 2008; Faleg 2012; Galbreath and
McEvoy 2013; Dunlop 2014). Where proponents of the epistemic communities approach have
applied this theoretical program to development, it has been uncritical of the “knowledge” that
Western donors, as the dominant community, contribute to policymaking. One such example
comes from Peter Haas (2015), who views epistemic communities as valuable actors in carrying
out the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and global governance programs that lead to
sustainable development. In using this lens to explore development in the global South, the
heavy influence that donors have had over policy selection in the postcolonial African state and
society begins to require critical reflection. Epistemic communities as a theoretical concept help
explain donors’ continued role in Africa under the pretense of development in crisis. It also helps
explain how donors have become permanent fixtures in Africa.
The Bank’s shift towards being a “knowledge bank” and no longer providing solely
finances contributes to the need to re-examine ownership and donors in light of this purported
shift for two reasons. First, suggesting that the Bank is just now becoming a source of
knowledge willfully neglects the epistemic aid that motivated and legitimized the proliferation of
structural adjustment policies, which indicates another supposed break in development
paradigms that does not exist. Second, it simultaneously opens the bank and others proposing
epistemic aid up to a scrutinizing of the purported neutrality of their knowledge.
Missing from the scholarly international relations discussion of the role of epistemic
communities and their ability to influence policy decisions is how knowledge production is not an
objective and value-neutral enterprise. Knowledge production is also the product of its
geopolitical contexts. Walter Mignolo’s idea of “geopolitics of knowledge” provides a useful
analytical tool for grappling with the relationship between knowledge and geopolitical spaces
and the “epistemic privilege” that the West has had over the question of development (2009).
Mignolo (2002, 2009) asks, “who and when, why and where is knowledge generated”(Mignolo
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2009, 2). Within the context of all forms of development, there is a “global power differential in
knowledge-making” (Mignolo 2009) -- meaning that if one were to look at the gestalt of
purposive development models targeting Sub-Saharan Africa countries since the colonial
period, the dominant paradigm has come from the North, with the exception of the brief period
of import substitution, a theoretical framework that emerged from Latin America (Santos 1970;
Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Prebisch 1971).
Furthermore, the literature on epistemic communities is missing an account of the ways
in which the community produces discourses or behaviors and practices that demonstrate
membership in the community. For example, there is a lexis or jargon associated with any
community (Swales 2011; Escobar 2011). Entrance into an epistemic community requires that
one demonstrate a mastery of the jargon, practices, and discourses internal to the community.
Consequently, epistemic communities become a privileged space closed off to unqualified
actors.
Postdevelopment Theory
I address the embedded limitations of epistemic communities, subjugated knowledges
and the geopolitical origins of hegemonic knowledges using a postdevelopment framework.
Postdevelopment highlights the ways in which the development industry is not neutral, but
steeped in the reproduction and reification of historical power relations between the West and
the Rest (Ziai 2015; Parfitt 2011). In promoting various Eurocentric development paradigms as
scientifically-based solutions for human suffering, alternative systems of thought that grapple
with socioeconomic and political change remain calcified relics of failed cultures or do not even
enter the discussion as possible alternatives to development (Saunders 2005; Berg 2007).
Thus, postdevelopment’s goal becomes to “decenter development” as the dominant frame
through which one discusses conditions in the global South. Doing so allows alternatives to
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development instead of alternative development.22 Alternatives to development alter “the
political economy of truth” or “development’s order of expert knowledge” in favor of local
knowledges as sites for solutions to political, economic, and social challenges (Escobar 2011,
xiii).
Grounded in the writing of Foucault and other post-structuralist scholarship, postdevelopment scholarship problematizes the underlying assumptions and aims of development,
as both an enterprise and an end in and of itself (Sachs 1997; Sidaway 2007; Rahnema and
Bawtree 1997). The assumptions rest on the notion that the post-industrialized countries,
generally denoted as the West, are the models for development. Consequently, the various
economic, social, and political agendas that these countries and their international institutions
propagate are rooted in a purportedly objective and scientific truth about development. Within
the ownership paradigm, donors serve as knowledge-experts; financial assistance becomes all
the more necessary for stakeholders in these countries to feel that they are on the correct path
to becoming developed. Donors have cloaked the term in rhetoric suggesting local control,
context-specific policy formulation, and boundless possibilities for African countries and their
development trajectories – when reality on the ground is starkly different, as my field research
reveals.
Analyzing ownership through these critical lenses problematizes the concept itself,
rendering it emblematic of development writ-large. The ownership paradigm continues to
propose one model for sociopolitical and economic progress and seeks to obscure the extent to
which donors continue to dictate what is considered progress and how Africa should achieve it.
This dissertation argues that ownership is a mechanism which international donors have crafted
to secure African governments’ and societies’ compliance with neoliberal policies in the form of
PRSPs. But the way in which ownership is defined and the way in which stakeholders practice
22

Escobar (1995, 96) gives the example of the peasant model, which gives primacy to the earth and her needs. Human existence
depends on the earth; the difference between abundance and scarcity is a tied to how “healthy” the earth is. Thus, more food
scarcity and natural disasters mean that humans are neglecting the earth. This is a radically different rendering of sustainability and
development, than the market and human-centered neoliberal approach.
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it, vary greatly. The unfolding of the ownership paradigm in both countries reveals that if
development policies fail, international donors like the World Bank can remain impervious to the
same types of criticisms that they received in the 1990s, because African governments have
admittedly “taken ownership of development,” despite the World Bank and IMF having designed
and laid out the framework for development.
A second assumption central to the practice of ownership as explored in this dissertation
is that ownership necessitates a perpetually underdeveloped subject. On the question of
underdevelopment in Africa, Walter Rodney (1974) explains the processes through which
Europe underdeveloped Africa in a material sense, namely through colonization and slavery.
Understanding the process of material underdevelopment is important for historically situating
Africa’s inability to achieve international development benchmarks. As the international
benchmarks for development become increasingly tied to countries’ economic capabilities and
internationally produced standards, many African states and communities, international states
and the outside world as well continue to view themselves as underdeveloped and in need of
development. However, postdevelopment theory helps unpack the discursive processes that led
to Africa’s material and mental underdevelopment. Underdevelopment through this lens
challenges the assumptions embedded in the ownership enterprise that Africa’s
underdevelopment is a consequence of autochthonous factors.
Although couched in seemingly benign rhetoric (featuring terms like poverty reduction,
global equality, and sustainability), the discourses associated with hegemonic development
paradigms aim to first, construct the underdeveloped so that development becomes necessary
(Esteva 1992). This process is also facilitated through the extension of development past its
provincial origins to a global and “scientific” enterprise. Esteva notes, “The helpless individual,
whose survival now becomes necessarily dependent on the market, was not the invention of the
economists; neither was he born with Adam and Eve, as they contend. He was a historical
creation. He was created by the economic project redesigning mankind” (1997,15). This form of
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underdevelopment is especially salient in the language and policies of family planning in Africa
along with the paternalistic nature of donor relations and discussions of African states.
The logic that undergirds family planning efforts in Africa further speaks to the question
of culpability that surrounds the need for ownership. The Malthusian policies that Western
countries promoted in Africa, and the global South, in the name of population control were
undifferentiated and were aimed towards economics and not human beings.23 The economic
discourse of neoMalthusian policies constructs modern contraceptives and the spacing of births
as necessary for economic and social development. Women should engage in modern family
planning methods so that they are empowered enough to contribute to the work force (Boserup,
Tan, and Toulmin 2013). Men should encourage their wives to consume modern contraceptives
so that the woman will be empowered; men and women, in turn, will both be able to afford to
educate their children so that they can grow up and contribute to the work force as well
(Kowalewski, Mujinja, and Jahn 2002; Rao 1994; Bandarage 1997).
The language of population control had died down until it resurfaced under the auspices
of population development in the 1990s. The notion that family planning was a matter of
economic development was exemplified in the International Conference on Population
Development in 1994 and the World Bank’s Investing in Health report, issued in1993.24 These
documents construct the problems and solutions to reproductive health in market discourse.
Scholars have identified a number of problems with the neoliberal framing of reproductive
health. On one hand, women’s empowerment through family planning is a ligature in a history of
eugenics and racialized sterilization campaigns towards women of color around the globe
(Hawkesworth 2012; Ewig 2011; Briggs 2003). The population control approach to development
is also imbued with a paternalism that does not lead to women’s empowerment but instead to
their continued subjugation (Hawkesworth 2012; Saunders 2005). If ownership were truly a
23

British economist Thomas Malthus and the British Malthus League popularized the idea that overpopulation caused poverty and
poverty, as it is today, relates to the question of economic well-being (Rao 1994). Western countries adopted this economic logic
that too many people leads to an over extension of finite resources such as water, land, and food (Briggs 2003).
24
I explore these two documents in greater length in chapter four.
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question of country-specific and country-led development, in Burkina Faso, where there is a low
demand for modern contraception, the family planning policies should look markedly different
from those in Kenya where there is a relatively higher demand for modern contraception
(Ministry of Health 2013). This, however, is not the case.
Post-development theory is not without limitations as well.25 Parfitt (2011) argues that
post-development theorists may fall into the same paternalistic trap with which they charge the
Western development industry. In other words, how can post-development theorists be sure that
their assessments and solutions for ongoing problems in the global South are better than those
offered by so-called development experts? Post-development scholars have also been charged
with a uniform rejection of modernity and development without acknowledging its successes,
like increased life expectancy (Corbridge 1998; Parfitt 2011), or with idealizing local
communities as “noble savages” who do not want development or modernization (Storey 2000),
which leads to critiques of the theory as culturally relativistic. Nanda (1999) criticizes postdevelopment theory for creating a static and essentialist view of traditional cultures.
The ownership paradigm is not inherently problematic because it promotes development
and modernity, but rather because of the ways in which it masks the continued asymmetrical
power relations between OECD countries and aid-dependent African states. Modernity and
development become discernable issues when one unpacks why it is that African states and
some facets of different African societies are striving for development and a particular type of
modernity, the particularity being rooted in neoliberalism. Furthermore, my findings in this
dissertation contribute to postdevelopment theory by demonstrating how the “post” in
postdevelopment does not represent the end of development, as postdevelopment scholars
have argued. Critically excavating the ownership paradigm in Africa exposes how the “post” is

See Jan Nederveen-Pieterse’s (2010) critique of postdevelopment. He accurately argues that just as there are problems with
knowledge coming from donors, there are problems with local knowledges as well.
25

39

more an indication of development’s move to a lingering axiom in Africa’s present and future
ontology.
Conclusion
The ownership paradigm is less a question of African countries dictating the possibilities of their
own development, and more a discursive trope for handing culpability for failed donor-driven
development to African countries. Through my fieldwork in Burkina Faso and Kenya, I find that
the ownership paradigm is not an emancipatory framework leading to African modalities of
progress. These limitations are evident when examining ownership through the lens of power
and knowledge production. Ownership formally codifies donors as knowledge experts. This
undergirds their existence as an epistemic community, which uses its “consensual knowledge”
to influence development strategies and goals in Africa. Rather than African solutions to African
problems, Africa’s solutions and problems remain wedded to the developmental discourse that
promoted structural adjustments in the 1980s and 1990s. I bring together two theoretical frames
for examining ownership: epistemic communities and postdevelopment theory. The epistemic
communities literature aids in explaining why and how African states and societies have
institutionalized donor influence in the form of knowledge experts under the ownership
paradigm. Epistemic communities theory also elucidates why donors constantly refer to
development in Africa as being in a state of uncertainty or crisis. Postdevelopment theory
exposes the limitations that come with donors as a putative epistemic community place on
alternative renderings of development and ownership in general. In this way, ideas matter.
Even within the web of power and knowledge that donors create with the ownership
paradigm, there is space for agency. The legacies of political leadership during the initial period
of structural adjustments act as a critical juncture for understanding how ownership evolves in
Burkina Faso and Kenya today. Politics still matter, and there is still potential for an ontological

40

rupturing in the gnosis of African development. This dissertation also explores the conditions
under which such a rupture is possible.
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Chapter 2: La Santé Avant Tout (Health Before Everything)
“While revolutionaries as individuals can be murdered, you cannot kill ideas.” Thomas Sankara
(2007, 20)

Burkina Faso is located predominantly in the Sahalien region of West Africa. A former French
colony, Burkina Faso exists in very similar socio-political and economic development contexts
as other Francophone countries in Africa: it is a low-income country with what development
experts would consider a dismal development record as measured against any international
standard. Burkina ranks 183 out of 187 on the Human Development Index. GDP per capita
lingers around $740 US dollars per year. Only about 30 percent of the population lives in urban
areas (World Bank 2013, 7). A dearth of natural resources and rudimentary infrastructure makes
foreign investment in the country a precarious venture. Reports on human rights and progress
towards gender equality in Burkina render the picture even grimmer and desperate in the
imaginary of those invested in development.26 By every international benchmark for
development, Burkina falls short. In essence, it remains “developing,” meaning that it has not
achieved the political, economic, and social sagacity of the West.27
This bleak picture of Burkina Faso and its inability to develop provides the backdrop for
the country’s engagement with the ownership paradigm. Burkina, however, has been very
invested in reaching these development targets; this is evident in the country’s efforts to sign
onto a number of global development agendas and, in particular, the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee’s (OECD-DAC) Aid
Effectiveness fora. More specifically, the Burkinabè government and civil society actors have

Amnesty International’s 2013 report highlights a number of human rights abuses in Burkina Faso with respect to maternal and
child mortality rates and impunity for top government officials (2013). See also the Swedish International Development Cooperation
Agency’s (SIDA) 2004 report, “Gender Equality in Burkina Faso” (2004)and the United State’s chapter on “Burkina Faso 2012
Human Rights Report” in the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012 (2012a)
27
By “the West” I am simultaneously proposing a monolithic group of countries that we often describe as being “developed” and
suggesting that even these countries have not reached the teleological ends of progress. In the development sphere, these are
generally the donor countries that comprise the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Throughout this
dissertation, I use a postdevelopment conceptualization of development (Escobar 2011; Ferguson 2006).
26
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invested in the ownership paradigm that comes from the World Bank, International Monetary
Fund (IMF), and Paris Declaration.
If one accepts the OECD’s definition of ownership—a developing country’s government’s
ability to exercise leadership over its development policies and strategies and co-ordinate
development actions—then both theoretically and practically, ownership should operate in such
a way that Burkinabè stakeholders have more control over the direction and substance of their
health development policies vis-à-vis donors (OECD 2011, 29). The Ministry of Health (MoH)
and Ministry of Finance and Economics (MoE) should not only design and implement health
policies, they should be able to coordinate all other actors involved (OECD 2011, World Bank
2005). Civil society actors in the health sector should also be able to participate in the policy
development and implementation processes so that health outcomes reflect the needs of civil
society and the poorest segments of the population (Declaration 2012; White 1996; Steinle and
Correll 2008). By aligning their financial support with these health policies and using national
systems and institutions to deliver this support, donors can, in turn, create a space for more
local ownership. The final product should lead to increased aid effectiveness, which would lead
to more tangible results in the health sector. These results would mean achieving MDGs and
reducing global poverty.
This chapter applies the postdevelopment framework and epistemic communities
concept to data gathered from fieldwork in Burkina Faso in order to answer the questions, what
is ownership of development and how does it operate under the contemporary aid paradigm? I
demonstrate the ways in which the notion of ownership (l’appropriation de développement)
varies across different stakeholders as a consequence of historically embedded relationships to
development. My analysis is informed by data from thirty-eight original interviews and participant
observation carried out between June and August of 2015 with government officials in the
Burkinabè Ministry of Health as well as the Ministry of Finance and Economics, civil society
organizations, community-based associations, and international donors. I conducted seven
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interviews with four different donors working in Burkina’s health sector: the Peace Corps, World
Bank, UNFPA, and USAID. From the Ministry of Health (which includes civil servants working at
the local clinics) and the Ministry of Finance, I collected seventeen interviews. Finally, I spoke
with fourteen representatives from within civil society.
Despite the underlying difference in understandings, the institutions and expectations
rooted in the officially agreed-upon ownership paradigm (enshrined in the Paris Declaration and
MDGs) are still in operation in Burkina Faso. Drawing on this case, I find that in essence, the
current international framework for ownership does not lead to more development in the health
sector or leverage for aid-recipient countries, but instead constructs and reinforces the
underdeveloped subject, placing donors as indispensable sources of development knowledge,
and absolving donors of any responsibility for failed health policies. Ultimately, ownership in
Burkina’s health sector further entrenches donors in Burkina’s decision-making apparatus, as
the teleological end of development remains forever unreachable. Although Burkinabè
stakeholders are invested in the form of development that donors are propagating through the
ownership paradigm, they view donor control and their prolonged presence as a Faustian
bargain for the promise of development.
The Burkinabè stakeholders’ perception of donors as problematic interveners is tied to
their unique conceptualizations of ownership. Over the course of my interaction with people in
Burkina, I found that policymakers shared similar renderings of ownership with members of civil
society who are involved in the country’s health sector. These local actors view l’appropriation
de développement as a collective understanding about the responsibility that all societal
members have to participate in bringing about development. Representatives of donor
institutions, by contrast, grounded their understanding of ownership in a country’s financial
capabilities: was the Burkinabè government financing its own development? I argue in chapter
four that this difference in conceptualization and the government’s view of donor presence as
Faustian bargain are legacies of the Burkinabè revolution from 1983 until 1987.
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The ways in which ownership reproduces the underdeveloped subject and donors as an
infallible source of development knowledge are borne out in the country’s family planning
policies. Global discourses surrounding family planning elicit both a real and imagined fear that
can only be addressed through developing the underdeveloped. This lingering catastrophe
around population growth and family planning creates a space for the epistemic community of
donors to operate on an interminable basis. Across the continent, donors and scholars
consistently refer to the prevalence and usage of contraceptives as “critical” for economic
development. For example, in a New York Times article titled, “Talking their way out of a
population crisis,” the author paints a grim picture of Africa’s population emergency: “In many
parts of Africa, people already scramble to obtain food, land and water, and discontent provides
fertile ground for extremism. So it is important to think carefully about the response to Africa’s
exploding population” (Epstein 2011, n.p.). Even donors like the Bill and Melinda Gates
foundation have taken up the fight to address the critical need for modern contraceptives around
the world. At a talk for the American Enterprise Institute, Melinda Gates described the global
situation around family planning as follows: “We have 220 million women asking us for
contraceptives, and we’re not delivering them. Because of the political controversy, we backed
away from the issue as a world. And yet women are dying in childbirth because they have child
after child after child, and their children are dying because they’re coming too quickly” (Reed
2016). The picture of poverty and destitution in Africa and the global South presents an
impending crisis as a result of a population boom.
Following this logic, accountability for these development consequences should fall on
both donors and Burkinabè stakeholders’ shoulders (OECD 2011, 2008). The reality on the
ground, however, is that not only is this definition of ownership not employed by stakeholders in
Burkina’s health sector, but also the premises and supporting institutions do not lead to any
substantial shift in donor practices; yet the ownership paradigm has fundamentally changed the
rhetoric surrounding development. The question then becomes, how do actors in Burkina’s
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health sector define and understand l’appropriation de développement? Do the emergence of
this discourse and corresponding change in institutional frameworks lead to more local
stakeholder control and better health outcomes, or not? How does ownership operate in
practice within a given context, such as Burkina Faso?

Investing in the Ownership Paradigm
Although the World Bank and IMF had already laid the foundation for ownership with the
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), first introduced in 1999, rhetoric associated
with this paradigm was cemented through the OECD High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness,
beginning in 2003.28 Of the four fora that took place--Rome, Paris, Accra, and Busan—Paris and
Accra have become emblematic of the international community’s commitment to increasing aid
effectiveness through ownership, harmonization and alignment. In fact, while conducting
fieldwork, government and civil society stakeholders I interviewed repeatedly attributed the call
for ownership to the Paris Declaration (the product of the Paris forum in 2005) and not the World
Bank and IMF's Comprehensive Development Framework, adopted in 1999.
International donors and supranational institutions have played a long and sustained role
in Burkina's development practices, further establishing and reifying the ownership paradigm.
The Burkinabè health sector is highly demonstrative of the country’s history with regional and
international institutions. In 1987, the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF developed
the Bamako Initiative (BI) as a corrective to the salient inefficiencies in the health sectors across
Africa. More specifically, the BI was tailored to address the dearth of resources in many African
states as they tried to implement comprehensive primary health programs (Bamako Initiative
1987). The Burkinabè government launched its version of the BI in 1993. In 1996, Burkina Faso
reconfigured its health sector, adding regional health districts, which created 11 health regions
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, the language of ownership assumes a paradigm shift in the ways in which aid is managed
and delivered. Increasing the volume of aid is necessary for achieving the Millennium Development Goals, governance, and
improving development performance (OECD 2011). Furthermore, if countries can better “own” development, aid can better address
poverty, inequality, and increase economic growth (OECD 2011; World Bank 2005).
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over 53 health districts and the implementation of cost-sharing mechanisms, like user fees, to
generate income for the health sector ( Ridde 2008, 2011). The initiative reflects some of the
core principles found in neoliberal development policy recommendations such as cost-sharing.
Within this model, consumers would carry the burden of health costs, which in Burkina Faso
meant increased cost for essential generic drugs (Haddad, Nougtara, and Fournier 2006). The
underlying logic for pushing cost-sharing at the community level was that the income that
families were spending in the informal sector could be reallocated toward expenses in the
formal health sector and combined with donor and government contributions. Under the BI, the
government also decentralized the health sector (again, with an emphasis on efficiency), the
underlying assumption being that communities could better manage the delivery and
maintenance of health services than the central government (Ridde 2011). The plan led to the
creation of private pharmacy depots that provide generic drugs to health centers at the district
level. Another element of the BI was a reliance on increased donor funding for the health sector.
Donors were encouraged to help contribute to the initial purchase of essential generic drugs in
Burkina. Between 1992 and 1998, donor contributions to health increased by about 31 percent
annually (Haddad et al. 2006, 1891).
Scholars have linked the macroeconomic reforms under World Bank and IMF-instituted
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) to the stagnant progress in public health sector (Kanji
1989; Ridde 2011; Konadu-Agyemang 2000; Sahn and Bernier 1995). Because of the currency
devaluation, drug prices became too exorbitant for the average Burkinabè to afford. After the
currency devaluation, drug prices increased by 76% and medication represented about 80% of
the cost for visiting health professionals (Haddad et al. 2006, 1892) Because of the required
liberalization, fees for consultation increased between 100 and 150%, while fees for delivering a
baby increased by 20-30% (Haddad et al 2006, 1892). After these economic reforms and their
impact on the health sector, health care in Burkina Faso became more expensive than in
neighboring countries like Mali and Cote d’Ivoire (Bodart et al. 2001). The population remained,
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generally dissatisfied with health services and allocation of resources remained inefficient.
These lingering lacunae from the BI implementation and SAPs is attributed to donors and NGOs
in the health sector promoting an overemphasis on efficiencies and little focus on equity in
health (Ridde 2008)29.
A distinct discourse on international interventions and approaches to development and
health in Burkina emerged with the creation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and
the Millennium Development Goals in 1999 and 2000. The World Bank and IMF, looking to relegitimize their presence in development politics, created the Comprehensive Development
Framework (CDF) as a new poverty-centered framework for aid-dependent countries (Ferguson
2006). In order for aid-dependent countries to continue accessing concessional loans from both
institutions and access Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) funds, they would have
to subscribe to this new framework for “eradicating poverty.” As a heavily indebted poor country,
Burkina produced its first PRSP titled le Cadre stratégique de lutte contre la pauvreté (the
Strategic Framework for the Fight Against Poverty), which was implemented in 2000 (Ministere
de l’Economie et des Finances 2000). That same year, Burkina also became signatory to the
UN’s Millennium Development Goals. In adopting this global pledge to reduce poverty, the
government agreed to work towards achieving the 8 pre-established development goals, three
of which are health-related.30 The shift in international development discourse to partnership and
poverty reduction prompted a call to increase donor funding and presence in national
development strategies, along with the mobilization of domestic resources to meet these new
development goals. A year after agreeing to work towards the MDGs, Burkina collaborated with
a number of other states in the African Union to produce the Abuja Declaration. With this
document, Burkina Faso and other African states agreed to allocate at least 15% of their annual
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There is considerable scholarship that addresses the ways in which the quest for efficiency through neoliberal policies led to
inequality in the delivery of social services outside of Africa as well (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Chapman 2016; Easterly 2005).
30
There are three Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that pertain to health: MDG number four is to reduce the under-5
mortality rate by two-third; MDG number five is to reduce the maternal mortality rate by three quarters; and, MDG number six is to
combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases.
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budgets towards their health sectors. Ideally, in meeting the Abuja pledge, these states would
also achieve the three health related MDGs (World Health Organization 2011). African leaders
also called on donors to meet their former pledge of committing at least 0.7% of their domestic
GNI towards development in Africa (World Health Organization 2011). These four international
declarations—the Bamako Initiative, Comprehensive Development Framework, Millennium
Development Goals, and the Abuja Declaration—inform the current foci of political and
economic resources in the Burkinabè health sector.
The World Bank and other donors have had a substantial impact on Burkina Faso’s
social, political, and economic development strategies. Since the early 1990s, the World Bank
has facilitated Burkina Faso’s transition to a market economy and neoliberalization (World Bank
2010). Beginning with independence in 1960, the country produced five-year development plans
to guide the government in its quest for “development” along Western lines. The government
produced plans that spanned periods from 1967-1971, 1972-1976, 1977-1981, 1986-1990, and
1991-1995. Between 1984 and 1985, the government elaborated le Programme Populaire de
Développement (PPD, People’s Development Program)—a biannual plan (Ministère de la
Planification et du Développement Populaire 1985). After 1995, the government moved away
from the five-year plan to its first 10-year strategy. La lettre d’intention de politique de
développement humain durable (LIPDHD, The Letter of Intent on Sustainable Human
Development Policy) was the first 10-year development plan that the Burkinabè government
established. However, the government quickly jettisoned this plan when it became eligible for
HIPC funds in 1997 and had to replace the LIPDHD with the Cadre stratégique de lute contre la
pauvreté (CSLP, Strategic Framework for Poverty Reduction)—the country’s first PRSP—in
2000. Because the country was under pressure to complete the first CSLP in order to receive
HIPC funds, it created its first PRSP in just seven months (World Bank 2013). The CSLP, being
the first iteration of the PRSP, was the country’s comprehensive and long-term approach to
social, political, and economic development. It reflected the spirit of the Bank and IMF’s
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comprehensive development framework in that it presented a long-term holistic vision, used the
language of country led-partnership and country ownership and was “results- oriented” meaning
it elaborated time-bound targets to measure the achievement of goals (Merry, Davis, and
Kingsbury 2015; Rottenburg, Merry, Park, and Mugler 2015; Cooley and Snyder 2015). The first
CSLP spanned 2000 to 2010. After the CSLP came La stratégie de croissance accélérée et de
développement durable (SCADD, The Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable
Development) from 2011 until 2015.
La SCADD is the second iteration of the country’s PRSP. Much like the CSLP, La
SCADD articulates the present state of development in the economic, political, and social
sectors and provides a technocratic strategy for achieving the stated development goals. Also
like the CSLP, la SCADD takes economic cues from the neoliberal playbook, which influences
the approach to dealing with health issues. According to the government and donors, key
problems in the health sector include governance and leadership, improving health service
delivery and finding enough resources to fund health services (International Development
Association 2010; l’Organisation Mondiale de la Santé 2009; Ministere de l’Economie et des
Finances 2011). The outlined health issues remain directly in line with the Bamako Initiative and
MDGs. The major public health challenges identified are malaria, acute respiratory infections,
malnutrition, HIV/AIDS, and noncommunicable diseases like diabetes, cancer, and cardiovascular issues (Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances 2011). The plan also articulates
specific development benchmarks integral to achieving the stated goals, such as increased
numbers of health centers, assisted births, vaccinated infants and decline in HIV/AIDS
prevalence (Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances 2011). According to la SCADD,
development successes are the product of country ownership, and increased donor assistance.
To achieve the MDGs, the government prioritizes financing the social sectors. Ultimately,
average annual financing of La SCADD over the period 2006-2010 accounted for 38.66% of the
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annual Burkinabe budget, with a high of 44.64% in 2010 (Ministere de l’Economie et des
Finances 2011).
Through a formal adoption of the discourse and the donor-sanctioned tools and
instruments for development, the Burkinabè government has consented to the principles and
practices of the ownership paradigm. The adoption of the CSLP and La SCAAD as long-term,
holistic development strategies that conceive of development in terms of poverty reduction
through economic growth comes directly from the World Bank and not the Burkinabè contexts.
The consequences of the government consenting to the ownership paradigm also unfold across
the Burkinabè development stakeholders.
Ownership from the Top Down
Taking the government’s national strategies at face value leads one to believe that,
although struggling in some areas, Burkina Faso is well on the path to development and has
demonstrated remarkable appropriation de développement. A number of significant tropes come
to light in moving from examining ownership at just the national level to how it is understood and
applied at the micro level with community supported organizations (CSOs) and donors in the
health sector.
Although the need for ownership of development remains paramount under this current
paradigm, there is no consistency across stakeholders on what the concept means, how it is
executed, and whether or not it exists in Burkina’s health sector. Across the various donor
groups included in this study, the World Bank, the U.S. Peace Corps, United Nations Population
Fund (UNFPA), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), all
defined ownership in similar terms. For these stakeholders, ownership was very much about the
government and local stakeholders taking the lead with respect to funding development and
participating in program implementation. For example, one respondent in the World Bank’s
country office in Burkina Faso stated that “ownership of development in the health sector is the
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Ministry of Health giving all the resources that it has, both technical and financial, to meet
development partners halfway; not just the Ministry of Health, the communities as well.”31
Another donor from USAID noted that who owns development is “whoever contributes most of
the budget.”32
If, for donors, ownership means that the government is giving all possible financial
resources to the health sector, then it would be very difficult to say that the Burkinabè
government owns development. There are three main financial contributors to Burkina’s health
sector: government, donors, and households. Of the three, government consistently contributes
more than the other two stakeholders to health. However, these numbers do not reflect the
international NGOs and donor projects that circumvent government, which calls into question
the practical and theoretical purchase of ownership as donors define it. Notably, respondents at
the World Bank did not see the government as fully owning development in the health sector,
but regarded it as being on track to doing so.
For government officials in the Ministry of Finance and Economics (MOFE), specifically
the subdivision known as la Direction générale de l’économie et de la planification (DGEP),
ownership is a combination of control over policies and consciousness about development. The
element of control over policies seems informed by the donor version of ownership in that a
number of respondents used the “government in the drivers’ seat” metaphor to define the
concept. There are also elements of the international version of ownership evident in the
reasons for why most of these actors believe that government does in fact own development.
For civil servants in the DGEP, government owns development because it takes the initiative in
creating national documents, like la SCADD and le CSLP. Again, this version corresponds with
the Bank and IMF’s measures of ownership, evident in the assessment of the Paris
Declaration’s implementation. In the Ministry of Health, there is overlap with the connection
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between ownership and consciousness. Policy-makers in the MoH, across the board, view
ownership as involving a level of consciousness about development. The expected level of
consciousness percolates down to the individual level where, as one official noted, “Chacun a
son part â jouer” (Everyone has a role to play).33 But more importantly, each person knows what
his part is. There is also an element of responsibility and independence that seeps through this
understanding— “Nous devons écrire les chemins que nous voulons suivre” (we write the path
that we want to follow).34
Whether these same actors see the government as “owning” development is not so
black and white. Respondents at the local level, including nurses and midwives working at the
health center where I conducted participant observation and several interviews, believe that
government owns development based on reasons ranging from the allotment of government
subsidies for services and medication to the decentralized state of health care – a process of
decentralization over which they feel little control. Technocrats in the MoH suggested otherwise.
One top government official in the MoH gave a resounding no in response to my question as to
whether or not the government owns development:
Non, le gouvernement ne s’approprie pas le développement parce que le gouvernement
détruire l’argent. Il gaspille l’argent. Ca va dire qu’il travail, oui, mais ce n’est pas arrivé.
Ils auraient pu mieux faire (No, the government does not own development because the
government destroys money. They waste money. That means they work, yes, but it’s not
enough. They could have done better).35
For other officials in the MoH, the reason for government not owning development came back to
the question of aid dependence. “Il y a beaucoup de volonté pour pouvoir aller dans le sens de
[l’appropriation], mais quand on n’a pas souvent l’argent, les choses sont dicter d’ailleurs quoi”
(There’s a lot of will to own development, but when one often doesn’t have money, these things
are dictated from elsewhere).36
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Tacit conflict over the terms, definitions, and the ways in which it is manifest in the
development sector exists between donors and government. Other than one official at the World
Bank, people I interviewed did not mention the presence of an operational development strategy
as evidence of ownership.37 Again, the focus was primarily on funding the health sector. This is
not necessarily divergent from the goals outlined in many of the international commitments to
reduce poverty and improve the health sector. For example, both the Abuja and Bamako aid
frameworks as well as the MDGs all refer multiple times to the need to increase government
funding to the health sector. With the exception of the World Bank, donors tied the term
inextricably to funding.
By contrast, Burkinabe government officials were particularly proud of, and grounded in
their national and sector-wide strategy for health promotion. One official in the MoH maintained,
“je prend l’exemple très simple, si je me dit que le Burkina s’approprie son développement, par
exemple, je prend le PNDS. Un peu en Afrique d’Ouest [le Burkina] est un exemple. Le Burkina
est un exemple et les gens même viens s’inspirer de l’exemple de Burkina” (I’ll give a very
simple example, I tell myself that Burkina owns its development, for example, I take the PNDS.
Burkina is somewhat of an example in West Africa. Burkina is an example and people are even
inspired by Burkina).38 Pointing out how Burkina’s PNDS is an example that other West African
states use as a model for their own health strategies is exemplary of the pride this government
official takes in producing a development strategy, which he then associates with the
government taking ownership of development policies in health. Many government officials
share in this sentiment. One Burkinabè doctor I interviewed who currently works for USAID but
formerly practiced under the MoH, characterized the PNDS as an important document that the
government elaborated in order to achieve strategic objectives in the health sector.39 At the
same time, another top official from USAID, with an American nationality, described the
Part of the Paris Declaration’s operationalization of ownership is the presence of an operational development strategy. The
operational development strategy often takes the form of a Poverty Reduction Strategy paper.
38
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document as not that important, and not a living document, because there had been no changes
to the PNDS since it was validated.40
Although other donors may have mentioned contributing to the PNDS and
“accompanying” government in their quest to execute the stated objectives, no donor (other
than one World Bank official) used the document as an example of government ownership
(Ministère de la Santé 2011). That the Bank highlighted the government’s creation of the PNDS
as exemplary of government control of development is not striking, particularly because, as
explained in my earlier discussion of ownership, the Bank is responsible for formulating and
promoting this technocratic approach to development policy making (Pender 2001; Goldman
2006). Given its role in establishing this framework, the Bank is thus heavily invested in the
government’s ownership of the PNDS. However, this particular Bank representative also linked
ownership to the government’s ability to finance 100% of the health sector and development
programs and projects overall: “Avec la déclaration de Paris, on peut dire qu’il y a un tendance
ver l’appropriation. Bien sur quand tu as 40% de ton financement qui dépend des aides
extérieur, tu peut avoir petites influence par ci par la (With the Paris Declaration one can say
there is a trend towards ownership. Of course when you have 40% of your financing that
depends on outside aid, you can have small influences here and there).41
The collection of actors in Burkina’s civil society are numerous and vibrant. Scholars
have mislabeled civil society and Burkina as a-political, when in fact actors in Burkina’s civil
society have engaged in a number of politically transformative movements (Engberg-Pedersen
2002). Since 2008, multiple movements (both organized and acephalous) steeped in political
and economic demands have arisen around issues varying from cost of living to police impunity.
In 2008, the Coalition Against the High Cost of Living together with national labor unions
organized a national protest under the banner “La vie est cher (Life is expensive) to protest the
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exponentially rising cost of living. Three years later, in 2011, in what might be the third or fourth
largest city in the country, police killed a student, John Zongo, which led to massive protests,
looting, and demonstrations around the country (Hilgers and Loada 2013; Banegas 2015). While
the explicit aims were to have the offending officers prosecuted, the larger and implicit target
was the pervasive air of impunity that encapsulated government officials, military, and police
activities.
During the protest, demonstrators burned government buildings, the CDP headquarters,
and police stations and attacked police officers until the officers involved were eventually jailed.
In 2011, there were also 64 distinct local mobilizations in Burkina (Harsch 2016). Perhaps the
most significant uprising came in October 2014 with the forced resignation of 27-year incumbent
president Blaise Compaoré. From formal CSOs like Balai Citoyen, to women carrying wooden
spoons, people marched in the streets of nearly every major city in Burkina, demanding the
ouster of Compaoré (Harsch 2016; Vink and Sangaré 2015). The protests ended with a burned
National Assembly building, a destroyed hotel where CDP officials took refuge during the
protests, and the burned homes of political allies and family members of the former president.
Ultimately, Compaoré fled into exile in neighboring Côte D’Ivoire, leaving the country open to a
democratic transition (Harsch 2016).
This level of political engagement testifies to the willingness of average people to
participate in the processes of political and economic development. Calls by the international
community for the inclusion of civil society organizations in the development process and as
stakeholders in the ownership model come against this backdrop of considerable domestic
political unrest (OECD 2011, 2008). Donors continue to expect that civil society organizations
and people will increase the government’s potential for achieving development goals in
Burkina’s health sector (Brinkerhoff 1999; Steinle and Correll 2008), regardless of the level of
internal unrest.
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There are a plethora of actors contributing to the Burkinabè health system: faith-based
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, international nongovernment organizations,
community based organizations, and associations, just to name a few. Under the ownership
paradigm, these actors should participate in elaborating the sector-wide strategy for the health
sector and aid government in implementing the projects and programs tied to national health
policies. With a decentralized health system based on the Bamako Initiative, local actors are
heavily incorporated into the health framework; but whether or not they in fact exercise power or
have autonomy is an altogether different question, to which I will later return. At the community
level, there is the Comité de Gestion (CoGes, Management Committee). The CoGes consists of
members from the local communities services by the CSPS, otherwise known as the aire
sanitaire. Community members elect representatives from their villages to serve on the CoGes
board for a number of years. The members are responsible for implementing health related
activities and using funds collected from the community in conjunction with the CSPS.
Community members are also responsible for selecting the manager of the pharmacy, from
within the community.
Civil society members also play a critical role in implementing the policies and programs
tied to either the national health strategy or to donor health programs and projects that
circumvent that government’s strategy. For example, in order to implement the PADS and the
PNDS, donors and government fund large NGOs. The NGOs, in turn, will find local associations
throughout a particular region in order to implement the different activities and sensitize the
population based on the articulated directives from the Programme d’Appui au Développement
Sanitaire (PADS, Program to Support Health Development). These community-based
organizations are responsible for working with a certain number of villages and their agents de
santé (health promoters) to carry out grassroots health promotion in the village. In this way, civil
society members become essential for implementing the health policies created under the
ownership model, in a top-down fashion. This diffusion model reflects the ways in which
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ownership is not an innocuous concept that state actors and donors employ with little
consequence. Instead, these actors breathe life into the concept through their implementation of
PADS and other national health strategies produced under the ownership framework. Later in
this chapter, I will demonstrate how this system further reinforces the neoliberal approach to
health and development.
Although the majority of my interviews with civil society members came from local health
associations working in the city of Tenkodogo and the neighboring villages, I also included input
from Burkinabé who do not work in the health sector, or have worked as former members of
CoGes. I engaged these respondents in the capital Ouagadougou and in the city of Koudougou,
primarily. These respondents were able to provide a more qualitative assessment of the health
care system than that conveyed by the quantitative data that the state and donors used to
assess the system. In this context, it becomes important to interrogate how this range of actors
define and engage with ownership.
Civil society’s understanding of ownership is more in line with that of the government.
Respondents in the different community-based organizations and in civil society, in general,
often met my question, “What does ownership of development mean to you?” with hesitation.
On multiple occasions, I had to explain that there was no right answer to the question.
Collectively, civil society members working in the health sector relate ownership to an
understanding of the role that individuals within the community have in bringing about
development at the country level: “le développement droit être un problème ou une question de
tout le monde. Et tout le monde droit s’impliquer pour que l’Etat puisse se développer. Ce n’est
pas un problème de seulement les dirigeants pour le gouvernement, mais tout les citoyens
s’impliquer pour que on puisse atteindre se développement effectivement” (Development should
be a problem or a question for everyone. And everyone should involve himself or herself so that
the state can develop. It’s not a problem for only government leaders, but all citizens involve
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themselves so that we can achieve development).42 These sentiments reflect the dominant
understanding of development amongst members of civil society. “L’appropriation de
développement ca va dire que chacun de nous a en tète son développement. Il ne droit pas
attendre que quelqu’un ailleurs pour venir te dire, il faut que tu fasse comme ca pour être
développer. Ca, ce n’est pas un développement qui est propre a toi même” (Ownership of
development means that each one of us has development in mind. He shouldn’t wait for
someone elsewhere to come to tell you; you must do it this way in order to be developed. That’s
not a development that is just for you personally).43 For many people in civil society, notions of
ownership are thus shaped both by the need to understand the policy itself and by a felt sense
of responsibility for implementing it.
As with many government officials, a number of respondents do believe that the
government owns development in the health sector because the government produces
development strategies for the sector. One respondent working for a local association in
Tenkodogo stated, “le gouvernement essaye de s’approprier le développement parce que le
gouvernement a élaboré ces plan de développement” (The government tries to own
development because it elaborated its development plans).44 Not all civil society members felt
that government was either owning or on track to own development in the health sector. For
many, and especially those not working with PADS or NGOs, the government was not in the
position to own development because of the democratic transition that was taking place at the
time I conducted interviews (i.e., from June to August in 2015). Again, the general consensus
was that government was on course to own development, not because it was fully funding
development in the health sector, but because it produces health strategies and works with
donors.
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How does ownership work in Burkina Faso?
As explained previously, the PNDS is the national strategy that articulates the national plan for
developing the health sector in accordance with the priorities outlined in PNS, which
corresponds with the country’s larger economic development objectives in the SCADD, which is
Burkina’s variant of the PRSP. These documents do not remain stagnant at the national level. In
fact, government and donor institutions alike use local level organizations to carry out the
objectives by financing the relevant activities under the PADS. As it stands, the PADS funds
different NGOs throughout the country, who in turn, fund local associations. These associations
use the money to pay for their own overhead costs and the activities outlined under the PADS. I
was able to experience this process first hand in Tenkodogo.
While in Tenkodogo, I was able to participate in a meeting hosted by the NGO
Renforcement de Capacités (RENCAP), which funds ten different associations working in the
Tenkodogo district. The PADS is comprised of multiple targets based on the PNDS. Donors pay
the NGO, which pays the associations, which pay the village agents, to implement related
program. Donors include the pannier commun (community basket), which is a compilation of
various donors, including the World Bank, UNFPA, and Gavi vaccinations. The meeting I
attended in July 2015 functioned to gather ground-level data from the various associations with
respect to their implementation of key activities. At the meeting, representatives from the ten
different associations presented their reports from the previous trimester of activities to the NGO
representatives. The NGO then gathered the data for a larger report to transmit to the donors
and government funding the different strategic activities. There were four major strategic
activities that donors funded: improving governance and leadership in health; reinforcing
communication for changing behavior; improving the delivery of health services; and promoting
health and the fight against diseases. For this particular meeting, the associations were
reporting on their progress on these activities from January through June of 2015.

60

The tone and orientation of the meeting was illustrative of the impact that donor priorities
and knowledge structures have in dictating how policies are executed and subsequently turned
in to reports that suggest progress in development. The number of community awarenessraising activities or sensibilizations that each association carried out, along with whether or not
they were successful in completing the tasks assigned, weighed heavily in whether the NGO
thought the associations would continue to receive funding. In fact, at one point, a number of
associations had to explain why they were not able to execute the perdue de vue activity that
GAVI Vaccinations funds through the PADS.45 Most of the association members attributed not
being able to complete the task to the lack of cooperation on the part of the ICP at the CSPS,
along with the last minute addition of GAVI to the list of participants. In response, the head of
the NGO emphasized how their inability to complete the task and spend the money would lead
to less money in the future.
In another instance, the head of the NGO at the helm of the consultation questioned how
all of the associations could have 100% completion of all of the assigned activities; he in turn
suggested that he would corroborate reports with the various CSPSs. The general tone was not
one of full participation in the decision-making process with respect to the health activities or
some “partnership” between these local associations and the more politically well-connected
NGO, donors, and the state. Rather, it appeared as if the associations were to function mainly
as the sensibilizing-mechanisms for the larger health policies that came from the capital,
Ouagadougou. Much of their data and motivation for the activities seemed purely financial.
Many of the members noted in their interviews how their particular organization could not
continue functioning without the funds from the PADS. As one of the association members
stated: “quand un financement tombe, ce n’est pas pour s’amuser avec. On vous dit, voila, vous
respectez nos clause. Nous voulons intervenir dans le district sanitaire de Tenkodogo. Et voila,
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Perdue de Vue refers to children that do not complete the series of vaccinations. One of the activities that GAVI Vaccination
required from members of the local associations was to find these children and keep them on file.
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nous attendons telle, telle, et telle résultats. Donc, c’est [les PTF] qui on le dernier mot. Nous,
on ne fait que exécuter leur désires quoi” (When financing falls, it’s not something to play with.
They tell you, look, you respect our clause. We want to intervene in Tenkodogo’s health district.
And look, we are waiting for these, these, and these results. So, it’s the donors who have the
last word. Us, we do nothing but execute their desires).46
Ownership of development in the Burkinabè contexts operates to further entrench the
problematic elements of the development enterprise. The paradigm itself keeps states locked
into a neoliberal development paradigm through the act of sensibilization, which takes place at
multiple levels. Despite donors contending that ownership is evident where governments are
financing the majority of the budget for development, this does not mean that donors do not see
a continued need for their presence in Burkina’s health sector. Instead, donors are moving to
position themselves as technical and epistemic sources of power. By promoting their
contribution as less financial and more knowledge-based under this framework of “development
partners”, donors have the potential to become permanent advisors on development without
taking on the financial burden. This maneuver places the responsibility for failed health policies
on the state and civil society, while absolving donors of any direct responsibility.

Creating the Underdeveloped Subject
The ownership paradigm situates poverty reduction and development as key problems that the
international community and domestic actors in “developing” nations must address. The belief in
the country’s struggle or incapacity to develop without donor assistance is also evident in its
PRSP and PNDS. The dominant document that international donors and institutions use to
define and articulate ownership is aptly titled, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. The four
pillars of Burkina’s PRSP are all poverty and economically driven: “raising growth and equity in
a stable macroeconomic environment to reduce poverty; increasing access to and quality of
46
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basic social services; improving employment and income opportunities for the poor; improving
governance with a particular emphasis on public sector management and budget management
reforms” (World Bank 2010, 3). Much of the belief that countries like Burkina remain works in
progress, with respect to development, is also evident in the explicit aims of MDGs. By investing
in this model, development’s underlying process of creating the underdeveloped does not
cease. Instead, it is further entrenched in national actors’ imaginaries.
At the state level, the Burkinabè government has, in fact, tangibly bought into the notion
that the country is underdeveloped, or developing by producing PRSPs and using them as a
measure of ownership. With this process comes the reinforcement of being underdeveloped in
popular consciousness as well. One government official noted, “Le Burkina, c’est un pays sousdéveloppé. Donc, quand on parle de développement, c’est de sortir de sousdéveloppement…C’est d’être totalement indépendant. Actuellement, on dépend beaucoup de
l’aide extérieur” (Burkina is an underdeveloped country. So when one speaks of development,
get out of being underdeveloped. It’s to be totally independent. Actually, we depend a lot on
outside aid).47 No government official would disagree with this statement. In fact, these
sentiments resurfaced at the MOFE and MoH alike, with government officials describing Burkina
Faso as “un pays pauvre” (a poor country) or “un pays sous-développé” (an underdeveloped
country).48
Despite the government’s efforts to remediate problems such as high infant and
maternal mortality, decreasing the number of fatal malaria cases, and increasing the number of
CSPSs, Burkina still remains unable to achieve MDGs or to satisfy the global agenda for
development in health (Ministry of State for Planning, Land Use and Community Development
and United Nation System in the Burkina Faso 2012). In fact, using the measurements provided
by the UN, over 80% of low-income African countries were not on track for meeting the 4th and
47

NM0107, 07/01/2015_Koudougou
BS3006, 06/30/2015_Ouagadougou; NM0107, 07/01/2015_Koudougou; DR0107, 07/01/2015_Ouagadougou; CD0707,
07/07/2015_Ouagadougou
48

63

5th Millennium Development (i.e. good on reducing mortality in children under five years old and
improving maternal health), although they made significant progress in these areas (Cohendet
et al. 2014).
Institutions like the World Health Organization contribute to this sense of
underdevelopment as well. Although the organization acknowledges some of the country’s
achievements with respect to progress on MDGs 6 (on combating HIV/AIDS and reversing
current trends) and improvements towards MDGs 4 and 5, the list of challenges that remain are
nothing short of daunting. According to the WHO, Burkina still needs to strengthen the health
system to drive forward implementation of priority health interventions; improve the quality of
health care; improve financial access to health care for the poorest and most vulnerable; reduce
maternal, neonatal and infant and child mortality rates; reduce the double burden of
communicable and noncommunicable diseases through prevention, case management, and
research and surveillance, including implementation of the International Health Regulations;
routinely take account of the social determinants of health as essential component for improving
the health of the population; improve the availability and affordability of quality, safe and efficient
health products; adopt a health financing strategy, give effect to the universal health insurance
scheme and the various initiatives on subsidies and free medical care; develop a strategy for
health promotion that includes community health (l’Organisation Mondiale de la Santé 2009;
World Health Organization 2014). Some of the challenges listed remain unfulfilled by some of
the most “developed” countries in the West (Connolly Carmalt, Zaidi, and Yamin 2011). These
challenges will also take time and resources that will extend into the not-so-near future,
prolonging the need for interventions on the part of the international community. The WHO’s
problems for Burkina’s health sector are not lost on the state policy-makers or at the local level
in the CSPS. In fact, during my interviews, many respondents contributed to this laundry list with
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a number of other problems that plagued the health sector, like the limited number of nurses
and doctors, receiving medication in a timely manner, or even aesthetically pleasing facilities.49
Civil society actors were also keen to point out how poor and underdeveloped Burkina is.
Health workers in the different associations articulated a very similar sentiment to that voiced by
government officials: “on ne peut pas dire actuellement que le Burkina se développe même.
Mais il y a des efforts qui sont faire qu’a même pour aller vers ce développement la. (We can’t
actually say that Burkina is actually developing. But, there are efforts being made at least
towards development.)”50 Beyond just the actors working directly with civil society organizations,
my personal encounters with Burkinabé also reflected this understanding of Burkina as poor and
not having enough resources to develop itself. On several occasions, my status as an American
solicited request for money and help with visas to the U.S. because “tout les Américains sont
riche et les Burkinabè, ils sont pauvre” (All Americans are rich and the Burkinabè are poor). This
persistent reference to Burkina not as “developing” or “developed” but “underdeveloped” speaks
to the critiques that scholars like Gustavo Esteva (1992) and Sylvia Wynters (1996) have of the
development industry.51 There are psychological and tangible consequences for the
underdeveloped subject.
Situating oneself on a teleological spectrum of progress predicated on the unique
histories of only a handful of the world’s population requires that one perpetuate and reify the
myth of development. Oddly enough, the most pervasive donors in Burkina’s health sector were
also the ones to note that the ways in which one defines development are in some ways based
on a Eurocentric model and international norms.52 Nevertheless, the feelings of being
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underdeveloped and too poor to develop without donors percolate from the government level to
the level of society.

Indispensable donors
Resolving Burkina’s health problems under the ownership model leads to the necessity of the
indispensable donor. For many of the state and local stakeholders working in the health sector,
donors are essential for maintaining Burkina’s health system. Government officials were very
clear that the Burkinabè government elaborates its own health development strategies in
collaboration with other stakeholders (both local and international). Again, this exemplified
ownership for many of the respondents in the MOFE and MOS. However, they also made it very
clear that developing and executing the strategies would be especially difficult without donors’
financial and technical assistance.53
For example, nurses at the CSPS in Koudougou were vocal about the role that they
think donors play in keeping the health system a float: “c’est eux [donors] qui vient justement
soulager beaucoup plus la population Burkinabè”. (It’s donors that come and relieve so much of
the Burkinabè population).54 More often than not, the health workers suggested that donor
influence and presence was not only positive but essential for providing subsidized medicines
and services to the Burkinabè population. A typical CSPS, secteur cinq’s (sector 5) building and
aesthetics were by no means welcoming. Parts of the ceiling were rotted out. All of the walls
were covered with more dirt than paint. The floors, cracked slabs of cement, were equally
layered in dirt. Each wall displayed health propaganda that bore the mark of an international
donor. One sign stated, “You want your wife to help you work? Support her in choosing a
contraceptive” paid for by USAID. Each of the consultation rooms contained boxes of Plumpy
Nut and sacks of cereal from World Food Program, staples of food relief. Given the amount of
is around 1%. A World Bank official explained how we do not label Cuba as developed, although it has a health system comparable
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tangible goods the nurses at the CSPS receive from donors and the ubiquitous presence of
donor-sponsored health fliers, it is no wonder they feel that donors maintain the health system.
Associations at the local level find that their work would be especially difficult to carry out
without donor support. As the director of one association noted, “on est dans un système ou le
financement est obligatoire. On a un besoin de financement pour pouvoir fonctionner” (We are
in a system where financing is necessary. One needs financing to be able to function), or as
another member of a different association stated, “aujourd’hui on comprend que le monde
aujourd’hui, ca évolue avec l’argent” (Today, things evolve with money).55 This sense of financial
necessity guides much of the reverence for donors and their contributions to the health sector. It
also leaves the majority of the organizations unable to say that they are autonomous. As a
number of workers in grassroots health promotion organizations commented in interviews that
many of their important health activities depend on donor funding to continue. This is not only
the case in the health sector. The majority of community-based associations and NGOs in
Burkina depend on donors to finance not only their activities, but also their over-head costs
(Engberg-Pedersen 2002). Such financial dependence on donors and the state calls into
question whether these organizations fall into the traditional understanding of civil society. At the
same time, they demonstrate how these groups are brought directly into the ownership
paradigm to maintain it, not subvert it.
This financially grounded rendering of ownership places the responsibility for health
outcomes on the Burkinabè population while absolving donors of any responsibility.
Government and the community should be in control, meaning that they are the ones funding
development. These views are not divergent from the overall contemporary discourse on aid
and development. Donors and governments alike are suggesting that there be less aiddependence in low-income countries.56 However, the reality is that although foreign aid is
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declining in general, this does not automatically give way to more country ownership. Instead,
donors have repositioned themselves as “development experts”, giving advice in lieu of
finances. According to one staff member I interviewed in the Burkina Faso office of the World
Bank, “la banque joue un role de knowledges génération” (The Bank plays the role of
knowledge generation). 57 Their position as sources of knowledge for health development is also
evident in donors’ professed strategies for health. Strategies for donors, as each respondent put
it, are to “reinforce” either capacity or the health system. All donors claimed that their role is
merely to support government priorities, but USAID was clear about its lack of support for
traditional medicine and any health intervention not approved by the WHO, despite traditional
medicine being incorporated into the government’s national health strategy.58 The emphasis that
donors place on knowledge production and reinforcing capacity speaks directly to postdevelopment contentions with the development industry. For donors, in order to demonstrate
that they sit in the driver’s seat, government must be able to fully finance sector development;
whether local governments truly determine health priorities or possess a knowledge-set
essential to health development does not factor into the equation.

Donor Influence and Impunity
Instead of saying outright that donors are funding the health sector, or dictate the policy
direction, some government officials I interviewed instead used the term “accompagner” (to
accompany), which is also integral to the language of ownership. Donors exist only to
accompany the government by providing technical and financial expertise. “Les PTF n’ont pas
d’influence comme ca sur le PNDS. Oui ils ont participé à l’élaboration de PNDS. Alors, comme
nous sommes un pays a ressource limiter, il n’y a pas beaucoup d’argent, ce sont des
partenaires maintenant qui nous aident. …Ils pourront que accompagner “ (Donors don’t have
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that much influence over the PNDS. Yes, they helped to elaborate the PNDS. Since we are a
country with limited resources, there isn’t a lot of money. It's the partners now that come and
help us. They will only be able to accompany us).59 As I probed further in interviews in an effort
to have these officials explain how donors are merely accompanying government when donors
have provided the framework for the PNDS, panier commun, PRSPs (initially approving all of
these documents before work could commence), respondents began to speak more candidly
about the ways in which donors influence health policies. “Puis que c’est eux qui finance la mis
en oeuvre de ces documents. Donc les PTF même s’approprie plus nos documents que nous
même. Voila ils on travaillé beaucoup avec les PTF de PNUD, le systèmes de Nations Unis en
générale. Mais lis connaissent bien nos document, oui” (Because it’s them that finance the
implementation of these documents. So the FTP even own our documents more than we do.
They work more a lot with donors from UNDP, the UN system in general. But they are very
familiar with our documents).60 This explanation is limited to the financial influence that donors
wield over the policy process. Indeed, when respondents did acknowledge donor influence, it
was primarily financial. Even if the government wanted to implement alternative projects or
programs in the health sector, government officials felt that the process would be futile since the
government does not have the economic resources to put these projects and programs in place
without donor support. The implicit reality is that donors will only pay for a development that
corresponds with their vision.
Despite the aforementioned ways that donors influence health policies and development
in Burkina, donors still maintain that they have limited influence over development in Burkina. As
one official at the World Bank characterized the situation, donors have only as much influence
as the government allows.61 In fact, this same official suggested that bilateral donors like the
U.S. were the more likely to push their own agendas to influence health policies than the
59
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multilateral donors: “mais l’influence sur le développement de pays n’est pas obligatoirement les
multilatéraux telle que la banque mondial et le FMI. L’influence est beaucoup plus votre pays,
les pays bilatéraux. C’est eux qui font l’influence de développement et empêche l’appropriation
en tant que telle. Les pays bilatéraux telle que la France, l’Allemand, les Etats unis d’Amérique
qui ont en terme dans les politique d’aide (But the influence over country development is not
necessarily the multilaterals such as the World Bank and IMF. The influence is much more your
country, the bilateral countries. They are the ones that influence development and impede
ownership).” 62 While there may be more overt political agendas with bilateral donors (which
seemed to be the case especially with USAID) the World Bank and IMF’s ability to dictate the
direction of health policies in Burkina may be more pernicious in that it is not so overt.
Surprisingly enough, another World Bank officer professed, “we go into a meeting with the
ministry and they express the need to, I don’t know, um revise a law or something. We will
supply them with the technical support but there’s a conflict of interest there because we
actually want the law to change, so we will channel the technical support not in the views of the
ministry but from our own perspective. And so, you wonder, where is the ownership at that
point?”63
These examples of donors promoting development strategies and policies that are not in
line with local stakeholder visions diverge significantly from the Paris tenets of ownership. Yet,
by measuring ownership with respect to PRSPs and funding mechanisms, there is no space to
discuss the embedded presence of donors in the policy and development process; this, in turn,
makes deciphering whether or not government and local stakeholders are in control of
development both tedious and difficult. Furthermore, the responsibility for any failed policies is
laid on the doorstep of the Ministry of Health; impediments to development are thus rendered
internal to the country, neither the product of structural inequalities nor internal to the
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development paradigm itself. These tropes of underdevelopment, epistemic community of
donors and Burkinabè stakeholders’ dependence on donors are evident in the family planning
policies and their implementation in Burkina Faso.
Family Planning and Ownership
International policies have set the stage for family planning policies in Burkina Faso. The
1994 International Conference on Population Development (ICPD) and Post-2015 Goals are
exemplary of international commitments that further the narrative of population control as
necessary for poverty reduction and global development. The ICPD aided in reformulating the
question of reproductive health in terms of sustainable development. And, according to the
ICPD, sustainable development is a question of economic progress: “sustainable development
implies, inter alia, long-term sustainability in production and consumption relating to all
economic activities including industry, energy, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, transport, tourism
and infrastructure, in order to optimize ecologically sound resource use and minimize waste”
(United Nations Population Fund 1994, 18). In order to address “the magnitude, diversity and
urgency of unmet [family planning] needs”, the ICPD encourages the international community to
adopt favorable macroeconomic policies that promote ‘sustained economic growth and
development’ (ibid, 159). The international community of donors has furthered the
domestication of its norm through their financial and technical expertise in the development
arena. For example, through Family Planning 2020, where donors like UKAID, Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation, UNFPA, USAID, and the United Nations Foundation, created a Rapid
Response Mechanism (RRM) to that will enable donors to rapidly deliver funding and resources
to countries and local organizations to assist in increasing the number of girls and women using
contraceptives by 120 million by the year 2020.
According to international donors, the gravitas of limited access to family planning and
its impending impact on both global and domestic economies allows this issue to fall within the
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scope of development. Family planning is purportedly one more technically complicated
problem too difficult for African governments to address without financial and technical expertise
from donors. Burkinabè development stakeholders engage with this pairing of knowledge, family
planning, and economics. The country also adopts the language of crisis that surrounds the
need to increase family planning.
In Burkina’s National Family Planning Stimulus 2013-2015, the government warns that
unchecked population growth to 55 million people by 2050 would mean excessive strain on
resources, leading to limited employment options and stalled poverty reduction (Burkina Faso,
Ministry of Health, n.d., 7). The plan also maintains that maternal deaths could be prevented by
up to 30% with family planning (Ministry of Health, n.d.). Implementing the population policies
will be a matter of private-public partnerships, getting men involved, and monitoring availability
of contraceptives (Ministry of Health, n.d.). The fight to provide access to contraceptives in
Burkina Faso necessitates generating a demand. Some 1.5 million people in rural areas do not
want to space out or limit births; another 280, 000 want to limit or space births but do not want
family planning compared to 160,000 women in rural Burkina that want to space out their births
but are limited in their understanding of family planning (Ministry of Health, n.d.11). These same
disparities are evident in the urban areas as well: 280,000 women do not want to space or limit
births; 70,000 want to limit or space births but not through family planning; and only 40,000 want
to space out their births but are not knowledgeable about family planning. The high number of
women in Burkina Faso who do not want to space or limit births indicates that there is little
demand for modern contraceptives.
In the Burkinabè contexts, donors and the government attribute the limited demand for
modern contraceptives and spacing of births to traditional commitments at the local level. This
discourse permeates the local associations’ approaches to community health. The act of
sensibilizing is an attempt to change an individual or community’s comportment around a given
issue. Sensibilisations take on a number of forms, “telle que la causerie, les entretien
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individuelle, le projection de film, de démonstration de produit nutritionnelle” (such as talks,
individual interviews, movies, and demonstrations of nutritional products). The underlying
assumption is that the original comportment is detrimental to the livelihood of the individual or
the community. The community health associations in Tenkodogo and those working under the
PADS employ the act of sensibilizing around family planning with the understanding that not
using modern contraceptives and/or spacing births is symptomatic of tradition and
underdevelopment, as one health agent noted, “Notre objectif c’est d’amener cette population à
laisser tomber ces choses traditionnelle" (Our objective is to get this population to let go of
traditional things).64 In fact, the local associations’ primary responsibilities are to sensibilize the
surrounding communities in accordance with the policies being paid for under the PADS.
The local actors take their orders directly from the national development strategy, which
is largely the product of donor and international priorities in conjunction with governmentidentified priorities. Again, these priorities, however, must align with the larger paradigm of
development. Within the project breakdown of the PADS, the World Bank requires the NGOs
and local associations receiving money from the PADS to sensiblise men and women on the
advantages of family planning through sixteen targeted sensibilizations.65
The process of shaming women into consuming these forms of family planning
becomes integral to development. The director of one of the associations remarked with
conviction, “C’est en fonctionne de ca que au niveau des OMD…mais le Burkina, vous avez
appris que le Burkina ne sera pas au rendez-vous. On n’a pas atteindre parce que jusqu’
aujourd’hui il y a des décès maternelle. Si je vous sort les résultat tout de suite vous allez vois
que a Tenkodogo il y a eu plus de vingt décès maternelle au cour de l’année 2014. A donc c’est
pour dire que c’est pas finir, la planification familiale, une femme neuf enfants, c’est trop. Ou
bien?” (It is a function of this, at the level of the MDGs ... but Burkina, you have learned that
64
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Burkina will not make the appointment. We did not reach it because even today there are
maternal deaths. If I show the results to you right away you will see that in Tenkodogo there
have been more than twenty maternal deaths in the course of the year 2014).66 In this
statement, we see the way in which the Millennium Development Goals percolate from the
international level all the way into the communities. The director frames Burkina’s progress in
terms of reaching the MDGs, and in line with the hegemonic development narrative blames
failure to decrease maternal mortality rates on the lack of family planning adopted by women.
He continues, “la planification n’a pas marché. La population n’a pas compris. Et il y a un
grande travail a faire pour que la population puisse comprendre…parce que quand tu regard il y
a trop de décès infantile. Le taux est élevé. Alors dans d’autre pays et quand tu fait la
comparaison, tu vois la Belgique le taux de décès est trop bas au niveau maternelle” (The
planning did not work. The population did not understand. And there is a great deal of work to
be done so that the public can understand ... because when you look there are too many infant
deaths. The rate is high. So in other countries and when you make the comparison, you see
Belgium the death rate is too low at the maternal level).67 In this instance, the need to
understand the importance of family planning is lost on the Burkinabe population in a way that is
not lost on the Belgian population, where maternal death rates are low. Again, the inability to
develop becomes internal to Burkina, not the consequence of inequities in the valuation of
knowledge or unbalanced global economic structures.
This type of thinking was pervasive across development stakeholders I surveyed, but
especially those actors working closely with communities. For example, another health agent
explained how, “nous au Burkina ici, on met beaucoup au monde des enfants. Tu vas trouver
une famille qui a douze, treize enfants la seul femme. Alors que le monsieur peut avoir trois ou
quatre femmes. Si chaque femmes a douze enfants, lui seul il a combine plus de trente,
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quarante et l’entretien est difficile, et présentement il ne plu pas beaucoup. Donc, on sensibiliser
surtout si c’est la planification familiale pour qu’on diminue le nombre d’enfant qu’on met au
monde pour pouvoir les entretenir” (We in Burkina Faso, we bring a lot of children into the world.
You will find a family that has twelve, thirteen children, only one woman. While the gentleman
may have three or four women. If every woman has twelve children, he alone has combined
more than thirty, forty and the maintenance is difficult, and presently it does not rain much. So
we have to raise awareness, especially if it is family planning so that we can reduce the number
of children we give birth to be able to maintain them).68 In accordance with the larger policies
and approaches to family planning, family size and birthing become understood in the context of
productivity within the larger national economy (Gill and Scharff 2013).
Family Planning 2020, ICPD, and World Bank claims of family planning aiding in
economic growth, women’s empowerment, and thus poverty reduction all place the onus, once
again, for failed development on factors internal to the postcolonial country. Yet, there are
statistics from the UN that clearly demonstrate a decline in the global population and Africa as
well.69
As demonstrated previously, the Burkinabè government has incorporated this logic as
the scientific bases for their family planning policies. In suggesting that if their countries were to
reach the projected population rates, there would be untenable strain on already limited
resources, the governments and donors promoting these claims look over the ways in which
resources are strained because they have either been privatized and/or are not being
distributed. Scholars have long exposed the fallacy of statements regarding “food scarcity” or
lack of access to potable water as natural phenomena (Holt-Giménez, Shattuck, Altieri, Herren,
and Gliessman 2012; Lappe, Collins, and Fowler 1981; Gleick 2000). Furthermore, the neoMalthusian approach continues to re-postulate the population problem as one solvable only in
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the realm of economics. Women’s empowerment refers to their ability to contribute to the formal
economy. For example, in the course of my field observations, I saw that donors like USAID and
RespondProject had prominently displayed posters on local clinic walls that stated, “You want
your wife to work, support her in choosing a contraceptive.” These family planning policies are
superficially about liberating women and giving them autonomy over their reproductive health,
they instead constrain women’s choices (Saunders 2005).
This approach to family planning under the auspices of development and family planning
are not particular to Burkina Faso. Donors and governments are carrying out similar neoliberal
family planning policies throughout Latin America. In Peru, the government and donors promote
family planning policies within the context of rights and economic development. On the ground,
there is forced sterilization and shaming of primarily indigenous women in order to achieve
poverty reduction and global development targets like those adopted at the ICPD (Ewig 2011).
One scholar provides the example of an indigenous woman being shamed “Mrs. Mestanza and
her husband had been harassed by health care officials for having more than five children,
harassment directed at their social status and indigeneity” (Chinkin 2006, 54).
As international health agendas drive these policies through an irrefutable neoliberal
frame and consequently demand that states own these policies in order to continue receiving
funding, there is no consideration of local contexts for family planning (Ravindran 2014). For
example, a World Health Organization (WHO) study highlighted what’s called the “infertility belt”
that stretches across central Africa, where there are a growing number of African women
experiencing infertility (World Health Organization 2010). But for global health initiatives and
ownership to sincerely conform to cultural values, policies would reflect the social stigma
attached to infertility in Africa.
Instead, the crisis of overpopulation drives the putative narrative around adoption of
family planning methods. And because part of the OECD’s articulation of ownership is the more
concentrated incorporation of international agendas into domestic development frameworks,
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donors mobilize the need to meet international benchmarks like MDGs by mobilizing around
reducing maternal mortality to further the implementation of FP methods. At the national level,
when governments take responsibility for these commitments based on the assumption that the
problems are not exogenous to the country but internally produced, the people at the local level
must also fall in line with the given policies. By forcing the population to change its mentality and
engage with family planning, the implicit reasoning is that not conforming to the given policies
stalls national progress towards development.

Conclusion
In many respects, the story of ownership in Burkina is the narrative of struggle and
sacrifice for the chimera of development. The World Bank, IMF, and international community
writ-large proposed ownership of development as the catholicon for poverty reduction and allaround progress, when, in fact, it proves to be one more nostrum that serves only to further
entrench development in its neoliberal state. In my field study of the ownership concept in
Burkina’s health sector, I have discovered significant differences across three dominant groups
of stakeholders—government, civil society, and donors—specifically in relation to how these
actors define and measure ownership.
Burkinabè development stakeholders view ownership as the individual understanding his
or her role in contributing to the overall progress of the community or country. In this way, the
Burkinabè civil society representatives and government officials who I interviewed produce a
conceptualization of ownership that is informed by their particular experiences with collective
progress. However, this version of ownership conflicts with the definition of ownership
embedded in the ownership paradigm. Consequently, government officials recognize the
limitations of ownership as it comes from the international community of donors. Nevertheless,
the Burkinabè government consents to the paradigm in exchange for its promises of
development.
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Donors continue to assess levels of ownership (whether at the locus of government
institutions, CSOs, or community level) based on indicators of economic development. And,
although donors are very influential in the health sector (so much so that many respondents in
my interviews believed that the health system would collapse without donors), the responsibility
for failed health policies, projects, and programs falls squarely on the government’s shoulders.
Donors evade responsibility by reconstituting themselves as “knowledge experts” who are in the
country merely to reinforce capacity and accompany Burkina on its path towards development.
Consequently, the “knowledge” that these “experts” bring to the health sector, and development
in general, creates a different type of dependence that transcends our traditional notion of aiddependence. Donor knowledge is grounded in the assumption that there are no alternative
approaches to, or understandings of health and progress that emanate from the Burkinabè
themselves. A secondary assumption is that Burkina will attain a certain level of socio-economic
progress not based on the resources that the country has at its disposal but commensurate with
the level of outside support it receives. Based on this model, any substantial progress will
remain elusive; superficial success will come at the expense of alternative
knowledge/approaches to development.
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Chapter 3: Beggars Can’t Be Choosers
“..It must have been thought in international policy circles that the pain of adjustments would be
easier to bear if the people felt that they had voted for it themselves”
--Ankie Hoogvelt (2002, 24)
“If we want to turn Africa into a new Europe ... then let us leave the destiny of our countries to
Europeans. They will know how to do it better than the most gifted among us.”
― Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o (2013, 25)

Kenya is located on the eastern coast of Africa. A former British colony, the country has
experienced a tumultuous political trajectory and volatile economic environment since
independence in 1963. Politically, the country has had only four post-independence presidents,
two of whom were despotic by all accounts.70 Economically, the country is exposed to
exogenous shocks from the international market given its heavy dependence on primary
commodity exports (Government of Kenya 1996). Members of the international community have
linked the political and economic instability to low indicators of progress in Kenya’s social
sectors, especially health. International benchmarks for development show Kenya as lagging in
its attainment of global health initiatives like the MDGs and Abuja Declaratio (United States
Government 2014). The putative reasoning for the country’s besieged health sector is the
Kenyan government itself. By failing to implement the economic policies (and create the political
environment conducive to these policies) that the World Bank and IMF recommend, the
government of Kenya (GoK) is stalling development. Although the range of actors influencing
Kenya’s development extends beyond the Kenyan government, by adopting the ownership
paradigm, the government assumes responsibility for the failed policies in the Kenyan health
sector.
Examining ownership of development in Kenya provides an example of an African
country fully invested in the discourses and practices commensurate with the international
70

Jomo Kenyatta, the first president died in office and ruled through a one-party system. After his death, Daniel Arap Moi assumed
power without holding elections and remained in power, ruling with an iron fist in Kenya until the first multiparty elections in 2002. In
2007, the country also erupted in civil unrest during the second national election for the Kenyan presidency. Violence broke out
between supporters of the two dominant rivals, Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga.
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development paradigm, but still not arriving at “owning” its development by donor standards. In
this chapter I will demonstrate how lingering distrust between the donors and the Kenyan
government over policy implementation, no matter how much the Kenyan government attempts
to enter the development discourse community through the adoption of donor instruments and
jargon, donors working in the Kenyan health sector refuse to view the Kenyan government as a
partner. In both Burkina Faso and Kenya, the ownership paradigm does not view lack of policy
implementation as demonstrative of country ownership. But Kenya demonstrates a particular
dearth of potential for a genuinely country-specific approach to development allotted through the
ownership paradigm, despite its efforts to fully investing in this paradigm, Kenya further
illustrates how ownership absolves donors of responsibility for failed development while creating
the space for donors to operate as an indispensable source of development expertise under the
pretense of partnership.
I collected the data for this chapter during two trips to Kenya. During the first trip (in
June of 2013) I spent four weeks in Nairobi interviewing policymakers in the Kenyan Treasury
(then known as the Ministry of Finance) and the Ministry of Education, along with academics at
the University of Nairobi. My original intentions were to focus this case study on Kenya’s
education sector. Working on the education sector became challenging when I realized that
Kenya’s major education program, the Kenyan Education Sector Support Programme (KESSP),
had succumbed to a large corruption scandal in which billions of donor funds went missing. In
this context, posing questions about ownership (which is imbued with sentiments surrounding
government-donor relations) proved difficult. Policymakers in the Ministry of Education were
apprehensive to discuss KESSP, and their responses regarding questions of ownership seemed
tainted by their recent fall-out with donors over the missing KESSP funds. During the first trip,
the majority of my interviews were with government officials working in the external resource
department of the Ministry of Finance. These officials are responsible for working closely with
specific donors operating in the various sectors in Kenya. This department also houses the
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office tasked with monitoring implementation of the Paris Declaration. Between government
officials in the Treasury, Ministry of Education and University of Nairobi, I collected twenty-five
interviews over this period.
During my second trip to Nairobi (from December 2015 through January 2016) I focused
my data collection specifically on the health sector, conducting interviews with representatives
of civil society organizations and donors working in Kenya’s health sector. From within the
Ministry of Health, I spoke with three top officials responsible for working with donors and
developing the Kenya Health Sector Strategy. With respect to donors, I conducted semistructured interviews with two separate officials at the World Bank, the Japanese International
Cooperation Agency (JICA), and a former contractor with the European Union and the Danish
International Development Agency (DANIDA). The number of interviews from this trip totaled
twelve, bringing the overall total number of formal interviews in Kenya to thirty-seven.
I draw on these formal interview data to explore the question: what is ownership of
development in Kenya? During the interview process, I engaged respondents in elaborating the
context within which they determine what the concept means to them. I also asked whether the
government owns development in the health sector. In order to understand how ownership
actually works in the Kenyan context, I triangulate across three main sources of data: 1) my
interviews; 2) government policy documents (such as the Kenya Health Sector Strategy,
Kenya’s Vision 2030, and the Medium-term Expenditure Framework); and 3) donor and civil
society policy papers, like the World Bank’s country partnership for Kenya and the Health NGOs
Network (HENNET)’s strategic plan for 2014-2018. I also draw on other primary sources such
as Kenyan newspapers, along with secondary sources including published reports on
development in Kenya.
This chapter provides another empirical case for understanding the consequences of the
ownership paradigm in Africa. The next section outlines key economic and health policies in
Kenya that reflect hegemonic development discourses and explores how they are rooted in the
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geopolitics of donor knowledge. The subsequent section answers the questions driving this
research: what is ownership of development and how does it operate in Kenya? I find that
Kenyan stakeholders view ownership according to their roles as defined under the ownership
paradigm. Consequently, ownership leads to the same regressive outcomes in Kenya, as was
the case in Burkina. Ownership constructs donors as an indispensable source of development
knowledge; however, donors do not share accountability with the GoK for stagnant development
in Kenya. As with Burkina, the paradigm also reproduces the Kenyan development stakeholder
as an undeveloped subject but through different means than the Burkina case. In Kenya, the
mistrust that characterizes donor-government relations leads to a continued paternalistic
relationship in which the government can never arrive at being equal development partners with
donors.
Investing in Ownership: Taming the Domestic
The ownership paradigm consists of a constellation of principles, institutions, norms,
legitimate actors, problems, and acceptable solutions germane to economic, political, and social
development. Central to investing in this paradigm is the drafting of a PRSP that incorporates
global development initiatives like the MDGs, Paris and Accra principles, using World Bank and
IMF-sanctioned mechanisms like Sector Wide Approach (SWAps) and MTFs through formal
channels of stakeholder participation. The Kenyan government and civil society stakeholders
have adopted the ownership paradigm as their current modality for achieving development.
Kenya entered into the ownership paradigm under precarious economic conditions and a
strained relationship with donors in 1999. Unlike many other African countries that subscribed to
the paradigm in order to access HIPC funds, Kenya was not eligible for HIPC (Boote and
Thugge 1997; Hamner, Ikiara, Eberlei, and Abong 2003). The World Bank and IMF did,
however, require that the country produce a PRSP in order to continue receiving concessional
lending from both institutions (Hanmer et al. 2003). The Bank and Fund recommenced giving
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concessional loans to Kenya in August of 2000, only to suspend them four months later in light
of government corruption (Booth 2003). During this same period, the Kenya African National
Union (KANU) government (Daniel Arap Moi’s administration) was drafting their interim PRSP.
The IFIs resumed lending in 2002 with the new Kibaki administration and the National Rainbow
Coalition (NARC). The NARC government came in to office pledging to address corruption,
implement economic reforms, and restore the government’s relationship with the World Bank
and IMF (Shiverenje 2005). Kibaki elaborated the Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS)
predicated on the Bank and IMF’s poverty reduction framework in 2002. This document
demonstrated an act of good faith on the part of the Kenyan government towards working within
the institutional parameters established under the CDF. While the final PRSP still awaited
approval from the WB and IMF, the NARC government drafted the Economic Recovery Strategy
for Wealth and Employment Creation (ERSWEC), which set the groundwork for the 2004
approved version of the first iteration of the PRSP. ERSWEC, as a development strategy,
focused on stimulating economic growth and economic recovery (Ministry of Planning and
National Development 2003). Kenya’s willingness to draft a WB and IMF-approved poverty
reduction strategy was the country’s attempt to reposition itself within the larger aid-architecture
and demonstrate that the government was willing to play by the IFI’s rules on governance. For
example, the second of the four pillars in the ERSWEC promotes “good governance”,
understood as being derived from rule of law (Ministry of Planning and National Development
2003). Notably, the government’s inability to create an environment conducive to good
governance and rule of law were some of the Bank and Fund’s most enduring problems with the
Kenyan government during the low funding periods.
The Kenyan government continued to operate within the ownership paradigm when it
produced the second iteration of its PRSP in 2008: Kenya Vision 2030. Slightly different from
the goal of economic recovery, Kenya Vision 2030’s ultimate goal is to turn the country into a
middle-income country by the year 2030, ensuring that all of its citizens experience a “high
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quality life” (Ministry of State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030, 2008). The
first Vision 2030 covered the period from 2008 through 2012. The second Vision 2030 covers
from 2013 through 2017. Although the stated end goals may be different, both versions of the
Vision 2030 carry forward the stated objectives in the ERSWEC, especially on the economic
and political axes. Economically, Vision 2030 seeks to achieve a GDP growth rate of 10% per
annum through six key sectors: tourism, agriculture, wholesale and retail trade, manufacturing,
business process off-shoring, and financial services (Ministry of State for Planning, National
Development and Vision 2030, 2008). Politically, rule of law remains central to the country’s
political progress (Ministry of State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030, 2008).
To implement the PRSPs, the government adopted the Medium-Term Expenditure
Framework (MTF) and Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp). As stated previously, the MTEF and
SWAp are instruments that the Bank and Fund created to accompany the PRSP. These
instruments, especially the MTEF, are also now part of ownership paradigm. The Paris
Declaration, for example, states that partner countries exhibit ownership when they, “Translate
these national development strategies into prioritized result-oriented operational programmes as
expressed in frameworks and annual budgets” (OECD 2005, 3). Evidence of a MTEF, thus,
becomes an operational facet of ownership (OECD 2011). The SWAp is also tied to the CDF
and Paris Declaration. In an assessment of SWAps in the health sector, the World Bank states,
The World Bank and other donors proposed a new way of working with developing
country governments to overcome inefficiencies, lack of government ownership, and a
number of other problems that were constraining the impact of international support to
developing countries. This new approach, eventually called the Sector-Wide Approach
(SWAp), embraced many of the principles of harmonization and alignment that were
later endorsed by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 and subsequent
international meetings (Vaillancourt 2009, x).
Not only did the Kenyan government adopt these instruments, but the government stakeholders
whom I interviewed also acknowledged the government’s incorporation and elaboration of these
instruments as demonstrative of the government’s commitment to development, often with a
sense of pride. In fact, for one Bank official, the government demonstrates ownership because it
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is “able to draw [its] own vision, they are able to translate that to medium term plans and they
follow through. These are the ingredients of ownership.”71
In 1999, the Kenyan government implemented its first medium-term plan for the health
sector: the National Health Sector Strategic Plan (NHSSP). NHSSP detailed the development
goals and strategy for the health sector from 1999 through 2004. In line with the requirements
of ownership, the government created NHSSP through a consultative process that extended
beyond just the donor community. This strategic plan gave primacy to primary health care and
to addressing the remaining constraints on health, thus indicating a desired shift from the
previous neglect of the sector during the SAP era (Rono 2002; Mwabu 1995).
The second medium-term strategy, NHSSP II, spanned the following five years (2005
through 2010). NHSSP II (the first health strategy) incorporated more of the institutions under
the ownership paradigm. The GoK and donors established the first Sector Wide Approach
(SWAp) for the health sector in accordance with the second medium-term strategy. The purpose
of the SWAp is to gather all stakeholders in a given sector and coordinate them around the
sector priorities. In June 2006, the Joint Program of Work and Funding created the SWAp with
significant donor support; there was attempted consultation (albeit limited) involving other
stakeholders in health (Glenngård and Maina 2007; Wamai 2009).
Along with the adoption of the tools and instruments for achieving development under
the ownership paradigm, the Kenyan stakeholders also adopted the respective roles as defined
under the paradigm. The following section briefly discusses “participation”, which is integral to
the ownership paradigm in the drafting of Kenya’s PRSP. The section also explains the ways in
which the dominant development stakeholders in Kenya conceive of ownership based on my
field interviews.
Participation and Stakeholders
71
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In accordance with the ownership paradigm, when drafting the PRSP, countries must
allow for a wide range of stakeholder participation, including members of civil society,
parliament, and the private sector, as well as members of the donor community (OECD 2011;
World Bank 2005). The underlying assumption is that wide participation from country
stakeholders will increase the development strategy’s staying power. Even beyond the initial
drafting, country stakeholders are also encouraged to aid in the implementation phase (OECD
2011). These actors, through various interventions, are responsible for implementing and
maintaining the development strategy.
Kenya’s PRSP has come under scrutiny for continuing to exclude the poorest
populations from the consultation process, giving priority to expenditures that do not correspond
with the poor’s demands, and for failing to acknowledge the nuances in the poverty situation
across the country (meaning that different social groups and regions experience poverty
differently) the result has been to keep the final say for the PRSP in hands of technocrats at the
ministerial level (Nyamboga, Nyamweya, Sisia, and George 2014; Calaguas and O’Connell
2002; Ufanisi 2002; Kiringai and Manda 2002; Wilkes and Lefrancois 2002). Others have
praised Kenya’s PRSP as revolutionary and holistic, arguing that it has brought a refreshing
element of participation and transparency to the policy formation process, and in many respects,
helped align the strategy with community-level priorities (Hamner et al. 2003; Shiverenje 2005;
Swallow 2005). Despite these differences, few consider the exercise futile. Where the
document is limited in its efficacy, there is a lack of political will, or an in-opportune political and
economic environment (Shiverenje 2005; Hamner et al. 2003).
In fact, much of the belief in Kenya’s PRSP stems from the participatory element, the
more participation in developing and implementing these poverty reduction strategies, the better
the outcome for reducing poverty. Proponents of increased participation find this to be
particularly true for the health sector (Olayo, Wafula, Aseyo, Loum, and Kaseje 2014). Yet the
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focus on participation overlooks the uncomfortable reality that participation does not
automatically translate into influence. Or, as one scholar states, “What began as a political issue
is translated into a technical problem, which the development enterprise can accommodate with
barely a falter in its stride. Incorporation, rather than exclusion, is often the best means of
control” (White 1996, 7). In an attempt to indicate a shift to the current development paradigm
from the neoliberal development paradigm of the 1980s and 1990s, donors moved to bring the
state and civil society back into the development process through increased participation and
ownership. Accordingly, each of these stakeholders has a hand in the country “owning”
development. This also suggests that the limits of each stakeholder’s participation are inscribed
in the paradigm’s principles.
One of the problems, however, with the term “ownership” of development is that its
meaning and application are ambiguous (Buiter 2007; Meyer and Schulz 2008; Renzio,
Whitfield, and Bergamaschi 2008). In the Kenyan context, there was more consensus across
stakeholders regarding the definition of ownership. I found that the Kenyan government, civil
society, and donors contributing to the Kenyan health sector all defined ownership in relative
accordance with the conceptual definition given in the Paris Declaration and Accra versions of
ownership; The Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) define ownership similarly
as: “Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies and
strategies and co-ordinate development actions” (2005/2008, 3).72 Different from the dominant
definition attached to the paradigm, is the restricted view of ownership being applicable only to
the government. Distinct from donors and government officials, the Kenyan civil society
representatives I interviewed saw their implication in the ownership process as being central to
bringing about ownership and development in Kenya.
Government
72

This is also the case for the education sector, which I focused on during the preliminary fieldwork for this study. The policymakers
in the Ministry of Education and the three academics whom I interviewed all defined ownership along the same lines as those
elaborated under the ownership paradigm.

87

During the first two decades following Kenyan independence, government was the only
stakeholder capable of ownership.73 Despite being the dominant decision-making apparatus,
however, government is not a monolithic entity; rather, it is a constellation of various institutions,
groups and ideologies. I thus interviewed a range of actors at the ministerial level. Despite there
being considerable differences in the sectors and policy foci, those who I interviewed in the
Kenyan Treasury’s External Resource Department and Ministry of Health all had corresponding
understandings of ownership: government should be in charge of its policies, programs, and
strategies. As a respondent in the External Resource Department put it, “We develop our own
policy. We develop our own programs. We have our own strategies. And then, we tell our
partners, this is the direction we are walking.”74 Or, more broadly as an official in the MoH
stated, “the country is in charge of its affairs.”75 Although the Paris document employs the term
country with a range of government and nongovernment stakeholders in mind, and most of the
Kenyan government respondents refer to the government as the agent responsible for
ownership, the Paris document implies that government should be the leading stakeholder.76
A number of respondents also used the metaphor of government being “in the driver’s
seat” to further explain ownership. 77 The government’s rendering of ownership also places
significant emphasis on donor support and presence in Kenya’s overall development process.
Referring to government and donors, one Ministry of Health official discussed the concept in
these terms: “ownership of development ideally should be where we sit together and, of course,
you are there to support me. We look at everything that we have. We agree on this, this is the
direction…so this is what I have, you say what you have and you support me to deliver on
Johnson and Wasty unpack the World Bank’s early articulations of “borrower ownership” as a mechanism for “providing credibility
to policies, safeguarding against policy reversals, and ensuring sustainability of benefits” (1993, 1). In this form, the state is the
borrowing entity and there is no reference to other stakeholders.
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The Accra Agenda for Action stipulates that ownership should include civil society. The Paris Declaration language thus begins to
refer to the larger network of country stakeholders as necessary for ownership; however, implicit in the operationalization of the term
is the primacy given to government. For example, partner countries commit to, “tak[ing] the lead in co-ordinating aid at all levels in
conjunction with other development resources in dialogue with donors and encouraging the participation of civil society and the
private sector” (OECD 2005/2008, 3).
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this.”78 For Kenyan government respondents, there was very little mention of civil society being a
necessary part of ownership. Donors seemed to be the primary partners in their quest for
development through the ownership paradigm.

Donors
Under the ownership paradigm, and with creation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers (PRSPs), donors should no longer be at the forefront of project and program
implementation. In allowing government and country stakeholders to take more control of their
development policies, donors should ease their grip on policy formation and implementation. All
of the donors whom I interviewed made this abundantly clear: the national government (not
donors) is responsible for implementation. Donors in Kenya should be working towards
harmonizing and aligning their systems for delivering aid with those in the Kenyan government
and working within the established policy frameworks that the government and other Kenyan
stakeholders have created to improve development.
The donor community in Kenya appears to have the same definition of ownership as the
government and the OECD: “Country-led, country-initiated, country-driven and a process that
actually addresses the concerns or the priorities of that particular government.”79 This was the
general consensus among donors. Representative who I interviewed from key donor agencies
argued that the country or government should determine its development trajectory. To the
extent that donors are present, they should not impose their own agendas on the government.
As with the Kenyan government’s definition, there is no concrete mention of civil society.
Ownership remains very government-centered. Civil society is not central to the ownership
process from the donor perspective.
Much of this focus on government perhaps comes from the contentious relationship
between government and donors. Kenya’s history of stalled implementation of donor
78
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conditionalities and what donors deem poor governance and corruption in the government
continue to mar the donor-government relationship in Kenya. My interviews revealed a
significant lack of trust between these two sets of development stakeholders. Both the World
Bank and JICA identified implementation as one of the major challenges that they experience in
working with government in the health sector. One Bank official gave the example of a health
insurance subsidy program that is stalled in the government, which means that the Bank is,
“spending hours, and hours, and hours, chasing implementation instead of using the time to do
other things.”80 As I will demonstrate later, this lack of trust between government and donors
translates into the GoK begging for more “ownership” vis-à-vis donors.
Civil Society
As key development stakeholders, understanding civil society’s rendering of ownership is also
essential. In Kenya, civil society organizations (comprised of faith-based organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and community-based organizations) began to directly receive
development assistance in the late 1980s (Amutabi 2013).81 Donors began to redirect funds
from government projects and programs to NGOs in the late 1990s (Booth 2003). Within the
ownership paradigm, CSO actors are responsible for a range of monitoring and implementation
functions including “to monitor the implementation of PRSP in the context of specific sectors
and/or thematic groups, such as gender, governance, HIV/AIDS, pastoralism, natural resource
utilization and management…monitoring is to be done in relation to budgetary allocations and
impact of the same on target groups” (Shiverenje 2005, 29). Each developmental sector has
established an umbrella organization for CSOs operating within the particular sector. For health,
the Health NGO Network or HENNET is the lead organization for the sector.
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Civil society in Kenya is constituted of non-state actors. The Health NGO Network (HENNET) refers to itself and member
organizations as the private sector in their strategic plan, which is not odd in Kenya since, according to one NGO director, there are
time when the private sector is included under the civil society umbrella (0053CSO, 01/08/2016_Nairobi).
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HENNET currently has 92-member organizations responsible for implementing health
programs throughout the country. The organization works in the realm of policy formation,
advocacy, and monitoring and evaluation of health programs, projects, and strategies. HENNET
also participated in elaborating the SWAp for Kenya’s health sector (HENNET Secretariat
2014). The director of programing described the organization as being highly influential with
respect to the health sector strategy: “In terms of the health sector strategic plan, I think we
influenced a lot in terms of bringing on board [the] private sector and influencing health and
contributing to health service delivery in the country.”82 As an organization, HENNET also
receives a substantial amount of its financial support from bilateral donors. In fact, all of the
representatives of CSOs that I interviewed were actively receiving donor funds. With HENNET,
however, the contribution was notable: “I might say we are 50/50; HENNET depends majorly on
donor funds...”83
Not surprisingly, representatives from the civil society groups produced a more communitycentered understanding of ownership. For example, one director of a NGO defined ownership
as, “all actors participate in the entire cycle of development, implementation, and feel their
decisions and contributions are valid and incorporated.”84 Another CSO respondent defined it in
similar terms, “Feeling a part of the planning process [and] taking it as your own.”85 To give
context to this definition, the respondent gave an example of ownership from her personal
experience. Growing up in a part of Kenya where access to water was limited, she explained
how donors would constantly go to her village and build water pumps without involving the
community. When the pumps would break, members of the village community took no initiative
to fix them. The village ultimately became littered with broken pumps. On one occasion, a donor
organization came to build another pump; this time, however, they involved the community in
the design and implementation stages of the project. While the rest of the pumps remain broken
82
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or have been removed, the NGO director noted how that particular pump remains a working
fixture and reflects a sense of pride for the community. This example is representative of the
general consensus on what ownership looks like in practice from people in civil society: the
community being involved in the various stages of development projects and programs. This
rendering of ownership corresponds far more to the amendments made to the ownership
paradigm at the Accra meeting. Interestingly enough, the CSO version of ownership does not
have the same underlying sense of donor dependency as with the government version. In fact,
one CSO respondent defined ownership as, “communities will think through innovative ways to
deal when things continue beyond donor funding.”86
Analyzing these three views on ownership illustrates the distinct manifestations of the
concept on the ground across the three main stakeholder groups. How people in each group
engage the term is a matter of their position of power within the policy-making institutions.
However, each of these stakeholders is aware of, and actively trying to increase ownership in
Kenya’s health sector through the various stages of the policymaking process, from creation to
monitoring and evaluation. The active pursuit of ownership on the part of each stakeholder
demonstrates the level of investment each group has in the paradigm. What each group also
understands is that the other groups are now permanent fixtures in the development process.
As one Ministry of Health official put it, “[Donors] are now our partners, like the communities are
our partners.”87 Again, this tripartite framework of government, donors, and civil society for
development policymaking comes directly from the ownership paradigm. The paradigm does
not, however, expose the ways in which donors shape preferences in the other two spheres.

How does Ownership Work in the Kenyan Context?
Having subscribed to the ownership paradigm, Kenyan development stakeholders are
now subject to the discourses that ownership produces. This section advances not with an
86
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attempt to measure ownership in Kenya, but with a description of discernible discursive tropes
that were manifest in my examination of the ownership paradigm in Kenya. After analyzing
interview responses across the different stakeholders and triangulating these responses with
the principles and policies associated with the paradigm, I found that the paradigm solidifies
donors as “development experts” who offer technical support and capacity building along with
their financial services. As the development partners who contribute the expertise (and with aid
flows to Kenya on the decline) donors are positioned to have a lasting role in Kenya’s
development process, making them an interminable part of Kenya’s domestic policy-making
process. Although donors have, and will continue to have, a lasting impact on development
policies, Kenyan development stakeholders do not hold donors accountable when health
policies fail to achieve their intended goals. These elements—donors as an indispensable
epistemic community of development experts with impunity—render ownership in Kenya a
chimera.

Donors as an epistemic community
The donor organizations that participated in this study all defined their role in Kenya’s
health sector as assisting the government through the use of their analytical abilities and
technical expertise. Accordingly, members of an epistemic community use their consensual
knowledge to persuade governments and other actors to pursue specific policies (Haas 1989).
With its promotion of measurable and evidence-based development strategies, the ownership
paradigm facilitates the imposition of policies through consensual knowledge. The World Bank,
for example, no longer imposes policies on the Kenyan government; it now exists to offer advice
based on its research, which aids the government in carrying out policies. As one of the Bank
officials that I interviewed aptly noted, “When we present something, we present the evidence.
We know that evidence is not everything in terms of policy, but we have strong evidence; you
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can persuade government to change its thinking.”88 This is the premise upon which an epistemic
community operates—using evidence generated from “scientific” research to persuade
governments to make policy decisions (Haas 2001; Haas 2015; Cross 2013). Another Bank
official working in Kenya stated,
Like I told you, we don’t implement. What we do is advise, ok. We say, ‘On the basis of
the information available’, because we do the analysis, ‘this is what we recommend.
These are the options.’ And they choose their option. So once they choose, we support
them along whatever they have chosen that goes with our interest.89
And the Kenyan government, in turn, views donors in this capacity. In the official Kenyan Health
Policy, the government outlines donors’ role in carrying out the policy as follows:
This policy recognizes that health services require significant financial and technical
investment in a context of limited domestic resources. Donors and international nongovernmental organizations have traditionally played a key role in providing resources
for the health sector. This role has been structured around principles of Aid
Effectiveness, which place emphasis on government ownership, alignment,
harmonization, mutual accountability and managing for results of programs in the health
sector (Ministry of Health 2012, 31).
In practice, donors assume the role of knowledge experts and leave a lasting impact on the
episteme by designing the training of personnel working in the realm of a particular disease. For
example, the respondent working with JICA explained, “one of our strong points is we do
technical cooperation. Technical cooperation means we are able to bring some expertise that
will [be] embedded in the ministry of health, provide policy advice, [to] provide strategic
support.”90 In this way JICA becomes institutionalized in the Kenyan Ministry of Health. JICA is
in the process of implementing a new Tuberculosis control program. Part of the program
involves training personnel at the national and country level along with providing laboratory
equipment. This level of influence and determination of thought is permissible and reinforced
through ownership, due to the focus on measurable results and improved decision-making (Owa
2015; OECD 2011, 85).
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The permanence and influence of donors as an epistemic community continues through
the constant articulation of development in Kenya as being in a state of crisis. For example, the
USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategy for Kenya 2014-18, states that,
The development context in Kenya is unstable and marked by numerous complex
challenges. These include poor enabling environment for economic growth; half of the
population living in poverty with limited access to basic services; chronic drought and
food insecurity; stubbornly high maternal and under-five mortality rates; weak rule of law
allowing corruption and a culture of impunity to flourish; natural resource degradation;
increased radicalization; and a growing youth population with limited employment
options putting pressure on social systems (United States Government 2014, 3).
USAID maintains that it will aid Kenya in redressing these developmental lacunae by
strengthening Kenya’s ownership of its development strategy, which entails the relaying of “U.S.
know-how, expertise and technology…” (United States Government 2014, 92). Ultimately, the
pervasive presence of donors in the health sector (and development writ large) alludes to a
permanent position for donors in the development process.
Donor longevity
By subscribing to this new development paradigm, Kenya is committing to an
interminable relationship with donors as they assume their role as development partners.
Donors are so institutionalized in the various aspects of Kenya’s development that parsing out
influence at the level of policy creation can seem difficult. Within the National Treasury, there is
now an Aid Effectiveness Secretariat responsible for tracking progress on the OECD’s Aid
Effectiveness forums. In Kenya’s health sector, donors play a substantial role in funding
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malarial service delivery. Donors generally fund between 60 and 90
percent of the health budget (Wamai 2009, 137). Thus, even though donor funding in Kenya’s
health sector is decreasing through the formal channels, donors continue to influence policy
through informal channels. Close to one-third of Kenya’s health expenditures are paid with
donor funds and about 90% of that is off budget. 91 As mentioned previously, donor impact is not
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limited to government institutions but also is manifested through the funding of a large number
of NGOs. With respect to HIV/AIDS, one NGO director working in the HIV sector explained,
60% of the policies for HIV/AIDS are donor-driven because 75% of HIV programs are donorfunded.92 The general consensus among NGOs in the health sector is that if donors were to
leave Kenya, the country would fall into a state of crisis. One NGO representative noted, “If a
donor says they’re closing shop today, you’d see a real crisis in Kenya…”93
Donors’ role as financiers of development would not be as significant if Kenya were not
committed to a number of international agreements regarding health that make the cost of
health development too expensive. In Kenya’s Medium-term strategic plan for the health sector,
the government lists a range of global health commitments as informing the Kenya Health
Sector Strategic and Investment Plan (KHSSP)- see figure 1.
Figure 1: Kenya Health Sector Strategic and Investment Plan (KHSSP)
•
•
•
•
•
•

International health regulations
Ouagadougou declaration on Primary Health Care and Health Systems
International Health Partnership on Aid Effectiveness
Millennium Development Goals and post-2015 Agenda
Abuja Declaration
International Human Rights Agreements: Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Child Rights Convention (CRC),
International Conference on Population and Development programme of action
(ICPD), Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action (BPFA).

Source: Government of the Republic of Kenya (2014, 4)

Implementing Kenya’s health sector strategic plan in two phases would cost the government
Kshs 588 million in the first year and Kshs 344 million in the 5th year (Ministry of Health 2014,
77). The government would still see a resource gap of Kshs 207 million after contributing 45% of
the total cost (Ministry of Health 2014, 77). Although health investments increased from $17 US
per capita to $40 US per capita from 1994 to 2010 (largely through government and donor
92
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contributions), Kenya’s health sector is still deemed developing and under-funded.94 In Kenya’s
revised PRSP for the IMF, the government lists as a targeted reform goal:
Increase total government spending on health from the current 5.6 percent as a share of
total public expenditure to 12 percent over the time period of this investment program.
Such an increase in the investments in human capital may seem ambitious, but past
public spending per capita on health in Kenya has significantly lagged behind as
compared to global and regional experiences. In addition, the challenges described and
the commitment of the government to make significant progress towards the Millennium
Development Goals justify such an increase (Government of Kenya 2005, 52 Italics
added).
Kenya’s commitment to MDGs and a number of other global health commitments forces the
government to create “ambitious” policies that, when not achieved, will act as evidence for more
donor interventions and ostensibly necessitate a development industry.
Along with the financial dependency that will keep donors around, there is the language
of partnership that surrounds ownership. A partnership implies a long-term relationship and
Kenyan development stakeholders are invested in this language. During a conversation with a
director in the Ministry of Education, I used the word “donors” and the director abruptly cut me
off to let me know that they are no longer referred to as donors, but development partners.95 In
fact, in every interview respondents consistently referred to donors as development partners.
Through the different national and health policies, this is the language used: “The
implementation of [the Kenyan Health Policy] will require the continued support of development
partners in health, especially given the devolved system of government” (Ministry of Health
2012, 31). In reviewing the way in which donors defined ownership, this reliance on donors is
evident by suggesting that ownership means that government creates the policies in conjunction
with donors, who then help by contributing much needed resources. One policy official in the
Ministry of Health remarked, “government ideally should lead agenda-setting but there are
limitations with resources and technical expertise.”96 Donors, according to the principles of
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ownership, necessarily fill these limitations, as they are responsible for building country
capacity. In joining the PRSP model, which also requires SWAps, donors are agreeing to help
governments with their policy design, development strategies, institutional reforms, and capacity
building (Hill 2002). With this considerable amount of influence and the ubiquitous language of
partnership, one would expect shared accountability across all development stakeholders.
However, findings from my fieldwork in Kenya suggest that the Kenyan government shoulders
the responsibility for failed development objects.

Accountability
Although donors have been very present in designing these development strategies, should
they take responsibility for the failed outcomes in the health sector? Another way in which
ownership works in Kenya is by government assuming sole responsibility for development
outcomes, despite its partnership with donors. Although the language of ownership says that
both donors and government are to be held accountable, this is generally not the case.97 I
asked each respondent: who was responsible when health policies failed to achieve their
desired outcomes and the overwhelming response was, “the government”. One government
official’s explanation of accountability on the ground suggests that accountability may be
different depending on the stakeholder. He professed,
Normally government, generally, is held accountable as opposed to donors. But that is
strictly speaking from an evaluative perspective. From the perspective of the population,
of course, it is very different. [The population] will say, “well the Germans, or the French,
or who ever it was, came here and they left nothing.” So the population probably holds
donors accountable for failures. A case in point, for instance, twenty, thirty years ago,
there was a big water project in western Kenya and they brought hand pumps which
didn’t work and which were not serviceable by the community. And they left them. Three
years later, there was no water. The community does not blame the government; they
blame the donors directly for that. Donors of course look at it very differently because
they hold the government of Kenya accountable for failed policies, rightly or wrongly. In
some instances, the local policies probably were not the best or, they were not backed

The Paris Declaration states that it was “developed in a spirit of mutual accountability” 2005/2008, 3. This is also one of the
partnership commitments, which translates to both government and donor stakeholders taking responsibility and holding each other
accountable while being transparent.
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by sufficient funding from the government side. But the flip side to that is that also the
donor strategy was incorrect.98
On one hand this account alludes to donors circumventing the government and going directly to
the communities. This is problematic in that it is a direct violation of the ownership principles, but
demonstrates the realpolitik of donor development practices. Donors are supposed to be using
government systems to deliver services. Using government systems cuts down on wasted
resources through duplication, making aid more effective (Winters 2010). One interviewee
articulated an on-going battle that the GoK was having with the World Bank over the use of
country systems:
Currently, right now, there is a very huge fight with the World Bank because the World
Bank is refusing to support devolution; and they want to support devolution using their
own systems, which then makes it impossible to effectively deliver services that the
Kenyans need. Then it means that when the projects are over, you’ll again have to start
setting up new systems. So donors just need to stop and follow the country systems that
have been set.99
If donors were, in fact, using government systems, communities would not be able to place the
blame on donors, as the projects would appear to be coming from the government. On the other
hand, with respect to accountability, the anecdote highlights the ways in which accountability
between donors and government tends to be one-sided, with donors holding government
accountable and not the other way around. Furthermore, communities may hold donors
responsible for projects; however, donors are not held responsible for policies, although they
design policies with input and influence tantamount to (and often greater than) the government.
The same respondent noted that most Kenyans do not hold donors accountable, “because they
think [donor] funding is a great thing.”100 Donor funding being a “great thing” is reinforced by the
development paradigm, in general. The entire paradigm is premised on donor funding being
essential for sustainable progress. In this way, donors become reinforced as defenders of
development.
98
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Begging for Ownership
The Kenyan government is very invested and complicit in reproducing the ownership
principles. Take for example, the government respondents’ answers to my question on whether
government owns development or not. Perhaps more illustrative is the concept’s ability to
induce commitment to external interests. Government officials in both the Ministry of Health and
the Ministry of Finance strongly believed that the Kenyan government owns development,
largely because the government has created its own national development policies and
contributes the largest share of resources to development. In the Ministry of Finance, there was
a strong sentiment that the GoK tells donors what to do, and for the most part, they follow.
Otherwise, it is the donors who impede ownership, not the government. This is because the
language of ownership gives government some leverage vis-à-vis donors. For example, one
official in the Ministry of Finance expressed how “[donors] know that they have to take a back
seat because, again, Paris, Accra, Busan is emphasizing the fact they are here to support.”101
Even before adopting the ownership principles with PRSP, the Kenyan government attempted
to demonstrate its commitment to poverty reduction and development with the National Poverty
Eradication Plan (NPEP).
The case of NPEP
Kenya’s contentious relationship with donors over the years, and the substantial
influence that donors have had over economic and health development strategies and policies
in Kenya, indicate the need for a concept like ownership as the OECD defines it. The story
behind Kenya’s initial engagement with PRSPs and the ownership model highlights the power
structure inherent to the ownership model.
Earlier in this chapter, I noted that Kenya produced its first PRSP not because it wanted
access to HIPC funds, but because it needed to restore its relationship with the World Bank and
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IMF in order to resume receiving concessional loans. The IMF required the PRSP, anticorruption legislation and governance reforms as necessary steps before the government could
receive more concessional loans (Booth 2003). When the Kenyan government created its first
PRSP, the government had already created a national plan for ridding Kenya of poverty, called
the National Poverty Eradication Plan (NPEP). NPEP was a long-term framework for alleviating
poverty across Kenya, covering the years 1999 through 2015. The development strategy was
no different from previous strategies that focused on increasing economic growth so that there
would be increased resources for improved services and assistance for poor families (Republic
of Kenya 1999). With specific goals for the health and education sectors, along with a slightly
gendered aspect, the strategy was also created through a largely consultative process
(Republic of Kenya 1999). For the health sector, the government sought to achieve universal
primary health care and increase access to potable water by 8% every year until 2004,
ultimately reaching universal access to potable water (Republic of Kenya 1999). To fund the
plan, the Kenyan government created the Poverty Eradication Budget and an Anti-Poverty Trust
Fund that would function independent of the government framework.
Despite drawing support from some in the donor community, the strategy did not garner
backing from key donor organizations, namely the World Bank and IMF.102 That the World Bank
and IMF were opposed to the government’s homegrown approach to poverty reduction is not a
surprise. Both of these institutions had a vested interest in getting the Kenyan government to
produce PRSPs since they reflect a strategy for poverty reduction and development that
corresponds to the development philosophy of the IMF and World Bank. The Bank opposed the
NPEP as a poverty reduction strategy because it was not mainstream enough; did not
adequately conform to the new medium-term structure that works with the PRSP; and did not
depoliticize poverty reduction programs (Booth 2003). One of the ways donors were able to

German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ) and the African Development Bank were in favor of the Kenyan government’s
NPEP.
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persuade the government to switch from NPEP to the PRPS, beyond financial incentive, was by
positioning itself as a “knowledge source”. Instead of proceeding with the NPEP, the KANU
government produced its interim PRSP in June of 2000.
The case of NPEP may serve as the necessary counterfactual example demonstrating
how the Kenyan government would have pursued an alternative approach to poverty reduction if
the World Bank had not demanded that the government create a PRSP. The World Bank’s
execution of power is not limited to simply imposing the PRSP as a condition of assistance. This
is merely the observable part of the power dynamic, an extension of historical donor-Kenya
relations in the context of aid and development. The more clandestine element of the power
play comes through ownership. In demanding that the Kenyan government switch from the
NPEP to the PRSP as a conditionality for resuming concessional lending, the Bank could have
been leaving itself open to more weak implementation on the part of the Kenyan government,
similar to what the Bank experienced with the country in the 1980s and 1990s. By situating
PRSPs within the ownership paradigm, however, the Bank could ensure that the development
reforms had staying power by getting the government to believe that it was the government's
idea to do so. As one Bank official noted, the Kenyan government owns development because,
“there are things the government doesn't want to do but will still do.”103 This is evident in the
Kenyan government’s insistence that it designs and controls its development strategy despite
the fact that PRSPs and the coordinating mechanisms like SWAps and MTEFs come from the
World Bank, and all aid-receiving countries use these same tools.
If the World Bank had not made the PRSP a requirement for the Kenyan government to
reconvene lending, the Kenyan government would have kept NPEP as its national approach to
poverty reduction. Coupled with financial incentives, the World Bank used its leverage as a
knowledge source to persuade other donors to commit to the PRSP over NPEP. The
government’s willful rejection of NPEP after investing resources in the drafting of the strategy in
103

0052 Donor (08/01/2016_Nairobi, Kenya)

102

favor of the PRSP highlights not only the power structures inherent in the ownership paradigm
that require full compliance, but also the Kenyan government’s eagerness to adopt the
paradigm.
For many in the government, the ownership paradigm is supposed to mark a welcome
shift in donor-government relations. Along with the requirement for increased participation, the
relationship between government and donors is to take on a new form, one of partnership
instead of paternalism. Prior to Paris, respondents noted that donors were scattered with their
programing, not using government systems, and took the lead in development. There were,
however, a number of reasons to conclude that not much has changed with respect to donorgovernment relations since the implementation of the Paris agreement. There remains a dearth
of trust between donors and the Kenyan government. More specifically, donors’ belief in the
Kenyan government’s commitment to development continues to wane.
Partnership or Paternalism?
Because of Kenya’s weak performance with respect to implementing structural
adjustment policies, the IMF and World Bank suspended lending to the Kenyan government a
number of times. Several of these suspensions took place during Daniel Arap Moi’s
administration and the KANU administration (Booth 2003; Shiverenje 2005). In 1997, the IMF
deferred loans under the enhanced structural adjustment facility because of poor governance on
the Moi administration’s part. During this period, the government had to borrow at market rates,
which negatively affected an already deteriorating economy (Devarajan, Dollar, and Holmgren
2001). In order to resume lending with the IMF in 1996, the government had to complete a
series of structural reforms, including the reduction of the civil service sector and privatization of
40 public businesses by the end of that year (Camdessus 2000, 714). According to the IMF, the
government made a decent start at implementing the reforms but never implemented the full
range of adjustments, leading the IMF to refuse lending until the government made substantive
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adjustments (Camdessus 2000). In the face of IMF and Bank claims that the government did not
fully implement their reforms, others have noted that in 1997, the Kenyan government executed
the swiftest round of deregulation of any African country.104 This strained relationship has not
completely dissipated. In fact, there remain lingering trust issues between donors and
government, impacting the degree to which donors can see the GoK as committed to
development.
As I demonstrated earlier, the Kenyan government eventually did decide to play fully by
the Bank’s rules with the adoption of PRSPs under Mwai Kibaki. Despite the elaboration of the
PRSP and incorporation of the concomitant instruments and institutions, donors continue to
view the government as lacking in ownership. In the health sector, donors refuse to offer budget
support—a modality for disbursing aid funds at the government’s discretion. Donor funds in
health either circumvent the government completely, going directly to NGOs or to specific health
programs. Consequently, donors restrict the government’s ability to redirect funds to the issue
areas that the government deems important (Wamai 2009). The Swedish International
Development Agency (SIDA), a bilateral donor in Kenya’s health sector, explained the situation
as follows, “Kenyan donors are faced with the contradiction of attempting to convey ownership
in the absence of partnership. Low donor trust of the Kenyan government’s commitment to
transparency and openness in budgetary matters implies that dialogue with the government is
prevented from making progress on ownership issues” (Weeks, Andersson, Cramer,
Alemayehu, Degol, Muhereza, Rizzi, Ronge, and Stein 2002, iii). In this same report, SIDA
argues that Kenya is lacking ownership because it does not commit to and take responsibility for
its development activities (Weeks et al. 2002). The rest of the donor community in Kenya
appears to share these sentiments.
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In 2009, donors and the GoK began participating in the Development Partnership Forum
Meetings (DPF) and the Pre-Development Partnership Forum Meetings. These meetings bring
together the various donors or development partners in Kenya and top government officials to
establish different commitments for the GoK to achieve by the next meeting. The DPFs are
institutional manifestations of the ownership paradigm—these fora operate in the context of
strengthening the partnership between the government and donors in order to facilitate more
government ownership. The title of these meetings, however, is very misleading. After reviewing
the notes and transcripts from the 2010 Pre-DPF, 2010 DPF, 2012 DPF and the 2013 DPF,
these meetings appear to be forums for donors to assess the GoK’s progress towards meeting
its development commitments (Government of Kenya 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010). The World Bank
representative, Johannes Zutt, on the other hand, represented donors with more peremptory
remarks, alluding to a less-than-equal partnership. What one finds in these forums is not the
GoK telling donors what to do, or donors eagerly awaiting the government’s command on the
next step forward. Instead, one finds the government and donors devising and monitoring
commitments that cater to donor objectives (such as governance and “business-friendly”
institutions) but must be implemented by the GoK.
Despite rhetoric suggesting equally valid input with regards to development strategies,
donors’ preferences have become more entrenched and pervasive, while their conditionalities
percolate deeper into government operations beyond the realm of development. During these
meetings, the World Bank representative used language regarding the GoK’s progress on their
agreed upon obligations which suggested the desire for greater commitment from government.
He states, “For our partnership to work best, we need to trust that agreeing to these
commitments will also result in getting them done, expecting unforeseen circumstances. It is a
matter of mutual credibility and accountability” (DPF 2012, n.p.). He, furthermore, suggests that
“Kenya is living beyond its means” and must do more to promote growth and reduce poverty
(DPF 2012, n.p.). In line with the CDF and international community’s development agenda, Zutt
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chides the government on its poor governance record and the potential consequences that may
arise if this issue persists. He argues that donors are “ambassadors” for other sources of foreign
aid, but this means nothing if Kenya does not create “business-friendly” policies and ensure that
“corruption does not impede equal competitiveness” (2012, n.p.). Zutt states, “Many donors will
shape their future aid program in the light of their assessment of Kenya’s governance—how well
the government manages the election process, its planning and budgetary processes, its
macroeconomic levers, the fight against corruption, and the agenda for structural reforms”
(2012, n.p.). If nothing else, this statement is demonstrative of the conveniently capacious
conceptualization of governance. In this form, donors become pervasive and inexorably linked
to entities in the Kenyan government—all under the auspices of development. These forums are
also illustrative of the extensive involvement donors have in monitoring the GoK, especially in
light of the history between both stakeholders. Donors interviewed during my fieldwork in Kenya
corroborated these accounts with respect to the health sector. One of the Bank officials whom I
interviewed stated,
I would say for Kenya, we don’t have a problem in terms of capacity of government to
actually implement. What I see is a lack of commitment from the government to
implement. For example, in the health insurance subsidy program, which is being
implemented through the national hospital insurance fund, it doesn’t matter what type of
support you give them, things just don’t move. Uh, I think it’s a typical civil servant’s way
of working, which derails the process.105
Donors do not reserve their mistrust just for the Kenyan government. Representatives I
interviewed from local CSOs also voiced frustration with donors withholding funds because they
do not trust the NGO. “[Donors] are after their money, but you, you are after your development.
So you see the two contrast [sic]. You want to build a school, but the donor’s telling you, give
me the accountability…you know, accountability works before you start your work. The first form
you receive is how are you going to account for the money. There’s no trust.”106 As the
respondent noted, the dollar is the bottom line for donors. And the larger paradigmatic
105
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orientation towards increased effectiveness measured through tangible results further breeds
these types of interactions. For example, the Paris Declaration makes clear the need to improve
aid effectiveness in the face of growing doubt from constituents in donor countries regarding the
utility of foreign aid (OECD 2011). The language of ownership, however, has the unintentional
consequence of providing a space for some agency for the Kenyan government.
Government respondents place the responsibility for blocking ownership on donors. A
number of government respondents argued that donors make it difficult to implement the Paris
Declaration. Although they believed that Kenya was better than it had been prior to Paris, a
number of donors still refuse to let Kenyans take the lead in their development trajectory.
According to the ownership principles, donors are supposed to work within government’s
framework for development. As I argued previously, many of these donors were actually
essential in developing these frameworks. Yet, a number of them refuse to work within these
guidelines. One of the major culprits is the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID). A Ministry of Health official explained that almost all of USAID’s funding is off-budget,
meaning that it is not delivered through the GoK, but instead through third parties.107 The third
parties, namely civil society organizations, also work with the government to implement
development strategies. When donors go straight to CSOs, they are not using government
systems. One Kenyan, who worked with two different donor organizations expressed how this is
damaging to the government: “I think even donors are to blame in this country because there is
a tendency for donors here thinking that they can drive this system. Well, indeed, they have not
been able to do that. And, one of the problems that the donors have been able to do is infiltrate
and penetrate the government and make it ineffective, replacing government funding with the
project funding that doesn’t last for long”.108 It is the principle of harmonization and alignment
that give Kenyan NGOs and government the rhetorical leverage to make these claims.
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Previously, during structural adjustments, there was no formal agreement between African
stakeholders and donors indicating the need for donors to use African systems. Still, there
remains little room within the ownership architecture for Kenyan stakeholders to operate outside
of donor influences. One of the ways African governments, the Kenyan government included,
have been able to gain leverage vis-à-vis donors that is not predicated on the formal language
of ownership is by not implementing certain policies (Whitfield 2009; Van de Walle and Ndulo
2014). Thus, where donors see the Kenyan government as untrustworthy and lacking
ownership, the government is actually employing one of the few tools it has to counter donor
hegemony over development. Overtly it embraces the rhetoric of ownership; covertly it subverts
the very same.
The mistrust that undergirds the relationship between donors and the Kenyan
government illuminates the circumscribed possibilities for any type of truly Kenyan-derived
approach to development under the ownership paradigm. Through its adoption of ownership,
the Kenyan government subscribes to the pervasiveness of donors through institutions like the
DPFs under the guise of partnership. The logic informing the ownership paradigm facilitates this
paternalistic interaction where the GoK must defer to donor knowledge and authority over all
development matters. For example, the African Development Bank’s president describes the
implementation of ownership as follows:
Strengthening ownership is more difficult to achieve than it first appears, basically for
two reasons. First, effective ownership requires that donors be willing to relinquish some
control, and second, it requires that partner or recipient countries have demonstrable
capacity to lead. Indeed, critical requirements for ownership are commitment to good
governance and strong state capacity (Kasekende 2006, 4).
This statement further points to ownership not requiring donors to release all control, but some
control. With the emphasis for ownership being on governments having capacity and
demonstrating good governance, these conditions not being present justifies donors not
relinquishing control. In this light, the relationship between donors and the Kenyan government,
based on the dynamics of the paradigm, can legitimately remain paternalistic. To the extent that
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the Kenyan government can only show its displeasure with policy direction by not implementing
said policies, one must ask how useful the ownership paradigm truly is in allowing aid-recipients
to articulate their development vision vis-à-vis donors?
Conclusion
Both theoretically and practically, ownership does not operate in such a way that Kenyan
stakeholders have more control over the direction and substance of their health development
policies vis-à-vis donors (OECD 2011, 29). The Ministry of Health (MoH) and Ministry of
Finance and Economics (MOFE) should not only design and implement health policies, but
should also be able to coordinate all other actors involved (OECD 2011, World Bank 2005). Civil
society actors in the health sector should be able to participate in the policy development and
implementation processes so that health outcomes reflect the needs of civil society and the
poorest segments of the population. By aligning their financial support with these health policies
and using national systems and institutions to deliver this support, donors could, in turn, create
a space for more local ownership. The final product should lead to increased aid effectiveness,
which would lead to more tangible results in the health sector. These results would mean
achieving MDGs and reducing global poverty. Accountability for these development outcomes
would fall on both donors and Kenyan stakeholders’ shoulders (Owa 2015).
Ownership does not necessarily function in such a fashion that the Kenyan government
designs and controls the road map of development. In examining health and economic policies
in Kenya, the mechanisms through which ownership emerges become all the more salient.
Critically, I find a rhetorical shift in development practices since the Paris Declaration, not a
substantive change. Yet, the rhetoric is not without consequences. In Kenya, ownership places
responsibility for health sector outcomes in the government’s hands, absolving donors of
significant responsibility for poor development results. The language embedded in the
ownership paradigm also turns donors into an epistemic community; their role is to provide
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knowledge and expertise to the Kenyan government. What follows, then, are permanent
institutions for donors within the Kenyan government like the DPF, DPDF, and Aid Effectiveness
Secretariat. Consequently, donor presence becomes an indispensable part of Kenya’s health
and economic sectors.
Even with the example from the CSO director about the donor organization coming to
build the pump and incorporating members of the village in the planning and implementation
process, the donors came to the village already knowing that they were going to build a pump.
The community had little say in that part. Thus, the consultation with the village (i.e. making
them feel as if they had a substantial input) was misleading. If the villagers could have said, “we
don’t want a pump, we want a school” this would have shown that the villagers were in charge
of identifying the village’s needs. But the donor group came in with an agenda (to build a pump)
and succeeded in making members of the community believe that they had made a significant
contribution. Ownership offers a false sense of choice, which one Bank official acknowledged:
“we say, on the basis of the information available, because we do the analysis, this is what we
recommend, these are the options and they choose their options.”109
If ownership were sincerely about aid-recipients determining their own development
plans and policies for poverty reduction, Kenya might not have a PRSP today. Naturally, one
might take the Bank and other pro-PRSP donors’ critiques of NPEP as valid criticisms coming
from development experts. Some might argue that it makes sense for the GoK to jettison the
strategy that it produced in favor of an IMF and World Bank-approved approach (Van de Walle
and Ndulo 2014). But this line of thinking is part of the larger problem with the ownership
paradigm and the development enterprise in general: despite a history of failed development
policies and approaches, donors are still somehow considered experts. The consequence of
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adopting ownership reinforces this narrative and validates continued donor interventions in
Kenya.
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Chapter 4: Ownership in Comparison--the audacity of choice
The empirical chapters in this dissertation highlight the ways in which ownership of
development is defined and implemented in the two African countries. Burkina Faso and Kenya
represent different geographical, historical, cultural, political, and economic contexts. Despite
these differences, the discursive practices embedded in the ownership paradigm produce very
similar development strategies in both countries. My findings in these empirically grounded case
studies challenge the dominant claim in development circles that there is no longer a coherent
development approach (Rodrik 2006; World Bank 2000). My analysis of development policy
evolution in the health sector of both countries reveals how the paradigm reproduces both the
underdeveloped subject and donor-dependency, while absolving donors of any responsibility for
failed development outcomes in Burkina Faso and Kenya.
Paradigm no more?
Ownership of development as the guiding discourse for improving aid effectiveness and
achieving development outcomes in aid-dependent Africa is pervasive across both Burkina and
Kenya. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness provides the consolidated definition, and
subsequently hegemonic version, of ownership: “partner countries exercise effective leadership
over their development policies, and strategies, and co-ordinate development actions” (OECD
2011, 29). Since the signing of the Paris Declaration in 2005, a range of development
stakeholders have leveraged the concept for varied and sometimes conflicting ends (de Renzio
et al. 2008; Buiter 2007). Although scholars and policy makers attribute ownership to the OECD
High-Level forums, this has not been the case.110 In an earlier chapter of this dissertation, I
articulated the origins of ownership as being located in the World Bank and IMF’s need to relegitimize their existence as necessary for development in debt-ridden and impoverished
countries (Pender 2001; Owusu 2006).
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For the World Bank, the process of re-legitimization entailed elaborating an alternative
set of rules of engagement for development than those used during the formal structural
adjustment era. The comprehensive development framework is an articulation of what the
Bank’s superficially changed engagement would look like: long-term and comprehensive
development strategies; countries must own their reforms by “devis[ing] and direct[ing]” their
own development agenda; there must be partnership between development stakeholders
(primarily government, donors, civil society, and private sector); and performance based on
measurable results (Wolfensohn and Fischer 2000; Wolfensohn 2005). These rules of
engagement form part of the set of instruments, measures, discourses, and practices
commensurate with the ownership paradigm. Incorporated in the paradigm is the usage of
Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps), Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), Medium-Term
Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs) as the standard policy tools for development, and the
principles of ownership, partnership, poverty reduction; while the dominant actors are donors,
the state, and civil society. There are also the international institutions that inform the domesticlevel development goals such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), now Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs).
Much like the PRSPs, identification of legitimate stakeholders, and focus on poverty
reduction, SWAps and MTEFs are products of the World Bank. Local actors in the two countries
have also adopted the language of partnership and ownership. In both Burkina Faso and Kenya
one finds a version of development consistent with the ownership paradigm. Both countries
possess a PRSP, which is tied to a SWAp for the health sector through a MTEF. Burkina Faso
has the Vision 2020 as its long-term development strategy and Kenya has its Vision 2030.
These two strategies give primacy to rapid economic growth as key to poverty reduction, along
with other factors like good governance and foreign direct investment (Ministry of State for
Planning, National Development and Vision 2030 2008; Ministere de l’Economie et des
Finances 2011).
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Donors in both countries no longer carry the formal title of “donors”. In accordance with
the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), donors are now development
partners. Burkinabè and Kenyan stakeholders have fully adopted this change in nomenclature.
For Burkinabè, donors are now “les partenaires technique et financier” (PTF) or technical and
financial partners. Kenyans refer to these same actors as development partners. Although all
development stakeholders should be partners based on the consensus coming from the AAA, in
Kenya, informally the term is reserved specifically for donors. In order to gauge the extent to
which local actors had consolidated this change in rhetoric, I formulated my interview questions
in both countries using the term “donor”, making sure to use “development partner” in
communication with the respondent only after the respondent referred to donors as
development partners.
My chapter on Kenya demonstrates how committed the Kenyan government is to the
notion of partnership, as it seemingly provides leverage for the government when negotiating
with donors over development policies. Government officials in Burkina Faso, while they did
employ the language of partnership in conversation, were not as committed to it. Burkinabe civil
society proved different. In the midst of a conversation with a friend who worked with one of the
local associations responsible for carrying out national health programs, I, once again, kept
referring to les donateurs. This friend at least waited until the end of the conversation to tell me
that they were no longer referred to as donors, but as “les PTF”. In practice, however, Burkinabe
actors continued to use “les PTF” and “les bailleurs de fond” interchangeably—bailleur de fond
is another word for donor. At the level of formally consolidating the language of ownership, both
countries have done so. Development policies and frameworks in both countries unequivocally
make the rhetorical move of referring to donors as partners; however, the Kenyan government
has truly bought into the partnership rhetoric. It is at the informal level that one notices the
difference between these two cases. Much of this language, as I will explain later, is a result of
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their country-specific renderings of ownership, which is a function of the countries’ historical
engagement with aid and development.
By formally consolidating the language of ownership, both countries reproduce the same
outcomes with respect to donors and development. In Burkina Faso and Kenya, whether
referred to as donors, PTF, partners, or bailleurs de fond, local stakeholders have codified these
actors as sources of development “knowledge”. Although the development industry has always
implied this relationship between African countries and aid-giving countries, ownership cements
this asymmetrical dynamic (Alemazung 2010; Keita 2011).
Even the informal measures of ownership persist across both cases. Donors in Burkina
Faso’s health sector measure the degree to which the government owns development
according to its ability to finance the associated programs and projects. As one donor at the
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in Ouagadougou stated, “Je crois que oui [le
gouvernement s’approprie le développement] parce que, quand on regardait déjà le niveau de
ressource domestique que le pays injecte, c’est qu’a même importante” (I believe so, [the
government owns development] because when having looked at the level of domestic resources
that the government injects, that is at least important).111 The same thought process is evident
across Kenyan civil society organizations. As the following quote from a Nairobi-based NGO
representative illustrates: “I don’t think there is ownership; and if there is ownership, than the
political will is not there because the key factors, like I’ve already told you, 75% of HIV
[treatment and prevention activity] is donor funded…I think the highest we’ve allocated to health
in the national budget was about 7%.”112
Although the OECD measurement makes no mention of who the funder of the “wellcosted” policies should be, on the ground, stakeholders are suggesting that this should be the
government’s responsibility. The formal measure for ownership is meant to account for context-
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specificity. What the informal guidelines show is a more standard measure that clashes with the
particulars of each country. For governments themselves, being able to fund the development
programs and projects that correspond with international targets for progress trivializes the
degree to which the same governments are attempting to design their own development
trajectories in accordance with their available resources. Ultimately interpreting ability to fund
development as a measure of ownership reinforces the assumptions of universality embedded
in the current paradigm and is evident in the various health commitments and targets to which
the Kenyan and Burkinabè governments must agree. The implicit universality is consistent with
the funding-gaps that both governments encounter in trying to attain these targets.113
As chapters two and three demonstrated, however, the ownership paradigm produces
the same outcomes despite variation in the country contexts. Within both countries I found that
the ownership paradigms reproduce the underdeveloped subject, reconstructs donors as an
epistemic community, absolves donors of any responsibility for failed development. These
outcomes lead, not to less development, but more development predicated on donor
intervention in Africa.

The Ownership Paradigm in Africa
One evening in July, at the World Bank headquarters in Ouagadougou, I sat in the shared work
office transcribing interviews that I had collected that day. To my right, an economist who the
Bank had contracted for a short-term project on governance and to my left was an American
student pursuing his Masters in Political Science at Yale. We were all typing feverishly when an
I.T. specialist working for the Bank walked in. He asked whether we were economists, to which
he received one yes and two no’s. He then asked, if there are all of these economists here
(meaning in the World Bank) why hasn’t the country seen any progress? Coming from a
permanent employee of the World Bank, I began to expect the response to be part of some
well-known institutional joke, to which I was obviously not privy. So, I responded, isn’t the
country experiencing an 8% growth in GDP? “Ah bon?” he said. Are we really, because there is
a difference between real growth and GDP growth. Now, he had my full attention. Maybe the
problem isn’t growth, but how the growth is shared, I said. He nodded, “that’s true, you need
both. But after SAPs, which didn’t work (“des chaos” to be exact) we’ve still had nothing but
economists with their models, paradigms, and formula that don’t work. We say the Minister of
I give examples of this in both the Burkina and Kenya chapters, highlighting in the governments’ policy documents how they
outline the cost of implementing their health strategies and consistently fall short of meeting these identified amounts, requiring more
donor financial inputs. Furthermore, the problem of funding is evident in the calls by the WHO and UN, along with other donors, for
more financial commitments from governments to health in order to meet MDGs and SDGs.
113
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Finance must be an economist. Basically, all government officials must be economists. Even
here, at the Bank, everyone is an economist. But, their recommendations haven’t yet produced
progress. I think the whole discipline needs to change.” I listened for him to finish with a laugh
indicating how uncommitted he was to his previous statement, or some indication that he was
joking. I listened in vain. Instead, hoping to get more from the gentleman I said, “It is, in fact.
There are changes happening within the discipline.” In an honest and telling manner, he
responded, “I just think we need other people with different trainings and backgrounds making
decisions.”114

This vignette from my field experience in Burkina Faso is emblematic of the hegemonic
influence of economics in African development. Mkandawire states, “the economics profession
in Africa has rarely been critical of its epistemological foundations, nor has it seriously
considered the deontology of the profession, especially the implications of its material
underpinnings and social construction on the integrity and credibility of its research” (
Mkandawire 2014, 173). As a development discourse, the economic framing of problems and
solutions to development in Africa is a continuation of the economics discourse from the
structural adjustment era. Thus, donors like the World Bank, IMF, and USAID produce this
knowledge set as scientifically sound and value-neutral approach and consequently,
understanding of development. Ferguson (2006, 80) demonstrates how the World Bank
employs what he terms, scientific capitalism in Africa as an irrefutable and non-moral order that
makes progress a question of technical expertise, mastered through economics. The economics
discourse is part and parcel with the ownership paradigm, as it aids in the construction of
donors as knowledge experts of development because of their “technical” and economic
acumen.
As knowledge experts, donors are operating as part of an epistemic community that offer
insulated policy input based on a purported “expertise” that donors bring to development in
Burkina Faso and Kenya by way of their mastery of economics. The overall purpose of an
epistemic community is to change state interests through the use of consensual knowledge,
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which functions best during periods of uncertainty or crisis (Haas 1989). In the health sectors for
both countries, the epistemic community of donors provides the governments with “advice”
regarding sound policies for strengthening the respective health sectors, which are always
somehow rooted in the market. The World Bank, the WHO, USAID, and other donors produce
policy papers and publications about the conditions of country-level and global health with the
intention of offering policy-advice.115 The production of policy papers alone does not make these
donor organizations epistemic communities in health. It is the other factors (such as their
institutionalization around consensual knowledge and the perpetual crisis in the health sectors)
that facilitate this process.
I mentioned previously that the ownership framework is predicated on donor involvement
in development. Their role in development, and in the health sector more specifically, is to equip
governments with the technical capacity to deal with the technical problems that accompany
establishing a fully functioning health system. Donors also provide financial assistance that can
translate into consumable health commodities, or workshops and trainings that build and
strengthen capacities. Using the word “technical” however, presumes a certain level of
objectivity surrounding the donor contribution to development. On the ground, technical is
imbued with normative implications around knowledge. As one donor working with JICA in
Kenya noted, “One of [JICA’s] strong points is we do technical cooperation. Technical
cooperation means we are able to bring in some expertise that will embed in the Ministry of
Health provide policy advice, provide strategic support.”116 This same arrangement exists in
Burkina with the UNDP, “Ce qu’on entend par le renforcement de capacité, en d’autre terme,
c’est vraiment les accompagner pour que eux même ils puissant avoir le compétence pour
assurer les actions de développement qu’ils auraient définir“ (What we mean by capacity
building, in other words, it’s really accompanying them so that they themselves can have the
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competence to secure the development actions that they would define).117 That JICA is a
bilateral donor and UNDP multilateral, demonstrates how this view of donor responsibility and
superiority in development knowledge vis-à-vis the Kenyan and Burkinabè governments is not a
question of multilateral versus bilateral politics. Instead, it is donors conforming to their roles as
indicated in under the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action.
The Paris Declaration identifies capacity building and “strengthening partner countries’
national development strategies and associated operational frameworks” as part of donor
responsibilities in carrying out the plan for aid effectiveness and increasing partner countries’
abilities to actually own development (OECD 2011; OECD 2008). The explicit role of donors as
knowledge experts is also evident in the original CDF. Former World Bank president James
Wolfensohn, in propagating the Bank’s new framework, made clear that the Bank would act as
“a source of knowledge” and no longer “implement” projects. This framework reinforces the
consensual knowledge that protects donors from government criticism. It also explains why
there is a false distinction between technical expertise and policy advice. Policy advice assumes
that there are other viable alternatives; technical expertise assumes an inarguable truth with
respect to a given problem. The consensual knowledge that binds donors to technical expertise
plays out in the designing of strategies and solutions to development problems, problems that
are often the consequence of the strategy itself.
Attempting to change government interest and consensual knowledge is necessary but
not sufficient for explaining the ways in which the ownership paradigm reproduces donors as an
epistemic community. There must also be a state of crisis or uncertainty. The ownership
paradigm presents the interminable crises around poverty and underdevelopment in order to
further validate the epistemic community of donors. One of the ways in which epistemic
communities are able to maintain power in a given policy arena is through the contribution of
technical expertise during periods of crises. Generally, the technical knowledge that the
117
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community contributes is deemed too complicated for political officials to ascertain on their own
(Haas 1989). The need for ownership and its associated procedures grows directly from the
crisis around global poverty and the twin challenges of meeting the UN Millennium Development
Goals while improving aid effectiveness. The World Bank has been instrumental in creating this
fear. In fact, the creator of the CDF and ownership paradigm, former Bank president James
Wolfensohn, articulated his vision of CDF in a speech titled, “The other Crisis” (1998). He
states,
And so in response to the current crisis, we at the Bank have been focusing on putting in
place the short- and the long-term measures for sustained recovery. Working with
governments on financial, judicial, and regulatory reform, on bankruptcy laws, anticorruption programs, and corporate governance — so essential to the restoration of
private sector confidence. Before the crisis hit, we had already worked on financial
sector reform in sixty-eight countries. At the request of our shareholders, we have now
expanded that capacity by one-third and we are reinforcing our leadership in corporate
governance. On the social side, we have been restructuring our existing portfolios to
ensure a sharp focus on priority programs that can reach poor communities quickly
(1998, 4).
Wolfensohn is referring to the crisis of global poverty—a world in which millions of inhabitants
go without food, health care, education, etc. He and others central to the epistemic development
community deem these problems to be the consequence of poor economics internal to each
country. Take for example the World Bank’s assessment of Burkina Faso’s social and economic
standing with respect to implementation of the country’s first PRSP:
Burkina Faso is faced with daunting economic and social problems, from the slow
process of privatization and private sector growth to below-benchmark social indicators.
However, if the country continues to improve its economic management and sustains its
commitment to poverty reduction, there is a good probability that it can implement the
CSLP and, in the process, make solid progress toward achieving the Millennium
Development Goals, a parallel target of the government (World Bank 2003, 25).
By suggesting that the problem is rooted in economics, so too is the solution. The problem that
the I.T. specialist at the World Bank articulated is pervasive, and part and parcel with the
maintenance of donors as “development experts”. Instead of viewing the knowledge generated
within the communities of economists as being a set of internally derived and maintained
opinions about development, both governments take the policy advice coming from donors as
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rooted in sound, empirically-tested evidence. Thus, when the Kenyan government refuses to
implement donor-backed policies, within the context of the ownership paradigm, it is an affront
to science and evidence-based development. Similarly, rural Burkinabè women to abstaining
from consuming modern contraceptives is not a matter of personal choice, it is an indication of
backwardness and blatant rejection of development. Placing the onus for stalled progress on
the African subject (be it the state or individual) aids in the exoneration of donors from any failed
development outcomes.

Donor impunity with influence
The ownership paradigm and accompanying global targets around health give donors as
an epistemic community considerable input in the policymaking decisions and development
designs in Burkina Faso and Kenya but do not lead to more donor accountability. The Paris
Declaration makes clear the considerable engagement that donors will have in increasing aid
effectiveness in aid-dependent countries and helping these countries reduce poverty and
achieve the MDG targets. As an epistemic community operating with the agreed upon goal of
fostering development, donors have embedded themselves within the policy-making processes
in aid-dependent Africa.
Beyond just direct government-donor negotiations over policy preferences, bilateral and
multilateral donors also reinforce their influence through global agendas and within civil
societies at the local level. Ownership facilitates this process by pointing to “insufficient
integration of global programs and initiatives into partner countries’ broader development
agendas” as one of the reasons for ownership (OECD 2011). Both countries have incorporated
the numerous global health initiatives into their health sector strategies. The top four most
influential are Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis; Global Alliance for
Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI); President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR);
and the World Bank Multi-County AIDS Programme (MAP). These large funding sources shift
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the priorities of health workers from other health concerns to target these globally recognized
diseases (Ravindran 2014). The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) also inform the health
development strategies in Kenya and Burkina. As I have indicated previously, both countries
use MDGs as one of the major guidelines for determining success in their health sectors.
In being considered partners, which implies shared responsibility, donors participate in a
number of policy decisions in both countries. The health sector policies and strategies in
Burkina Faso and Kenya are demonstrative of the partnership that characterizes the
government-donor relationship during the policy-making process. Both governments, however,
look differently at the ways in which donors go about exercising their partnership. In Kenya,
government officials I interviewed suggested that they only support what the government wants.
Burkinabe policy makers described their role as an accompagnement (to accompany). While the
Kenyan government officials held fast to the notion that donors merely support the government
through technical and financial assistance, Kenyan civil society organizations operating in the
health sector thought differently. Respondents I interviewed from the different civil society
organizations stated that health policy was a donor-driven sector, especially with respect to
HIV/AIDS. According to respondents, donors drove the health sector proportionate to the
financing they contributed. One director noted, “If a donor says they’re closing shop today, you’d
see a real crisis in Kenya and a real crisis in any African country. Because I think, in terms of
donor-dependency, it’s not just a Kenyan thing, it’s across [Africa].”118 This is not unlike the
statement that the employee in the local association in Burkina Faso made regarding the loss of
funding to health associations: loss of donor funding is nothing to laugh about.119
When the call for ownership was formalized at the OECD, so too was the accompanying
framework for delivering the long-term, holistic, development approach integral to demonstrating
a country’s ownership. The World Bank, and not the individual countries, was responsible for
118
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designing the skeletal structure for all of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and
corresponding Medium-term plans and SWAPs. The Bank’s role in designing these instruments
translated into their responsibility for approving the first generation of PRSPs. Prior to either
country being able to access the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) funds, the World Bank
and IMF had to approve both Burkina Faso and Kenya’s development strategies. This fact never
figured into any of the rationales for why and how donors influence development in the
respective countries. In a conversation with a World Bank official in Nairobi, the Bank official
brought up the question of ownership very early on in the interview. I later asked whether he
thought that there could be genuine “ownership” if the World Bank and IMF had to approve the
plans? He quickly retorted, “No, they don’t have to be approved.” I followed up by saying
“originally,” to which he gave a rapid, “yeah, originally, but now they don’t.”120 The emphasis was
on how theses institutions no longer “impose” their beliefs. I continued to push, “right, because
[countries] are now able to do it by themselves.” Exasperated, he responded, “They simply
share. Yeah, they do it through a consultative process; it is a requirement, which they have to
do. So [countries] go and do it themselves in a consultative process and then share with us. We
don’t endorse or whatever.”121 This level of influence rarely factors into considering the degree to
which donors influence development in either country. Respondents focused more on the
observable forms of influence like funding.
Financially, donors have considerable influence in the given health sectors. This is part
and parcel with their role as capacity builders and ownership enforcers. However, finance as a
form of influence is becoming less salient in Kenya. In Kenya, 38 percent of the development
budget came from external development partners in 2014/2015. This is 19% less than donor
commitments to the development budget during the 2013/2014 fiscal year (National Treasury
Development Estimates 2014). Health expenditures saw declines as well. Donor contributed
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close to 26 percent of the total health expenditure in 2012/2013, down from 35 percent in
2009/2010 (Kenya National Health Accounts). With respect to reproductive health, which
houses family planning, donor contributions also fell from 22 percent in 2009/2010 to 18 percent
in 2013 (ibid). These estimates do not include the considerable amount of funds that donors
allocated to development projects through NGOs and civil society organizations.
Donor ability and desire to circumvent government and directly target community level
associations speaks to another element of influence donors wield over development strategies
and outcomes. One of the more persistent problems that representatives of governments in
Burkina Faso and Kenya brought up in interviews I conducted was the issue of donors
reallocating funding to NGO and civil society projects. This was the case especially in the health
sector where there are ample numbers of NGOs willing to deliver health services like
contraception and medications. Both governments expressed discontent with this process. One
policy maker in the Burkinabe Ministry of Health recounted, “Les PTF, ils vont directement au
niveau communautaire même. Ils sont entraine d’aller ver la bas parce qu’il y a, on a trop
politique, quoi. Ca va dire on parle plus qu’on réagisse. Au niveau communautaire, quand on va
directement, c’est l’action même. Donc eux [les PTF] préfèrent aller directement [au niveau
communautaire]. Ils sautent plus des étapes" (The [donors] go directly to the community level.
They are going there because there is, we are too political. That means we talk more than we
react. At the community level, when one goes directly, it is the action itself. So [donors] prefer to
go directly [to the community]. They skip more stages).122 But as the policymaker noted, “Ca
aussi ce n’est pas une très bonne chose, parce que nous [le gouvernement], on a un plan qui
est la, qu’il faut [le] suivre" (That’s also not a very good thing, because we [the government]
have a plan that is there, we must follow [it]).123 In Kenya, government officials expressed the
same frustrations, “Most of [USAID] funding doesn’t run through the budget. Most of the, almost
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all of it, is kind of off budget. So they work through third parties.”124 One of the respondents at
USAID acquiesced that, “It’s hard for governments to tell donors how to spend their money.”125
These accounts of donors, especially USAID, circumventing government control and
instead interacting directly with the communities and NGOs demonstrates the multiple axes of
intervention that donors have within development. As noted in chapters two and three, every
civil society organization in this study stated that they either could not function without donor
funding or would have a very difficult time doing so. If donors are circumventing government to
carry out different development projects, what does that mean for the governments’ abilities to
lead and direct all development stakeholders?
Through international commitments, designing government strategies, and funding local
NGOs donors are influencing health policies in these two aid-dependent African countries.
Despite influence at these various levels, the dominant narrative remains that donors do not
influence health policies, which means that they cannot be held accountable if health policies
produce undesirable outcomes. Responding to the question, “who is held responsible when
health policies do not produce the desired outcomes?” the resounding answer across both
countries and with multiple stakeholders was the government, not governments and donors. My
interviews revealed how development stakeholders in Burkina Faso and Kenya view the
respective governments as responsible for policy outcomes and not donors; this view is not
inconsistent with the hegemonic language of ownership since country ownership purports to put
governments in control of development, and not donors.

The underdeveloped subject
Gustavo Esteva aptly explains, that “for those who make up two-thirds of the world’s
population, to think of development—of any kind of development—requires first the perception
of themselves as underdeveloped, with the whole burden of connotations that this carries”
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(Sachs 1997, 3). Chapters two and three illustrate the ways in which the ownership paradigm
reproduces Burkinabè and Kenyan stakeholders’ perceptions of self as underdeveloped, but
through different means. Consistently attributing failed policies to development stakeholders in
both countries reinforces the notion that their development problems are internal to their
respective countries and not a consequence of historical and structural inequalities. In
accordance with the dominant rationale for Africa’s underdevelopment, the new culprit is its
institutions (Grovogui 2001). Neither country can development due to their cultural institutions,
as is the case with the family planning, or state-level institutions that are not conducive to good
governance. Burkinabè development stakeholders also referred to themselves and Burkina
Faso as being underdeveloped. Often times, this was in the context of not having enough
resources to meet their development objectives. Coincidentally, this frame of thinking justified
donor presence in Burkina Faso. Viewing themselves as underdeveloped and in need of donor
help in order to develop played was manifest in Burkina Faso’s family planning policies and the
implementation of these policies at the community level. In Kenya, ownership reproduced the
underdeveloped subject through a continual rejection of the Kenyan government as a legitimate
partner in development.
In Burkina Faso, the paradigm constructs the Burkinabè man and woman who abstains
from family planning methods deemed legitimate under the neoliberal model of development as
underdeveloped. As I demonstrated, local associations in Tenkodogo receive funding from the
Programme d’Appui au Développement Sanitaire (PADS) to carry out a range of health-related
activities aimed at implementing the national and sector-wide strategies for the health sector.
Along with the Burkinabè government, donors such as the World Bank, GAVI Vaccination, and
the UN Development Programme (UNDP) fund and list specific health objectives that the local
associations are to carryout in their local communities. One of the dominant objectives is to
sensibilize (or teach with the intention of changing behavior) men and women about the benefits
and necessity of family planning methods like modern contraception and the spacing of births.
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The act of sensibilizing itself refers to the changing of an individual or community’s behavior
through the delivery of relevant and evidence-based information. Act in a manner that does not
conform to the behavior-modifying information indicates backwards thinking and a “traditional”
mindset. By interviewing respondents from these health associations, I was able to see how the
health workers employed these modernizing and underdevelopment discourses to persuade
men and women in Tenkodogo to adopt this rendering of family planning. Not divorced from the
international discourses around family planning in Africa, the health workers intimated that
women and men who refused to use modern contraception and space out their births were
keeping the country from meeting the MDGs or putting an undue burden on the population. As I
demonstrated in chapter 2, by demarcating the line between what is women’s empowerment
and what is not, these family planning policies under the ownership paradigm dis-empower
women, making them view family structures that do not conform to the nuclear model as
backward and traditional.
Underdevelopment in Kenya, at the state-level, happens through a different process.
The Kenyan government attempts to mobilize the development discourse and adopt the
associated practices as demonstrative of their equal status with donors and commitment to
development. Fredrick Cooper explains,
While development ideology was originally supposed to sustain empire, not facilitate the
transfer of power, the discourse still provided ‘something trade union and political
leaders in Africa could engage with, appropriate, and turn back’. Much as one can read
the universalism of development discourse as a form of European particularism imposed
abroad, it could also be read…as a rejection of the fundamental premises of colonial
rule, a firm assertion of people of all races to participate in global politics and lay claim to
a globally defined standard of living (1997, 84).
Even before the advent of the ownership paradigm, Kenya was appropriating the language and
practice of hegemonic development. As I mentioned previously, Kenya was the first African
country to accept structural adjustment packages from the World Bank and IMF. It was also the
first African country to adopt a family planning program that promoted women using some form
of contraception, at a time when other African leaders were skeptical of the Malthusian logic
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embedded in the push for population control policies (Obadina 2014). The Kenyan government
has also long been open to a market approach to development, again, even when its neighbors
were experimenting with economic socialism as a model for development (Okereke and
Agupusi 2015). Consequently, it is not surprising that the Kenyan government has taken up the
ownership paradigm as its own.
Chapter three lays out the ways in which the government officials who participated in my
study had fully adopted the practices, using the appropriate development tools such as SWAps,
MTEFs, and PRSPs to address the country’s development problems and consulting civil society
and other non-state stakeholders regarding development policy options, and establishing an aid
effectiveness secretariat, for example. The government respondents also appropriated the
ownership discourse and demonstrate that it has mastered the development lexis, referring to
donors only as their partners, invoking the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action (AAA)
as illustrative of a shift in donor-government power dynamics. Prior to the elaborating its first
PRSP, the government even used these same principles of long-term development strategies
for poverty reduction with broad stakeholder participation to produce its National Poverty
Eradication Plan (NPEP). However, the World Bank and IMF did not consider NPEP a
legitimate poverty reduction strategy (Hamner et al. 2003). And despite the government’s
numerous attempts to demonstrate its commitment to the ownership paradigm, donors
operating in Kenya do not trust the Kenyan government, and suggest that the Kenyan
government lacks ownership (Weeks et al. 2002; United States Government 2014). Donors’
inability to trust the Kenyan government (and at times civil society) was a dominant trope that I
found during my fieldwork in Kenya. Much of the donor distrust is rooted in the GoK failing to
implement agreed-upon development policies and programs.
Refusing to implement agree-upon programs and policies, is an example of the GoK
exercising some agency with respect to the country’s development (Whitfield 2009). However,
such actions on the part of government are not deemed legitimate under the ownership
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paradigm. For example, the putative definition of ownership only accounts for government’s
implementing and taking responsibility for development (OECD 2005). Thus to not implement
policies or take responsibility for them, the GoK cannot “own” development according to these
discursive restraints. Nevertheless, in the face of the Kenyan government attempting to show
that it has mastered the required development lexis, adopted the modes of sanctioned
communication with the Development Partnership Forums, and met the other requirements for
genuine partnership with donors, the donor community continues to engage the government in a
paternalistic relationship. Donors I interviewed consistently lamented the constant monitoring
and pursuit of implementation that they felt was necessary vis-a-vis the GoK. And, because the
paradigm constructs donors as the development experts, to not implement their recommended
policies, again suggests that the GoK is acting in bad faith and rendering Kenya perpetually
underdeveloped.
When Kenyan and Burkinabè development stakeholders choose actions that do not
conform to the principles, science, or solutions that donors deem to be valid and contributing to
development, the current development paradigm reproduces the stakeholder as
underdeveloped. The examples of family planning in Burkina Faso and policy implementation
(or governance) in Kenya illustrate the ways in which the ownership paradigm constructs the
underdeveloped African subject through a constraining of choice. Acting in their capacity as
“development experts” and working towards measurable indicators of aid’s effectiveness,
donors present African stakeholders with, what seems to be, their only options for development.
In turn, the paradigm attempts to keep African stakeholders dependent on western knowledge
for indications of progress. It is, however, an attempt. Although one of the implicit goals of the
ownership paradigm is to de-politicize development, remnants of the political are trapped in the
different country renderings of ownership.
Footsteps versus Revolution: Politics Matter
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In Kenya, government and civil society-based stakeholders produce a rendering of
ownership that is informed by the World Bank and OECD’s definition, or the hegemonic
definition of ownership. For these actors, ownership refers to the state and community’s ability
to control its development trajectory vis-à-vis donors. The notions of ownership in Burkina Faso
vary drastically from the OECD and Bank’s definition, and consequently from the Kenyan
rendering. Burkinabé stakeholders view l’appropriation de developpement as a particular level
of consciousness regarding the individual’s role vis-à-vis the community in bringing about
development. Much of the difference between these two conceptualizations comes from the way
in which the countries initially engaged the neoliberal paradigm. As a critical juncture, the initial
introduction of SAPs in Burkina Faso and Kenya marked a critical moment for reifying the
ontological possibilities for development in both countries. The legacies of this crucial juncture
do not bear out at the level of path dependent policies in both countries (Thelen 1999; Pierson
1993), but at the ideational level.
In both Burkina Faso and Kenya, the executive institutions left lasting legacies with
respect to stakeholder engagement with development. Notably, Kenya was the first African
country to receive a structural adjustment loan in the 1980s. Then-President Daniel Arap Moi
was considerably open to the economic changes that the World Bank and IMF required as
conditions for the stabilization package that the country required during its second economic
recession. The generally welcoming disposition towards donors was characteristic of the Moi
regime. Although he ruled with a tight grasp around the political processes in the country, Moi’s
economic and development policies were commensurate with the neoliberal development
framework coming from the IFIs (Smith 2008; Maathai 2008). His nyayo (footsteps)
development proposed an incremental approach to progress. As Kenyans suffered from cuts to
the social sectors, nyayo development sought to elicit a consensus of patience from the
population waiting to reap the benefits of these policies (Moi 1986). While Moi was in Kenya
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pushing nyayo, for a brief period, Thomas Sankara was attempting to revolutionize Burkina
Faso in a direction opposite that of structural adjustments.126
Thomas Sankara's development model borrowed heavily from the ideologies of
socialism and Marxism. Ultimately, this led Sankara to promote a national identity based on selfreliance and social solidarity and with it, an anti-charity sentiment across the social and political
sectors (Sankara 1985; Martin 1987). This is not to suggest that the country was not receiving
external aid during this period. However, aid from international donors only targeted projects
(Harsch 2013; Wilkins 1989). This very targeted aid was a consequence of both Sankara's
development philosophies and dominant donor opposition to these same philosophies. For
example, once France, the U.S., the World Bank, and other major international donors at the
time became aware of Sankara's anti-charity, anti-debt, anti-structural adjustments, and antineo-imperialist politics, these donors became anti-Thomas Sankara. Consequently, France and
the World Bank ceased offering budgetary support to the Burkinabè government during
Sankara's tenure (Gabas, Faure, and Sindzingre 1997) . Where donors did remain present, the
Sankara government created a consultation table that required donors to sit down and work with
the Burkinabè government around this new model of development (Harsch 2013; Zagré 1994).
A staunch anti-neoliberal, Sankara refused to accept the neoliberal structural
adjustment packages that the World Bank and IMF were demanding of other in-debted nations
throughout the 1980s. In the context of my own fieldwork, while having a conversation with an
older Burkinabè man about the recent political uprisings of the early 2000s, as with most
political conversations in Burkina, he began to talk about his time in the military under Sankara.
More specifically, he recounted how opposed Sankara was to structural adjustment policies.
126

During the mid- to late- 1980s, Burkina Faso gave rise to what some have called the last African revolutionary, Thomas Sankara.
In order to understand local renderings of ownership in Burkina, one must take centrally into consideration the politics and legacy of
Thomas Sankara. Sanakara came to power in 1983 by overthrowing a military government with the help of the military and civilians.
Although he was also a military official, he centrally included civilians within the ranks of the National Council for the Revolution
(CNR) government (Harsh 2013). While in power and after his assassination in 1987, Sankara's approach to development
constitutes an alternative to the current neoliberal model of development prevailing in Burkina. As a consequence, so too does the
notion of ownership of development that lingers from the Sankara era.
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The man recalled that during one of his speeches to the military, Sankara told the soldiers never
to accept the structural adjustment packages that the World Bank and IMF were imposing
across the rest of the continent. Sankara told the soldiers that accepting SAPS would be akin to
selling out your family so that only a few members could eat. Instead, he advocated for a
collective tightening of belts. Everyone, he proposed, should “tighten their belts” until the period
of economic hardship had passed because once the country accepts the SAPs, it can never pull
out. As we spoke, the old man went on to lament how Burkina sits today exactly where Sankara
predicted it would. As soon as former president Blaise Compaore took office after Sankara's
death, one of the first things he did was implement World Bank and IMF structural adjustment
policy reforms. 127
In unpacking the narrative that the older gentleman gave, one dominant theme of
Sankara's development approach is evident: the country must develop using the resources at its
disposal. In asking that Burkinabè make-do with the resources that the country had available,
Sankara was imposing a different type of adjustment program, distinct from the type that spread
hardship across all groups (Savadogo and Wetta 1991). In relying primarily on domestic
resources, the government was still able to spend more on the health and the social sectors
than in previous years (Harsch 2013). Although the country was experiencing challenging
economic conditions during this time period, the Sankara government was still able to make
noticeable changes in the public health sector. By 1986, the government built 7,460 primary
health posts (almost one per village) throughout the country (Harsch 2014). Public health
spending also increased by 27% between 1983 and 1987 (Savadago and Wetta 1992, 60).
Furthermore, 2.5 million children received vaccinations (Smith 2015). During this same period,
Moi was implementing structural adjustments in the health sector that led to increased infant
mortality rates, a decline in doctor-to-population ratios, and an increase in overall poverty rates
(Muga, Kizito, Mbayah, and Gakuruh 2005; Rono 2002).
127

This participant observation is based on a conversation that I had on July 7, 2015 around 8:30 pm in Koudougou.
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Sankara's self-reliance model, in the economic sense, meant that the national
economy would operate based on domestic interests. The needs of subsistence farmers and
rural communities would take precedence over exports that served international interests (Zagré
1994). The government departed from a top-down approach in allocating resources and
focused instead on the needs of people and institutions at the grassroots level. To this end, the
government relied on social mobilization and community self-help projects to promote
development. These community self-help projects were essential to maintaining the Sankara
model of development during periods of economic hardship (i.e., from 1983 to 1984, in
particular). Alternatively, Nyayo reinforced a notion of development that can only come from the
state; Kenyans could not obtain development without fierce loyalty to the state (J. H. Smith
2008).
Along with sharing hardship across the different groups, Sankara’s model of
adjustment also pushed Burkinabè to buy locally. In another conversation I had with a young
man not yet born during Sankara's time in office, a discussion of the history of imperialism in
Burkina was once again marked by invocation of the revolutionary spirit of Sankara. This young
man explained how Sankara once said that the African was so busy trying to fight the
imperialists but Africans should look down at their plates: imperialism was sitting on their plates
as they consumed rice and other imported foods from Western countries, despite producing
these same foods in their own countries.128 Stories such as these serve the dual purpose of
illustrating the impactful legacy that Sankara left in Burkina, as well as the alternative path of
development that Burkina was in the process of undertaking during his short time in office.
The different histories of commitment to neoliberal development largely inform the
disparate conceptualizations of ownership between Burkina Faso and Kenya. Kenya was
initially open to the types of reforms and development that came with structural adjustments in
the 1980s and 1990s. The Moi regime implemented an immense number of these economic
128

This participant observation comes from a conversation that took place on July 24, 2015 around noon in Tenkodogo.

133

policies, and even began allowing for symbolic multiparty elections in 1992 in response to
international pressure (J. H. Smith 2008; Brown 2001; Devarajan, Dollar, and Holmgren 2001).
In this way, the continuation of neoliberal policies under the guise of PRSPs is commensurate
with the history of policies coming from the Kenyan government. Ownership in Kenya will look
like “being in control of policies” with no inherent contradiction because the country has long
been oriented towards many of these market-driven policies. There are remnants of this thinking
in the African Socialism doctrine that Kenyatta proposed. Kenyans have, thus, had a long and
sustained engagement with the market-driven form of development.
The consequences of this relationship are evident in the stakeholder’s relationship with
ownership of development. Because the country has long been oriented toward a market
approach to development and has had an uninterrupted commitment to this particular rendering
of development, Kenyan stakeholders have adopted perspectives of ownership that conform to
market-based description of their respective roles. Representatives from the Kenyan
government overwhelmingly defined ownership in terms of the government taking the lead in
drafting development plans with donor support. Alternatively, civil society representatives who I
interviewed defined the ownership as the process whereby all members of society are included
in the development planning process. The ownership paradigm, which remains grounded in
neoliberal development discourse, clearly defines the state’s role as “taking the lead” in drafting
and implementing development policies through a partnership with donors, while civil society
exists in the capacity of consultation and watch-dogs for government implementation
(Declaration 2012; World Bank 2000).
Sankara's model of development called for a type of ownership from the various facets
of Burkinabè society that is ontologically different from the version of ownership that donors
have created and continue to proffer today. Ownership under this alternate model meant
individual sacrifice for collective progress along with a deep-rooted understanding of the
individual's position and responsibilities within the collective for furthering development. The
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sacrifice pertained to the need to thrive with the resources that the country had available and to
forgo the Faustian-type bargain that came with the development that the West was promoting
through SAPs and foreign aid. Although its application is difficult in the context of the current aid
paradigm, the spirit of Sankara's “ownership” remains embedded in Burkinabè notions of
ownership today. However, civil society members and government officials in the Burkinabè
health sector have bought into the dominant philosophy of development, and thus feel that
donors are necessary for achieving this end because, as many respondents noted, Burkina is a
poor country with no resources. Thus, there is no more imagining an alternative that aligns with
what the country has to offer, but rather an unyielding view of Burkina and Burkinabè as lagging
in development and struggling to catch up.
Although Burkina Faso eventually implemented very similar neoliberal development
policies as Kenya after Sankara’s death in 1987, the revolutionary ideas of development and
self-reliance continue to tacitly inform the Burkinabè rendering of ownership. Burkinabè
stakeholders conceptualize ownership as the individual acting with the greater community’s
interest in mind. Alternatively, the Kenyan and donor definitions of ownership are embedded in
the technical language of neoliberal development, where the state takes responsibility for
development policies and consults civil society and donors throughout the development
process. These two disparate conceptualizations of ownership remain rooted in their particular
political histories. Consequently, they illustrate how in a seemingly a-political and universal
development paradigm, politics continue to permeate development. In turn, the lasting legacy of
Sankara in Burkina alludes to the potential to rupture the current development paradigm,
replacing it with a more just and equitable alternative.

Conclusion
Claims regarding the end of the Washington Consensus and a paradigmatic approach to
development in Africa are untenable. The principles of ownership, donor-partnership, evidence-
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driven development, and long-term development strategies are just some of the indicators of the
reigning set of assumptions about political, economic, and social progress. Burkina Faso and
Kenya have both adopted these assumptions and the corresponding discourses and practices
into their domestic frameworks for development. Consequently, both countries also manifest the
same outcomes: donors as a community of development experts who, despite their
considerable authority over development-policy options, remain impervious to criticism and
accountability for failed policies. Under the ownership paradigm, Kenya and Burkina Faso also
remain underdeveloped subjects. At the community level, I provide the example of family
planning policies and techniques coming directly from the donors and the Burkinabè
government, which constructs the men and women who do not employ donor-legitimized family
planning methods as traditional and blames them for stalling development. In Kenya, I
demonstrate how underdevelopment manifests at the state level, where despite exhibiting
commitment to the discourses and practices of the ownership paradigm, donors continue to
regard the Kenyan government as untrustworthy and lacking ownership. Thus, the nature of the
Kenyan government-donor relationship is more characteristic of paternalism than partnership.
Politics, however, are still relevant in both contexts. Allowing stakeholders from both
countries to define what ownership of development means to them highlighted not only the
different ways in which stakeholders in both countries conceptualized ownership, but also how
those conceptualizations are informed by the particular political histories of each country, more
specifically the political climates that characterized each country during the initial moment of
structural adjustments in Africa. Irrespective of these different understandings of ownership, the
dominant language still permeates and influences state and civil society engagement with
development in a way that is consistent across both Burkina Faso and Kenya. However, the
lingering ideas informing the Burkinabè version of ownership suggest the potential for escaping
the ownership paradigm in Africa, and as Franz Fanon stated, setting afoot a new humanity
(Fanon 1961).
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Conclusion: Go Back and Get It
“Let us not look back at what has happened in the past; let us look forward” –Former World
Bank President, James Wolfensohn to African leaders in Addis Ababa (2005, 95)
“Se wo were fi na wosankofa a yenkyi," ("It is not wrong to go back for that which you have
forgotten”)—Sankofa Proverb

A cursory reading of the previous chapters leaves one with little hope in the ownership
paradigm’s potential to deliver genuinely African solutions for Africa’s development problems.
The paradigm is, however, useful in constructing African problems that will require Western
solutions. Despite the formal measures and language of ownership suggesting a relativistic
approach to development, in both the Kenya and Burkina Faso cases, subscribing to the
ownership paradigm results in the same outcomes with respect to each country’s relationship to
the current development paradigm. In both countries the language and application of the
OECD’s version of development produces donors as an epistemic community along with the
indispensable donor and the corresponding underdeveloped subject, which leads to donor
impunity with respect to policy failures. By way of conclusion, I will explore the following
questions: What are the consequences of Africa owning development? Is there an alternative;
and how does the aid-dependent African state make steps towards this end? In answering
these questions, I will embed a brief review of the findings from chapters two, three, and four.
Ownership is not context-specific; it represents another universal development model.
There is a cocktail of global development initiatives from MDGs to SDGs, ICPD, and other
international development markers embedded in the paradigm. African governments are
implored to adopt these as development ends. It is, then, difficult to see how development in
African can be based truly on local contexts.129 More importantly, the means and the ends are
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The demographics and demand for family planning differs significantly between these two cases. In Burkina, not only is there low
prevalence of family planning usage, but the low prevalence coalesces around the limited desire for family planning across the
Burkinabe population. On the contrary, Kenya has a longer history of engagement with family planning policies, and has seen
dramatic increases in the indicators around population control. Despite the difference in contexts, both countries are engaged in the
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not country-specific. Burkina Faso and Kenya use PRSPs, SWAps, MTEFs, and other donorsanctioned frameworks to achieve development, which is understood as poverty reduction in
both countries. Ownership has produced the same outcomes in both countries. Donors working
in Kenya and Burkina have taken on the formal role of knowledge experts. As knowledge
experts, donors constitute an epistemic community of development experts. They are formally
institutionalized in both countries through practices like donor-working groups and Aid
Effectiveness Secretariats, and in rhetoric as development partners. From their institutionalized
positions as development experts, donors actively work to change state and civil society
interests using their consensual knowledge. The consensual knowledge is embedded in donors
advocating the use of PRSPs, in donor-driven development tools, and in donors working to build
country capacity. It is also evident in their influence over development policies under the guise
of evidence-based and measurable development. The epistemic community of donors in both
countries is maintained through development being in perpetual crisis. There is either impending
economic, environmental, or social crisis that validates the need for donor expertise in both
countries.
Although donors have considerable influence in the domestic affairs of Kenya and
Burkina Faso, their function as knowledge experts absolves them of any responsibility for future
or past development failures in Africa. At the same time, it guarantees them an indispensable
role in the domestic affairs of both countries. In both countries I asked civil society, government,
and donor representatives who is held responsible when policies do not achieve their stated
objectives? Nearly every respondent named the government. And by adopting the ownership
principles, Kenyan and Burkinabè stakeholders (especially government) assume responsibility
for development. Even if the formal language of the Paris Declaration suggests that there be
mutual accountability across stakeholders, on the ground this is not the case. This discrepancy

same type of aggressive population control policies that suggest an impending population crisis that will reverse or stall efforts at
sustainable development.
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is a function of donors being cast as merely contributing expertise and capacity support. In this
light, it is difficult for African stakeholders to hold donors accountable for what seems like the
government’s failed development policies and initiatives.
In turn, the current development paradigm ultimately reproduces the underdeveloped
subject in Africa. Burkinabè development stakeholders view themselves as underdeveloped,
requiring financial and epistemic aid from donors to achieve development. Development, of
course, is understood in the terms expressed under global development agendas like the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Underdevelopment in Burkina is not just a matter of
material-lacking; it is a reinforced mindset (Sachs 1997). Family planning policies and
implementation in Burkina provide an example of how the ownership paradigm facilitates the
reproduction of the underdeveloped subject in Burkina, and further points to internal factors,
(such as a woman’s choice to have more than three children) as stifling development. In Kenya,
I demonstrate how the underdevelopment takes place at the state level. Donors refuse to
recognize the Kenyan government as a veritable development partner even though the Kenyan
government demonstrates a full command of the development lexis from the underlying
economic doctrines to the use of ownership discourses. Demonstration of this ability should
come with the ability for the government to reject implementation of agreed-upon policies.
Instead, donors view the GoK defaulting on policy implementation as a lack of commitment to
development, an indication that donors must continue to monitor the government. The
relationship between donors and the GoK becomes one of paternalism, not partnership.
Where there is variation under the ownership paradigm is at the level of semantics.
Stakeholders across and within both countries define ownership according to their respective
countries’ histories with critical moments in development. While Burkinabè stakeholders
maintain a relatively cohesive view of ownership (as i.e. each individual understanding their
responsibility within and to the community in the name of collective progress) Kenyan
stakeholders defined ownership relative to their defined roles under the conventional
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development paradigm. The Kenyan government viewed ownership as government being in the
driver’s seat but accepting help from donors. Kenyan civil society representatives defined
ownership as being involved in every stage of the policy process, from formulation to
implementation. Each version of ownership harkens back to the countries’ development
commitments at the time that the World Bank and IMF were introducing SAPs in Africa. The
stickiness of these ideas and the politics that they represent suggest that politics still matter in
Africa. As the current development paradigm seeks to make notions of progress seem a-political
and objective, these lasting interpretations suggest that the paradigm has not reached
hegemonic status.

What is There to Own?
As I demonstrate throughout this dissertation, the problems with ownership are rooted in
the problems with the promises of development ipso facto. The ownership paradigm does not
pretend to rupture the scientific coloniality that has long been the adhesive binding colonialism
and development in Africa (W. D. Mignolo 2009; W. Mignolo 2002; Gyekye and Wiredu 1992).
The shift of accountability is especially pernicious with respect to reproductive policies, in that
the burden of “development” falls on the African woman instead of states or private sector
actors for addressing the unequal distribution of resources needed to improve women’s
capacities.
The ownership paradigm raises the stakes of development in Africa. With African
governments and societies accepting full responsibility for the range of development policies
that the countries are implementing, should these countries continue to see limited progress fifty
years from now, there may be further justification for the types of neo-trusteeships that some
scholars have proposed for Africa.130 And, according to some, that critical moment may not take

In the 1990s with the “so-called” collapse of various African states, there was a small community of scholars who advocated for
the formal recolonization of Africa in the interest of protecting Africans (see Mazrui 1994; Pfaff 1995). The increased control of
130
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another fifty years to arrive. In a recent study, Ian Taylor argues that the continent is headed for
another economic crisis because the continent remains trapped in a “resource corner” that
precludes the possibility of industrialization across the continent (2016). Those who praise the
continent’s recent economic growth, laud the amelioration in policies, institutions, and
governance as responsible for the continent’s success. Taylor, however, argues that the
economic growth is predicated on a faulty reliance on GDP. In unpacking this indicator, it
becomes clear that the international companies responsible for extracting natural resources
from the continent have contributed to the ostensible increase in GDP. He furthermore argues
that the boom in natural resource prices due to the emerging economies’ growing
industrialization has aided in Africa’s economic growth. With the continued reliance on raw
material exports and importing finished products, the continent will not be able to industrialize
and thus will remain in the same structurally disadvantaged place as it did when Africa was the
“hopeless continent”.
The constant referencing of Africa in terms of a crisis, be it real or imagined, further
perpetuates the racist discourse that underlies the call for good governance and neededinterventions into the domestic and regional affairs on the continent (Anievas 2015). Siba
Grovogui aptly explains the West being coded in pop culture and scholarship as possessing
“cultural adaptability, political competency, and ethical versatility” while Africa, in these same
spheres, represents “internal dysfunction” (Grovogui 2001, 427). The internal dysfunction
impedes political, social, and most importantly economic development because of static cultural
institutions that are not conducive to “good governance”. The development impasse in Africa
becomes primordial in nature. For African governments to own development they have been
and will continue to remain responsible for underdevelopment in their countries.

African states by external forces eventually took on more palatable names like, proxy governance, neotrusteeship, and sharedsovereignty, see (Lemay-Hébert 2015).
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An accurate reading of contemporary Africa is incomplete without accounting for the
legacies of colonialism and remnants of the colonial system embedded in the development
industry. By incorporating the history of colonialism and its lingering power structures within
donor relations in Africa, the notion of “ownership” as emancipatory and paradigm-shifting
seems almost a cruel joke. By contrast, “ownership” as another scheme that guards Africa as
underdeveloped, in crisis, and in need of donor assistance in perpetuity makes more sense.
Moving Beyond Ownership
When the former World Bank President, James Wolfensohn, addressed a room filled
with African leaders in Addis Ababa in 1998, imploring them not to look back, but look only to
the future, he captured the underlying spirit of development. The language and practice of
development in Africa involve active attempts to a-historicize the centuries of exploitation and
extortion that the continent has undergone (Rodney 1974; Keita 2011). To truly consent to
development at this juncture is to not look back, when in fact, African states and societies
should adhere to Ghanaian proverb of Sankofa and “go back and get it”. “It” refers to a more
profound sense of social and political change that coalesces with Africa’s realities. “It” refers to
the demand that African leaders and societies once placed on the West to acknowledge its role
in underdeveloping and exploiting Africa.131 The act of “going back” highlights the continuities
across donor-driven development paradigms. African governments “going back” may also
demonstrate how the population development and the associated family planning methods
remain rooted in the racist and misogynistic logic of Malthusian political economy. The act of
“going back” also prevents donors and the international community from acting as the sole
arbiters of history.
Currently, the ownership paradigm and its call for government accountability and
commitment to development strategies and goals based on donor priorities does not permit
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Lagos Plan of Action is a development strategy that African leaders drafted and adopted in the 1980s that identified Cold War
politics, colonialism, and the global economic architecture as responsible for impeding Africa’s development (Organization of African
Unity 1985).
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African states and societies to go back. Bringing the history of exploitation to bear on the
ownership paradigm causes it to collapse, as the paradigm cannot reconcile this reality under its
current ontological frame. This act of bringing the past to bear on current development
paradigms has considerable import for understanding and grappling with donor characterization
of African states as predatory and ineffective. To truly reconcile with the past means that donors
must acknowledge the ways in which predatory African states are a legacy of colonialism
(Young 1994; Mamdani 1996; Lange 2004; Migdal 1988). It means tackling the reality of the
African state, as Makau Mutua argues, “At its dawn, the African postcolonial state was handed a
virtually impossible task: Assimilate the norms of the liberal tradition overnight within the
structures of the colonial state while at the same time building a nation from disparate groups in
a hostile international political economy” (2008, 28). Understanding the African state within this
historical lens forecloses attempts to characterize the political corruption and weak states in
Africa as reflective of an innate disposition that Africans cannot escape. This rendering of the
African state also forces the former colonizers, who are now donors, to struggle with the beast
that they have created, but not from the position of savior, instead, from a humble position of
atonement.
There have been numerous calls for Africa to move beyond the imperial project that is
development towards a model that truly comes from the ground up (Cheru 2009; Mkandawire
and Soludo 1999; Mutua 2008). The solution that I propose is moving beyond development in
Africa. This does not mean that factors such as health, education, and decent housing should
no longer be important attributes in African societies. However, what constitutes being healthy,
having a good education, and decent housing should not be the product of another culture being
in a hegemonic position to determine these things and subsequently rank the world accordingly.
When African governments and societies are engaged in the process of defining their
political, economic, and social trajectories, there is no need for external actors to measure the
level of country ownership. In fact, in instances when African countries have embarked on this

143

journey, historically, the West has intervened, as the outcomes of genuine African ownership
often conflict with Western interests.132 Thomas Sankara’s revolution is but one of many
examples. Collectively, Burkina worked towards achieving a standard of progress based on the
cultural, economic, and political resources that it had available under Sankara’s revolution. The
Sankara administration encouraged Burkinabè to consume the locally produced agriculture in
lieu of imported foods from Europe. The administration required civil servants to wear locally
made traditional garb to work instead of suits and ties (Harsch 2014; Sankara 1985). Requiring
Burkinabè to consume locally was not solely a matter of economic doctrine. It was a step
towards mental decolonization.
Both colonization and development must be practiced in accordance with a particular
value system, namely one that reveres that which comes from the West and deplores that which
is local. Overturning this fundamental understanding was at the heart of Sankara’s
development. In an interview regarding his administration’s progress after the first year in
offices, he acknowledged that there was a persistent neocolonial spirit in Burkina Faso: “The
most important thing for us, however, is not what is lacking. Most important is the effort we have
made to change people’s attitudes” (Sankara 2007, n.p.). As Sankara and the Burkinabè were
defining progress through a prism that corresponded with the Burkinabè realities, the outcome
threatened Western powers, and ended with Sankara’s assassination (Harsch 2014). The
Burkinabè revolution highlights the obvious futility of a concept or paradigm like ownership when
Africans are truly engaged in defining their own development.
The Burkinabè revolution also illustrates how Africans are not passive consumers of
modernity, which development implicitly assumes and attempts to reproduce. Values like
gender-equality, health, family planning, and fiscal austerity are not intrinsically western values.

132

One notable example of African ownership being truncated is Patrice Lumumba in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Belgium and the U.S. did not approve of Lumumba’s seemingly socialist policies and his unwillingness to allow the Kitanga region of
the Congo to exist independently. Shortly after Lumumba took office, Belgium and the U.S. colluded to have Lumumba assassinated
and put Sese Seko Mobutu in power. Mobutu would go on to serve Western interests during his 30 years in power and to exploit the
Congolese people simultaneously (Witte 2001; Gerard and Kuklick 2015).
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For example, in the aftermath of failed structural adjustments in Africa, a group of African
economists proposed the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes
for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP)(United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa 1990). The authors note that transforming economic and social structures
is generally couched in modernizing language that pits Africa’s social and economic trajectory
against those of the West. This language, then, is not in accordance with African values and
realities. Thus, the authors advocate a new “African transformation ethic” that incorporates
these realities and values. African consumption, especially in urban areas, is part of the social
and economic transformation that has to happen—
The present consumption patterns, especially those of the urban areas, are distorted, as
they are often a derivative of the value systems of the developed countries. The outward
orientation of consumption has inevitably resulted in a dependence on the products of
the developed countries, while undermining the development of internally-produceable
goods (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 1990, 12).
The transformation requires changes in production, where what needs to be produced should
be reassessed. Africa should stop relying on raw material exports as a means of development.
This is not to say that African countries should not trade these goods, but should look more
towards trading with other African countries and producing based on these needs. This call for
internal trade and looking within Africa is reminiscent of Kwame Nkrumah’s call for panAfricanism (Nkrumah 1968). Although both AAF-SAP and Nkrumah still employ modernizing
language in their frameworks for Africa, they are also attempting to produce a modernity
particular to Africa. Thus, breaking away from ownership and development does not entail
Africans forgoing certain material aspirations that development has co-opted (Ferguson 2006). It
does entail a decolonization of the values and the scientific capitalism that motivates their being
sought after.
Donors reify the need for development ownership in Africa through an epistemic and
financial dependency. This form of epistemic and financial dependency is not new. To quote
Hountondji:
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Thus it was natural that the annexation of the Third World, its integration in the
worldwide capitalist system through trade and colonization, also comprises a ‘scientific’
window, that the draining of material riches goes hand in hand with intellectual and
scientific exploitation… (Hountondji 1992, 242).
There is indeed a scientific exploitation evident in the ownership paradigm and neoliberal
development, writ-large. Donors propagate the ownership paradigm and the associated tools
and measures as objective and scientifically guaranteed to produced results if implemented
properly. However, tools like SWAps, PRSPs, and even the measure of poverty that come from
the World Bank have been criticized for having little empirical basis (Owa 2015; Wade 2004; Hill
2002; Lazarus 2008). Thus, ownership hinging on the consensual knowledge that the epistemic
community of donors wields over African governments and civil societies is a crucial starting
point for breaking down and delegitimizing the paradigm itself. Because colonial power is
situated in the episteme, any alternative necessitates a mental decolonization (Mignolo 2002).
African thinkers have posited what this process looks like in practice.133
Moving beyond ownership means moving beyond the language, practice, and promises
of development for Africa. Addressing the social needs specific to each African country cannot
happen under a universal approach that gives ex ante prescriptions for progress. Solutions for
more equitable, just, and humane conditions may mean the dissolution of the state or a
strengthening of state capacity. Economic progress may require the abolition of private property
rights or stronger mechanisms for their enforcement. Women’s empowerment may mean
allowing women to have more than three children, but ensuring that she is not ashamed of her
decision to do so. A post-ownership, and subsequently postdevelopment, Africa does mean
uncertainty, but the uncertainty that captured the continent in immediate post-independence
years. Uncertainty means endless possibilities, not crisis.

African writers and activists have also called for Africans to “know thy self”. N’gugi Wa Th’iongo (1994) illustrates the ways in
which language and literature in Africa must undergo a de-linking with European values, in that African writers should write in their
mother-tongues. Wangari Maathai also explores the need to escape the cultural nihilism that comes with education in Africa being a
question of how well one excels in European language and history (Maathai 1995; Harper-Shipman, forthcoming).
133
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